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ABSTRACT

Attempts at specifying the basic assumptions underlying
accounting span a period of over fifty years.

Despite these efforts

no generally accepted list of accounting assumptions is available.
One reason for this is a lack of understanding of the nature and
function of basic assumptions in deductive theories.
Accordingly, the objectives of this study are (1) to des
cribe the nature and function of basic assumptions in a theory or
discipline by a detailed analysis of the techniques of theory con
struction; (2) to demonstrate that the above is applicable to
accounting by constructing an outline of a theory of financial
accounting measurement; and (3) to demonstrate the wide applicability
of theory construction techniques in accounting by applying these
techniques to a diverse sample of accounting topics.

This study,

conducted in light of current thought in the philosophy of science,
led to the following conclusions.
Basic assumptions are necessary in a discipline in order to
avoid either an infinite series of assumptions or circular reasoning.
Normally, reduction is employed to determine basic assumptions.
Because the real world is too complex to totally describe, basic
assumptions contain idealizations.

Idealizations are descriptions

of real world determinative factors under distortion-free conditions.
Though they do lead to accurate predictions, idealizations are not
xvii

xviii
literal descriptions of the real world because many insignificant
distorting factors are ignored.
Five conceptually different types of basic assumptions were
identified, without which a discipline cannot be fully developed.
These are objectives, internal axioms, bridge axioms, internal
postulates, and bridge postulates.

Objectives indicate goals.

Postulates are assumptions originating within a discipline.

Axioms

are assumptions borrowed from other disciplines.
Internal assumptions (axioms or postulates) contain dispo
sitional concepts (nonobservable characteristics of observable
things) and theoretical concepts (nonobservable characteristics of
nonobservable things).

Because internal assumptions involve non

observables, neither they nor any theorems derived from them are
directly verifiable.

Bridge assumptions are needed to connect the

nonobservable aspects of these assumptions to observable phenomena
that can be measured and tested.
Various methods of obtaining general acceptance for a set
of basic assumptions were considered.
the empirical testing of theorems.

All were rejected except

But because positive empirical

confirmations are not logically valid, they cannot be considered
proofs.

Rather, they serve to gather evidence increasing one's

confidence in the underlying basic assumptions.
In accordance with objectives (2) and (3), the techniques
of theory construction were then shown applicable to accounting
theory construction.

This was done first by identifying several

xix
key assumptions in a theory of financial accounting measurement,
illustrating the use of idealizations and the five types of basic
assumptions.

Then, in order to show the broad applicability of

theory construction techniques to accounting theory construction,
several examples, chosen from the broad spectrum of accounting,
were evaluated in light of the earlier analysis of basic
assumptions.
Conclusions drawn from this evaluation indicated that the
nature and function of basic assumptions have not been fully under
stood in accounting theory construction.

For example, the absence

of bridge assumptions has made some theories incapable of application
in the real world.
The discipline of accounting consists of all generally
accepted accounting theories.

Because the accounting discipline is

so broad, it is highly unlikely for any one study to be able to
identify all the objectives, axioms, and postulates of accounting.
Future research should proceed on a theory by theory basis.

The

Financial Accounting Standards Board should concentrate on iden
tifying the major assumptions underlying its theories.

These

theories can later be refined and fully formalized by other
accounting researchers.

This way a gradual but open-ended list of

the accounting basic assumptions will evolve.

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Nature of the Problem

Any survey of accounting literature over the past fifty
years reveals the great inner struggle within the profession in its
attempt to develop an acceptable list of basic assumptions.
Accounting literature is replete with attempts by both well-known
and lesser-known authors.

Despite these efforts, no generally

accepted list of basic assumptions is available.
In addition, the literature has not fully explored the
nature of basic assumptions and theory construction.

In only a few

cases has a framework been advanced by those authors who have dis
cussed assumptions which underlie accounting.

With more and more

emphasis being placed today on empirical research in accounting,
understanding the nature of basic assumptions in accounting theory
construction is vital.

Until well-formed accounting theories are

constructed, their empirical testing has a questionable basis.

A

brief look at the volume and trend of the research on the basic
assumptions of accounting indicates the importance with which this
research is viewed.

Historical Development of the Basic Assumptions of Accounting
The volume of research directed at basic assumptions has
1

2
been increasing.

The American Institute of Certified Public

Accountants (AICPA) reorganized its research effort in 1957 to
center on developing a sound accounting theory structure.

Research on the Basic Assumptions of Accounting
A study done by Kiyomitsu Arai cited at least fourteen
attempts by significant accounting authors to specify the basic
accounting assumptions.

These fourteen, in chronological order,

were as follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)

1922 Paton. W. A. Postulates . . . .
1939 Gilman, S. Basic conventions . . . .
1940 Paton, W. A. and Littleton, A. C. Basic
concepts . . . .
May, G. 0. Postulates . . . .
1952 Study Group on Bsuiness Income, American Institute
of Accountants. Postulates . . . .
1953 Blough, C. G. Assumptions . . . .
1957 Committee on Accounting Concepts and Standards,
American Accounting Association. Underlying Concepts . . . .
1960 Arthur Andersen and Company (Spacek, L.).
Postulates . . . .
1961 Moonitz, M. Postulates . . . .
1962 Bedford, N. M. Postulates . . . .
1963 Prince, T. R. Postulates . . . .
1964 A Study Group at the University of Illinois.
Postulates . . . .
1965 Grady, P. Basic concepts . . . .
1965 Pattillo, G. [sic] W. Accounting Standard . . . .1

To this list might be added the work of other accounting researchers,
including D R Scott, Paul Kircher, Yuji Ijiri, Richard Mattessich,
the AICPA1s Accounting Principles Board, and lesser-known authors

^Kiyomitsu Arai, "Accounting Postulates: Their Historical
Development and Conceptual Classification," University of Florida
Accounting Series No. 6 : Theory Formulationsj ed. Willard E. Stone
(Gainesville, Florida: Accounting Department, College of Business
Administration, University of Florida, 1970), pp. 1-4.

such as Givens, Newman and Mellman, and Arai.

The great majority

of this research effort took place from 1960 to 1970.

Reorganization of the AICPA's Research Effort
In the United States 1957 marked the beginning of a new era
in research by practicing accountants.

It was the year in which the

AICPA reorganized its research effort.

Prior to this the American

Accounting Association (AAA) and the AICPA, two major professional
accounting bodies in the United States involved in accounting theory
research, had followed two entirely different paths.

Earlier Research by the AICPA
Previous research efforts of the AICPA had grown out of the
now-famous correspondence which took place in the early 1930's
between representatives of the New York Stock Exchange and a com
mittee of the Institute.

One result of this discussion was the

recognition that the Institute needed a standing body to study
accounting principles.

A committee, appointed for this purpose, was

subsequently reorganized in 1938—1939, and a research department was
established.^

This committee was destined to issue fifty-one

research bulletins during its existence from 1938 to 1959.
Reed K. Story, in his book The Search for Accounting
Principles, sums up the approach followed hy the Institute during

2Alvin R. Jennings, "Present-Day Challenges in Financial
Reporting," The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 105 (January, 1958),
p . 3Q.

4
this period:
. . . the Institute adopted what has been apropriately
called the "piecemeal" approach to accounting principles. This
approach was primarily practical; the objective was to give
immediate help to the practicing accountant faced with a problem.
Lengthy discussion of an over-all set of principles would merely
delay the service the committee on accounting procedure could
provide in reducing controversies, and there was considerable
doubt that a comprehensive program could be carried to a
successful conclusion. The committee therefore decided to
consider specific topics as the need arose and, if possible, to
recommend one or more alternative treatments as definitely
superior to other recognized procedures.^

Research by the American Accounting Association (AAA)
The AAA followed a more conceptual approach in its research
program.

Emphasis was placed on strengthening the over-all framework

upon which accounting practice rested, and formulating and gaining
acceptance for a logical and consistent set of accounting principles.
These principles could serve as standards toward which accounting
practice could be raised.^
Despite the approach differences of the AICPA and the AAA,
their ultimate conclusions were quite

similar,^

because the AAA

and the AICPA's concept of accounting was similar.

Storey discussed

these similarities:
Three basic similarities in the programs of the two
associations stand out: (1) the two societies had exactly the
same objective, i.e., the improvement of financial accounting
and reporting practice by reducing the number of acceptable
alternative procedures, (2) both saw financial accounting as

^Reed K. Storey, The Search for Accounting Principles (New
York: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1964),
p. 43.
^Ibid., pp. 41-42.

^Ibid., p. 43.

5
essentially a process of cost and revenue allocation rather
than as a process of asset and liability valuation, and
(3) both looked upon accounting principles as being derived
from accounting practice.6
But accounting had changed considerably in twenty-five years.

In

1957, Alvin R. Jennings, then president of the AICPA, felt that the
research approach of the Institute should also change.

The New Approach by the AICPA
Jennings felt that the approach to research which had devel
oped permitted little opportunity for testing and experimenting with
new ideas.

In fact, it actually might stifle creative thinking.

Therefore, he proposed a new approach to research by the AICPA wherein
accounting principles development would be regarded as pure research
similar to that conducted in the field of medicine.

He suggested a

research organization be established distinct from the Institute
itself.

This organization's function would be to examine and

re-examine the basic assumptions of accounting and to develop author
itative statements to aid both industry and the accounting pro
fession. ?
The Special Committee on Research Program was set up in
December, 1957, to study and report to the Institute on the new
approach to research suggested by Jennings.
later the committee stated:

In their report a year

The broad problem of financial accounting

should be visualized as requiring attention at four levels:

first,

postulates; second, principles; third, rules or other guides for the

fi

°Ibid., p. 41.

7

'Jennings, op. cit., pp. 31-32.

application of principles in specific situations; and fourth,
research.
In addition the committee recommended setting up the
Accounting Principles Board (APB).

The APB was to be the only group

within the accounting profession to issue authoritative statements on
what constituted generally accepted accounting principles.

Statements

or opinions of the APB were ordinarily to be based on accounting
research studies conducted by an accounting research staff.9

In

addition to other recommendations concerning the APB, the committee
determined the immediate research priorities.

The committee's

report read:
Immediate projects of the accounting research staff
should be a study of the basic postulates underlying accounting
principles generally, and a study of the broad principles of
accounting. The results of these, as adopted by the Board,
should serve as a foundation for the entire body of future
pronouncements on accounting matters, to which each new release
should be related.-*-^ [Italics not in the original.]
The priorities established, first on postulates and then on
principles, represented a new research approach by the AICPA.

This

approach was intended to result in a logical and consistent structure
of accounting theory.

Early Research Under the New Approach
The first priority for accounting research was met in
September, 1961, when Accounting Research Study No. 1 , "The Basic

^"Report to Council of the Special Committee on Research
Programs," The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 106 (December, 1958),
p. 63.
^Ibid., pp. 63-65.

^Ibid., p. 64.

Postulates of Accounting," was published.

In April, 1962, the second

priority was met with the completion of Accounting Research Study
No. 3, "A Tentative Set of Broad Accounting Principles for Business
Enterprises."

Both studies received mixed reactions.

approach was normative rather than merely descriptive.

The authors'
However, they

seem to have been significantly influenced by the profession's current
thinking on accounting theory.

Their research was perhaps not as much

in the area of pure research and creative thinking as Jennings had
visualized. Also these studies would have resulted in accounting prac
tice experimentation to an extent unacceptable at that time.

This

point was firmly established by the Accounting Principles Baord when
it stated:

"The Board believes, however, that while these studies

are a valuable contribution to accounting thinking, they are too
radically different from present generally accepted accounting prin
ciples for acceptance at this time."-^

However, the Board did not

reject future acceptance of some or all recommendations of the two
research studies should they prove more acceptable at a later date.
The Board apparently felt it could not make pronouncements mandatory
which were not generally accepted within the accounting profession.

Significance of the Rejection of ARS Nos. 1 and 3
This rejection of the recommendations was significant.

In

doing so the Board was rejecting the studies intended to serve as the

11

Accounting Principles Board Comments on 'Broad Prin
ciples,'" The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 113 (May, 1962), p. 10.
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foundation for all future APB pronouncements.

Without an agreed-upon

foundation of postulates and principles upon which to base their pro
nouncements, the APB ran the risk of reverting back to its prede
cessor's piecemeal approach.

This was what happened.

Trueblood stated, the Board went:

"...

As Robert

from one extreme to the

other— from an almost exclusive preoccupation with the theoretical to
a fixation on details of practice.

In so doing, the Board became more

a continuation of its predecessor committee than the sharp new instru
ment it had planned to be."-^
lar view:

Arthur Andersen & Co. expressed a simi

"Both groups [the APB and the Committee on Accounting

Procedures] have been involved primarily in what has been referred to
as 'putting out fires,' rather than taking a coordinated and planned
approach to the problem in total.
In evaluating the work of the APB, Mautz and Gray have
observed that in only about half of the cases in which APB opinions
have appeared did research studies precede APB opinions.^
tion, Mautz and Gray state:

In addi

"But our conclusion must be that the

Board has acted contrary to research recommendations as often as it

■^Robert M. Trueblood, "Ten Years of the APB: One
Practitioner's Appraisal," The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 129
(January, 1970), p. 62.
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Harvey E. Kapnick, Jr., Chairman, Arthur Andersen &
Co., Letter (November 16, 1970) to Marshall Armstrong, President,
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Before the
Study Group on Establishment of Accounting Principles (Chicago:
Arthur Andersen & Co., October 15, 1971), p. 40.
l^Robert K. Mautz and J. Gray, "Some Thoughts on Research
Needs in Accounting," The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 130
(September, 1970), p. 54.

has moved to implement research r e s u l t s . T h e s e shortcomings can
all be related, at least in part, to the lack of a generally accepted
foundation of basic assumptions upon which the APB and its research
staff could build.
The mere passage of time has not appreciably increased the
acceptability of ARS No. 1 and No. 3 ’s recommendations as the Board
may have hoped.

As late as March, 1970, Gustafson could report

acceptance in only a few areas, noteably installment sales, prior
period earnings, the financing method of handling leases, and the
interest method of bond premium and discount amortization.^
Although acceptance in those areas may indicate a trend eventually
resulting in acceptance of all recommendations of the studies, such
a statement is in question perhaps at this time.
The need for a foundation is still quite evident to the APB.
This can be seen from their recent attempt at describing accounting
assumptions and principles in Statement of the Accounting Principles
Board No. 4 , "Basic Concepts and Accounting Principles Underlying
Financial Statements of Business Enterprises" issued in October,
1970.

This report, like previous attempts at specifying the assump

tions, has been criticized.

Undoubtedly, one of the strongest crit

icisms of APB Statement No. 4 came from Arthur Andersen & Co. that
stated:

"Statement No. 4 issued by the APB in 1970 provides no real

15Ibid., p. 55.
■^George A. Gustafson, "Status of Accounting Research Study
Nos. 1 and 3," The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 129 (March, 1970),
p. 60.
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guidelines for progress . . . .
The era of research started with the creation of the APB is
ending.

This year, 1973, the APB will be replaced by the Financial

Accounting Standards Board (FASB).

The FASB will be composed of

seven full time members, only four of whom need be CPAs.

It will be

totally independent of the AICPA.
If the FASB should fail, the alternative may be governmental
control of accounting.

At this critical time in accounting history,

an analysis is needed on why accounting assumption studies such as
Moonitz's Accounting Research
have

Study No. 1and APB Statement

not given accounting its long sought after foundation.

No. 4,
In

particular, research is needed on what is the nature and function of
a discipline's basic assumptions and how are basic assumptions used
in theory construction.

This study hopes to contribute to this

research.

Limitations of
There are a number of

Previous Research Efforts
reasons why these previous attempts

have not yielded a set of generally accepted accounting assumptions.
These relate to a misconception of the nature and function of assump
tions and a failure to provide a framework for accounting theory
into which the assumptions would fit.

-^Arthur Andersen & Co., Before the Study Group on Establish
ment of Accounting Principles (Chicago: Arthur Andersen & Co.,
October 15, 1971), p. 40.
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Concepts, Not Basic Assumptions
There seems to be common agreement that assumptions are the
basic components of a theory.

However, when a representative list

is examined a mixture of stated assumptions, unstated assumptions,
and theorems is frequently found.

Such lists do touch on very impor

tant accounting concepts, but they are not complete lists of the
basic assumptions of accounting.

This is a direct result of failing

to recognize the nature of basic assumptions in theory construction.

Confusion Over the Function of Assumptions
Since the report of the Special Committee on Research Program
there seems to be confusion over the function of basic assumptions.
Its report described postulates (or assumptions) as follows:

"Pos

tulates are few in number and are the basic assumptions on which
principles rest."^

Moonitz^^ and other researchers have accepted

this description, apparently without questioning its reliability.
This seemingly minor criticism becomes major when one recognizes that
the special committee did not intend to give any definition of pos
tulates at all.

Mautz, a member of the special committee, stated:

. . . The Committee’s assignment was of another sort—
to devise a research program, not to define terms. It had no
real intention of defining postulates and gave very little
attention to these sentences. I can remember no specific

1R

Report to Council of the Special Committee on Research
Program," op. cit., p. 63.
^Maurice Moonitz, "The Basic Postulates of Accounting,"
Accounting Research Study No. 1 (New York: American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, 1961), p. 2.
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discussion of this "definition" in any of the committee's
meetings.^0
As a consequence of adopting such a definition, Moonitz and
others have attempted to derive accounting assumptions without under
standing their nature and function.

This misunderstanding has led the

APB to deny that accounting principles are derived from accounting
assumptions.

The APB stated:

"They [the principles] have developed

on the basis of experience, reason, and custom; they become generally
accepted by agreement (often tacit agreement) and are not formally
derived from a set of postulates.

Accounting principles undoubt

edly do develop from accounting practice, and accounting principles
must relate to accounting practice.

However, underlying these prin

ciples are some assumptions regarding the concepts with which the
practitioner deals.

These assumptions are the basic assumptions of

accounting.

Earlier Attempts Too Broad
A third criticism of many basic assumption studies is that
they represent overambitious attempts at theory construction.

It is

highly unlikely for any one research effort to be able to study and
develop a complete list of basic assumptions for the whole of

^Robert K. Mautz, "Place of Postulates in Accounting,"
Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 119 (January, 1965), p. 46.
O 1

Basic Concepts and Accounting Principles Underlying
Financial Statements of Business Enterprises," Statement of the
Accounting Principles Board Mo. 4 (New York: American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants, 1970), p. 12.

The
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accounting.

The best that can be done in any single study is to

take only a small segment of accounting and determine either prescriptively or descriptively the basic assumptions underlying that specific
segment.

Need for a Theory Structure
Previous research attempts have not yielded a set of gen
erally accepted basic accounting assumptions because a proper frame(3

work for accounting theories has not been provided.

The deductive

approach described in this study provides such a framework.
In summary, several reasons are cited why accounting lacks
a generally accepted foundation of basic assumptions.

Theseinclude

a confusion over the nature and function of basic assumptions, overambitious attempts at theory construction, and the lack of a theory
structure.

All three of these reasons reflect a lack of under

standing or application of the techniques of theory construction.
Accounting researchers must understand and apply the techniques of
theory construction to develop well-constructed and testable
accounting theories.

Objectives of the Study
The objectives of this study are as follows:
(1)

To describe the nature and function of basic assump
tions in a theory or discipline by a detailed analysis
of the techniques of theory construction;

(2)

To demonstrate that the above is applicable to
accounting by constructing an outline of a theory of
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financial accounting measurement; and
(3)

To demonstrate the wide applicability of theory con
struction techniques in accounting by applying these
techniques to a diverse sample of accounting topics.

This study hopes to contribute to accounting an understanding
of the nature of basic assumptions in deductive theories.

This anal

ysis, conducted in light of current thought in the philosophy of
science and social sciences, has important implications for accounting
theory construction.

Recent studies of accounting's basic assumptions

have only superficially analyzed this area.

In addition, through

the demonstration of the use of basic assumptions in theory con
struction, their wide applicability to accounting theory construction
is shown.

Research Methodology
In this study library research, deductive logic, and
reduction were relied upon exclusively.

Extensive library research

was employed in studying the techniques of theory construction. The
research results are presented in Chapters 2 and 3 which discuss the
nature of basic assumptions and theorems in a deductive theory.
Library research was employed in a detailed study of measurement
theory.

Chapters 4 and 5 contain the outline of a theory of finan

cial accounting measurement to illustrate the techniques of theory
construction.

To construct a theory of measurement in financial

accounting, one must be knowledgeable of both measurement theory and
theory construction.

Library research was again undertaken in

searching out other financial accounting examples in which the
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techniques of theory construction were directly applicable.

These

areas are discussed in Chapter 6.

Research Sources
In studying theory construction, measurement, and other
areas in the theory structure of financial accounting, researchers
draw upon literature from many sources.

Accounting literature,

itself, contains the work of noted authors as Moonitz, Chambers,
Sterling, and Mattessich.

These and other authors have attempted

to analyze and synthesize knowledge from a variety of sources and
apply it to accounting.

The Opinions of the Accounting Principles

Board can also be studied.

These opinions represent continuing

efforts at accounting theory construction.
Researchers can also examine literature in the field of the
philosophy of science.

Areas contained in the philosophy of science

that are particularly relevant to this study include the general
composition of the deductive approach, the nature of basic assump
tions and other techniques of theory construction, and the rules of
deductive logic.
Closely related to the above is the study of the deductive
approach found in the sciences and social sciences.

Because the

deductive approach has been used with great success in these areas,
this study selects the deductive approach as best suited for devel
oping a general theory of financial accounting.
Measurement theory can also be studied, first as a separate
discipline, and then as applied to other disciplines in the sciences
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and social sciences.

Knowledge gained in this study can then be

applied in constructing the outline of a theory of financial
accounting measurement which applies the techniques of theory
construction to accounting.

Deduction and Reduction
This study employs both deductive and reductive methodologies.
Deductive inference proceeds as follows:
fore, B."

"If A, then B.

A, there

In logic such an argument is called "affirming the ante

cedent" or "modus ponena," and is logically valid.

Deductive

inference, inherent in the deductive approach, is the means by
which theorems are derived from basic assumptions.

Reductive

inference, on the other hand, proceeds as follows:

"If A, then B.

B, therefore A."

In logic such an inference is referred to as "the

fallacy of affirming the consequence."

Since logic, itself, is con

cerned only with universally valid statements,22 such an inference is
invalid.

However, in science the reductive methodology is encountered

quite frequently.

Any time an empirical hypothesis is tested and con

firmed, the argument presented is in the form of a reductive
inference.

Because of this it is often said that the confirmation

of an empirical hypothesis proves nothing.
testing may prove the hypothesis false.
hypothesis false would have the form:
fore not A."

It is possible that future

An argument proving a given
"If A, then B.

Not B, there

In logic such an argument is referred to as "denying

22j. m . Bochenski, The Methods of Contemporary Thought,
trans. Peter Caws (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company,
1965), p. 68.
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the consequence" or "modus tollens," and is logically valid.

Being

a logically valid argument, one could say that it proves a hypothesis
false.
However, saying that the confirmation of an empirical hypoth
esis proves nothings does not imply that such a confirmation is
useless.

Quite the contrary, each affirmative test of a hypothesis

serves as further evidence of its truth, and is very useful.
Some tests of a hypothesis, because of the manner in which they are
structured, provide more evidence than other tests.

Each affirmative

confirmation, although proving nothing, increases one's confidence
that a given hypothesis is true.
At first glance the deductive approach and the reductive
methodology may not seem compatible.

But this is not the case.

Reduction is frequently subdivided into what is called "inductive"
and "non-inductive" reduction.

This classification represents

only one possible subdivision of reduction.

Reduction can also be

subdivided into regressive and progressive reduction.
reduction proceeds as follows:

"If A, then B.

Recall that

B, therefore A."

In

regressive and progressive reduction the consequence, B, is known to
be true.

In regressive reduction an attempt is made to explain the

consequence in terms of an antecedent, A, whose truth value is
unknown.

Regressive reduction or explanation is accomplished by

constructing a deductive system in which the statements to be
explained, the consequences, are derived as theorems.
teleological explanation are permitted.
always precede progressive reduction.

Causal and

Regressive reduction must
In progressive reduction
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verification is added.

From statements obtained initially through

regressive reduction, an attempt is made within a deductive system
to derive new statements which may be empirically verified.
reduction is consistent with a deductive

Thus,

s y s t e m . 23

Definition of Key Terms
The purpose of this section is to give a brief definition of
some key terms used in this study.

Their meanings are made clearer

as the study proceeds.

Deductive Approach
The essence of a deductive or axiomatic approach is that
one group of statements, called theorems, is derived through the
use of deductive logic applied to another more fundamental set of
statements serving as basic assumptions.

As used in this study the

axiomatic approach is synonymous with the deductive approach.

The

term "axiomatic approach" places emphasis on axioms or basic
assumptions.
logic.

The term "deductive approach" emphasizes deductive

Examples in accounting where the deductive approach has

been utilized include Ijiri's The Foundations of Accounting
Measurement,^

Mattessich's Accounting and Analytical Methods,^5

and Moonitz's Accounting Research Study No. 1 , "The Basic Postulates

^^Ibid., pp. 92-95.
2^Yuji Ijiri, The Foundation of Accounting Measurement
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967).
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Richard Mattessich, Accounting and Analytical Methods
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1964).
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of Accounting.

Basic Assumptions
The term "basic assumption" is used in this study in the same
way as the term "postulate" has been used in accounting literature
over the past fifty years.

In this sense, basic assumptions represent

the foundation statements in a deductive system.

Postulates actually

represent only one group of basic assumptions underlying accounting.
Axioms and objectives, defined in Chapter 2, are two other types of
basic assumptions underlying accounting.

The term "basic assump

tions," or simply "assumptions," normally is used to refer collec
tively to the objectives, axioms, and postulates of accounting.

Concept
Concepts represent views or descriptions of some aspect of
the real world.
itself.

A concept of something is not the same as the thing

Concepts are by nature abstractions or surrogates.

abstractions they have no real existence.

As

The things described by

concepts may have a real or an assumed existence.

If the thing

described has an assumed existence, it cannot be directly perceived
by the senses, but must be indirectly perceived, for example,
accounting, revenue, or fairness.

^Maurice Moonitz, "The Basic Postulates of Accounting,"
Accounting Research Study No. 1 (New York: American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, 1961).
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Theory
A theory, defined as a set of logically related statements
including some law-like basic assumptions having testable implications,
is an explanation and description of some concept.

All theories are

deductive systems.
A deductive system is characterized by two outstanding fea
tures:

a set of basic assumptions and deductive logic.

In general,

every theory can be reformulated in a deductive framework where every
new statement in the theory is deductively derived from a set of basic
assumptions.
A theory may be constructed about some aspect of a discipline
such as revenue recognition, measurement, communication, ethics, or
the treatment of leases in financial statements.

Such theories may

be broad or narrow depending on the concept the theory purports to
describe, explain, and/or predict.
Furthermore, the boundaries of an entire discipline, such as
accounting, are delimited and the discipline is implicitly defined
by the assumptions of the theories that make up the discipline.

In

other words, the accounting discipline is made up of all the account
ing theories that are generally accepted within accounting.

Since

every theory can be formulated in a deductive framework, so too can
one conceptualize a general theory of the discipline.

A general

theory then consists of the basic assumptions of all the discipline’s
theories and the statements deductively derived from these basic
assumptions.
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Scope and Limitations of This Study
The techniques of theory construction presented in this
study are applicable to many areas of accounting theory construction.
The assumptions stated in the theory of financial accounting measure
ment represent only an outline of such a measurement theory.

Emphasis

is placed on demonstrating the use of the techniques of theory con
struction, specifically the use of idealizations and the different
types of basic assumptions.
not extensively developed.

Theorems (also called principles) are
Assumptions in many areas related to this

measurement theory, such as in mathematics, logic, communications,
and psychology, are omitted.
to pure competition.

The measurement theory itself is limited

Other conditions under which the theory applies

are pointed out as the theory is developed.
In the applications to selected accounting topics in Chapter 6
only specific aspects of each topic are discussed.

Where necessary,

an effort is made to supply unstated assumptions and to develop appro
priate theorems.

Also the use of idealizations and the different

types of basic assumptions is evaluated.

Preview to This Study
This study begins in Chapter 2 with an investigation of the
nature of basic assumptions in deductive theories.

Euclidean geom

etry, the classic presentation of a deductive system, is studied.
Also, contemporary views on theory construction in the sciences and
the social sciences are drawn on heavily.

Chapter 3 contains an

analysis of the entire structure of deductive theories drawing upon

these and other sources.
Chapter 4 begins a two-chapter sequence designed to illus
trate the use of theory construction techniques in one extended
example.

Measurement theory is studied.

This must precede any

actual attempt to construct a theory of financial accounting measure
ment.
In Chapter 5 a concept of financial accounting measurement
is described.

Then, regressive and progressive reduction are used

to derive some of the key basic assumptions in the theory of finan
cial accounting measurement previously described.

Only a broad

outline of the theory of financial accounting measurement is given.
Emphasis is placed on demonstrating the theory construction tech
niques in Chapters 2 and 3.
Chapter 6 applies the theory construction techniques pre
sented in this study to selected but diverse areas of accounting
research.

Applications in these areas, along with application in

the theory of financial accounting measurement presented in Chap
ters 4 and 5, demonstrate that the techniques of theory construction
used so successfully in the sciences and other social sciences are
directly applicable to acccounting.
The final chapter includes summary and concluding remarks.
Implications for future theory construction in accounting are given.

Chapter 2

THE NATURE OF BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

This chapter begins a two-chapter analysis of the techniques
of theory construction.

The objective of these two chapters is to

describe the nature and function of basic assumptions in a theory or
discipline.

This is accomplished by a detailed analysis of the tech

niques of theory construction conducted in light of current thought
in the philosophy of science.
Chapter 2 concentrates on the nature of basic assumptions.
First, the concept of basic assumptions as found in a deductive theory
is examined.

Then further insight on the nature of basic assumptions

is gained when the Aristotelian and Euclidean concept of basic
assumptions are investigated.

Finally the problem of obtaining gen

eral acceptance for a set of basic assumptions is discussed.
The nature of basic assumptions cannot be fully explored
unless their relationship with the entire structure of a deductive
theory is explored.

Accordingly, Chapter 3 looks briefly at the

entire structure of a deductive theory.

Basic Assumptions
What is meant by basic assumptions?

Dictionary definitions

connote that basic assumptions are some fundamental, self-evident,
23
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basic, underlying propositions about a concept.^

Rather than simply

offering such a dictionary definition of the term "basic assump
tions," it might be more helpful to investigate the term from several
perspectives.

The result is a rather lengthy description of the term

"basic assumptions," but one essential to the purpose of this study.
Understanding the nature of basic assumptions is essential if one is
to employ basic assumptions in constructing accounting theories.

^•Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary of the English
Language Unabridged, (2nd ed.; New York: The World Publishing Company,
1962) offers the following definitions of "assumption" and the
synonyms "axiom" and "postulate" on pages 114, 132, and 1408, respec
tively:
assumption— "1.
2.
3.
4.

an assuming or being assumed
anything taken for granted; supposition
presumption
a postulate or proposition assumed. In logic, the
minor or second proposition in a categorical
syllogism."
(Definitions 5 and 6 are not relevant for this study
since they deal with assumption in the religious
sense.)

axiom— "1. a self-evident truth or a proposition whose truth is so
evident at first sight that no process of reasoning or
demonstration can make it plainer; as, the whole is greater
than a part.
2. an established principle in some art or science; a prin
ciple received without new proof.
3. a statement universally accepted as true; a maxim."
postulate (noun)— "1. a proposition or supposition assumed without
proof, or one that is considered as selfevident, or too plain to require illustration;
a proposition of which the truth is demanded
or assumed for the purpose of future rea
soning; a necessary assumption.
2. in mathematics, a self-evident problem,
answering to axiom, which is a self-evident
theorem.
3. a prerequisite.
4. a basic principle."
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In developing this description the relation of basic assump
tions to a discipline's underlying concept is explored first.

Second,

insight is gained on the nature and appearance of basic assumptions.
Third, several generally recognized characteristics or requirements
of basic assumptions are examined.

Referant of Basic Assumptions
It is impossible to discuss a discipline's basic assumptions
without also discussing the discipline's particular concept.

What Is a Concept of a Discipline?
A concept of a discipline is a description of that discipline,
including the conditions under which the description holds.

This

description may be presented narratively or in a set of basic assump
tions.

Normally, one begins with a narrative description of a dis

cipline or a specific portion of a discipline and then proceeds
reductively to determine the basic assumptions, including objectives,
that underlie that concept of the discipline.

The goal of this

reduction is to identify only the essential basic assumptions that
deductively yield the previously specified concept of the discipline.
Hendriksen describes the deductive process:
The starting point for any field of study is to set
forth its boundaries and determine its objectives. In the
field of accounting, the objectives can be considered part of
the postulates in the formal structure or they can be viewed
as a set of propositions above or at the same level as the
postulates. But it cannot be denied that some agreement on
objectives is necessary to determine what postulates are
relevant to accounting and to evaluate the principles and
rules based on the postulates in order to determine whether
or not they fulfill the requirements of the system. That is,
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the principles and rules should be logically derived from the
postulates and meet the test of squaring with the basic
objectives of accounting.2
Hendriksen uses the term "postulates" in this quote as this author
uses the term "basic assumptions."
The important point to note from Hendriksen1s statement is
not the location of the objectives, which is simply a matter of
choice, but that a determination of the objectives for accounting
precedes a determination of the other basic assumptions.

Further

more, the objectives are functionally different from the other basic
assumptions and represent a separate set of statements at or near
their level.

Does the Concept of a Discipline Change?
The concept of a discipline first must be determined before
the basic assumptions of that discipline can be determined.

However,

every discipline is constantly being exposed to new discoveries
within itself and from other disciplines.

Therefore, the concept of

a discipline is constantly changing, making a complete determination
of its basic assumptions an unattainable or a momentarily attainable
goal.
Only a slight change in the concept of a discipline may
necessitate changes in its basic assumptions.

This fact partially

explains why no two sets of basic assumptions identified in any two
accounting studies have been exactly the same.

Each of these studies,

^Eldon S. Hendriksen, Accounting Theory (Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965), p. 81.
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from Paton through APB Statement No. 4, was undertaken at a different
point in time.

Accounting as practiced today is different from

accounting as practiced in 1922, when Paton*s Accounting Theory-* was
published.

This change in the concept of accounting was not sudden.

Rather, it was a gradual, evolutionary change.

The author of each

study probably had a different concept of accounting in mind.
slightly different basic assumptions were obtained.

Therefore,

Unfortunately,

not all of these authors specified the concept of accounting they
studied.

Each of these authors may also have had a different concept

regarding the nature and function of basic assumptions.

These dif

ferences resulted in the specification of different basic assumptions.
Euclidean geometry sheds light on another possible reason why
no two accounting assumption studies have been alike.

The theorems

of Euclidean geometry have been derived from different basic assump
tions using different primitive terms by different mathematicians.

In

addition to Euclid, for example, Hilbert utilized twenty-one assump
tions and five primitive terms, andVeblen utilized twelve assumptions
and only two primitive terms.^
geometry.

All efforts yielded Euclidean

Likewise, it is possible that two accounting researchers,

starting with an identical concept of accounting and working
independently, could reductively derive different basic

William Andrew Paton, Accounting Theory (New York:
Ronald Press Company, 1922).

The

^Morris R. Cohen and Ernest Nagel, "The Nature of a Logical
or Mathematical System," Readings in the Philosophy of Science,
eds. Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck (New York: Appleton-CenturyCrofts, Inc., 1953), p. 140.
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assumptions underlying their concept of accounting.

The basic

assumptions may differ because the authors employed different
primitive terms, different levels of language^ and/or different
phraseology.

But the end product of these basic assumptions, a

given concept of accounting, would be the same.

Thus, one set of

assumptions should be logically derivable from the other set.

Appearance of Basic Assumptions
Both the accounting theorist Hendriksen and the economic
theorist Schumpeter have pointed out that basic assumptions may seem
trivial.

Hendriksen stated:

"The postulates are not necessarily

numerous or complicated, they may even seem trivial or obvious.
Schumpeter wrote:
. . . But we must not forget that the proudest
intellectual structures rest on trivalities that are entirely
uninteresting in themselves. What could be more trivial than
that a body at rest will remain at rest unless something (a
"force") acts to set it in motion (Newton’s First Law)? Let
us, then, look at the structure that was erected on those
trivialities.^
Einstein once said it is not the function of science to give
the taste of the soup; a description of the soup is enough.

A basic

assumption may contain concepts that are not exact descriptions of the
real world.

Science often employs such concepts.

Scientists find

5John W. Buckley, Paul Kircher, and Russell L. Mathews,
"Methodology in Accounting Theory," The Accounting Review, Vol. 43
(April, 1968), p. 279.
^Hendriksen, op. cit., p. 4.
^Joseph A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, edited
from a manuscript by Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1954), p. 911.
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such "idealized" concepts, although not strictly descriptive of
realtity, useful generalizations.

Examples of "idealized" concepts

include assumptions of "a rational man,"
"ideal gas," and "perfect competition."

"frictionless forces,"
Also, Einstein's use of

Riemannian non-Euclidean geometry in his theory of relativity assumes
that the universe has a constant curvature.

Today it is known that

the curvature is not constant.
Idealized concepts are not to be used loosely.
have very explicit definitions or descriptions.

Such terms

Their use often

allows scientists to simplify complicated phenomena.

Idealized

concepts aid theory construction by preventing theories from getting
bogged down in detailed attempts at describing reality.

Idealized

concepts are "true" descriptions of reality but under conditions in
which many possible unimportant distorting influences are ignored.
The essential points of the theories are emphasized, not the details
of unimportant aspects of the phenomena.

Total descriptions of

reality are doubtlessly impossible.
Concerning these "ideal" concepts, Nagel has- said:
In many sciences, relations of dependence between
phenomena are often stated with reference to so-called
"pure cases" or "ideal types" of the phenomena being
investigated. That is, such theoretical statements (or
"laws") formulate relations specified to hold under highly
"purified" conditions between highly "idealized" objects or
processes, none of which is actually encountered in experience.
In short, unrealistic theoretical statements serve
as a powerful means for analyzing, representing, and codifying
relations of dependence between actual phenomena.®

®Ernest Nagel, "Assumptions in Economic Theory," American
Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, May, 1963, pp. 215-216.
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In critically analyzing a theory, the view is often taken
that when all else fails, one can always criticize its basic assump
tions.

It is apparently felt that if these basic assumptions are at

variance with the real world then the basic assumptions are incorrect
and the theory is weak.

However, in many cases these basic assump

tions simply contain "idealized concepts" which, as shown above, are
quite common and indispensable in science.

In view of this situation,

a criticism of the basic assumptions of a theory is severely limited.
If the theory fails to adequately describe and explain or leads to
false predictions, then the basic assumptions may be legitimately
criticized.

If a theory utilizing "idealized concepts" accomplishes

what it sets out to do, then any criticism of the theory's "idealized
concepts" is a weak one.

Characteristics of Basic Assumptions
Several characteristics^ are generally required of statements
before they are accepted as basic assumptions.

A set of basic assump

tions should have a certain aesthetic quality, and should be consist
ent, independent, reproductive, and complete.

This refers to both a

single basic assumption and a set of basic assumptions.

Requirements

of a deductive system are discussed in the next chapter.

An Aesthetic Quality
A certain aesthetic quality is usually required of a single
basic assumption or a single set of basic assumptions.

Normally it

^Some or all of these requirements have been discussed by
several authors including Barker, Wilder, Eves and Newsom, and others.
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is desirable to state a basic assumption as simply as possible.
Euclid’s basic assumptions provide an example.

Euclid's fifth pos

tulate is longer and more involved than any of his other four pos
tulates.

Many attempts were made to show either that this fifth

postulate was derivable from his other four postulates or was
replaceable with a simpler postulate.

However, all attempts failed.

It is interesting to note, however, that this effort led to the dis
covery of non-Euclidean geometry.
It is also desired that a set of basic assumptions contain
the minimum number of basic assumptions necessary.
aesthetic requirements must be taken together.

Both these

A set of basic

assumptions could conceivably be stated in one rather long and
cumbersome statement.

But cumbersome statements are ruled out by

the requirement that individual basic assumptions be as simple as
possible.

Bochenski has pointed out that this aesthetic tendency is

sometimes taken to the point where a single, unclear statement is
employed rather than several perfectly clear statements.

Opera

tionally, determining the simpler of competing statements can be
difficult.

Application of a criterion would be helpful in selecting

the simpler statement.

But Hempel points out that although some

recent efforts have yielded interesting results, no satisfactory
criterion for judging simplicity is available.H

10J . M. Bochenski, The Methods of Contemporary Thought,
trans. Peter Caws (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company,
1965), p. 72.

11

Carl G. Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, InCi, 1966), p. 42.
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Consistency
A set of basic assumptions also must be consistent.

They

are said to be consistent if they do not contradict each other.
Consistency is a very important requirement.

Mathematical logic

has shown that every statement in a system is derivable from a
10

single contradiction. ^

Thus, if contradictory statements were

allowed in the assumptions of a theory, that theory could be used
to prove both a statement and a contradiction.

But, a statement and

its contradiction cannot both be true in any particular place at any
particular time.

Such a theory is useless.

Independence
A third requirement is that the basic assumptions be inde
pendent.

A basic assumption is independent if it cannot be derived

from the other basic assumptions of the system.
similar to the aesthetic requirements.

This requirement is

The absence of independence

of the basic assumptions will not destroy the system.

However, know

ing that the basic assumptions are independent allows one to differ
entiate between the basic assumptions of a discipline and the theorems
derived from those basic assumptions.

Reproductivity
Basic assumptions should be reproductive; they should logically
imply many theorems.

If a set of basic assumptions do not imply any

theorems, they are useless.

In such a case the assumptions convey

•^Bochenski, loc. cit.

very little information about a concept.
Completeness
Finally, it is desirable that no unstated basic assumptions
be used in deriving the theorems about a concept.

Euclid uninten

tionally employed assumptions not included among his axioms and
postulates.

Such a violation does not destroy a system, but does

make the system less than ideal.

Aristotelian and Euclidean Conception of Basic Assumptions
Earlier it was seen that objectives, though part of the set
of statements referred to as basic assumptions, represent a distinct
subset of statements.

In this section an attempt is made to further

subdivide the remaining statements in a set of basic assumptions.

Postulates and Axioms:

The Distinction

The term "postulate" is not new.
time of Aristotle, 384-321 B.C.

It has been used since the

Aristotle made an important dis

tinction between a postulate and an axiom.

Eves and Newson have

stated:
. . . We thus seem to have, according to Aristotle, the
following four distinctions between an axiom and a postulate.
An axiom is common to all sciences, whereas a postulate is
related to a particular science; an axiom is self-evident, whereas
a postulate is not; an axiom cannot be regarded as a subject for
demonstration, whereas a postulate is properly such a subject;
an axiom is assumed with the ready assent of the learner, whereas
a postulate is assumed without, perhaps, the assent of the
learner.

13Howard Eves and Carroll V. Newsom, An Introduction to the
Foundations and Fundamental Concepts of Mathematics (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1958), pp. 30-31.
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This distinction was not universal.

Since A r i s t o t l e , t h e terms

"postulate" and "axiom" have frequently been used interchangeably.
Copi has stated:

"The contemporary practice is to draw no such

distinction, but to regard all the unproved, initial propositions of
a deductive system as having the same standing, and to refer to themall, indifferently, as 'axioms’ or as 'postulates,' without attaching
any difference in meaning to these two t e r m s . D i s r e g a r d i n g contem
porary usage, an examination of the Aristotelian distinction between
postulates and axioms may yield an important insight concerning such
statements.

Euclid's Use of Postulates and Axioms
Euclid, whose use of postulates and axioms has been considered
the classic example, made use of the Aristotelian distinction.^
Euclid employed two groups of statements, one called "postulates" and
the other called "axioms" or "common notions."

These two groups of

statements are shown in Table 1 on the next page.
primarily were statements about geometry.

Euclid's postulates

His axioms or common

notions, concerned with magnitudes, were meant to apply to many
fields.
Barker further clarifies the distinction between postulates
and axioms which Euclid and others apparently had in mind.

Barker

14Ibid., p. 31.
l-*Irving M. Copi, Symbolic Logic (3rd ed.; New York:
Macmillan Company, 1967), p. 181.
■^Eves and Newsom, op. cit., p. 34.

The
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Table 1
Euclid's Postulates and Common Notions

Postulates
Let the following be postulated:
1. To draw a straight line from any point to any point.
2. To produce a finite straight line continuously in a straight
line.
3. To describe a circle with any centre and distance.
4. That all right angles are equal to one another.
5. That, if a straight line falling on two straight lines make
the interior angles on the same side less than two right
angles, the two straight lines, if produced indefinitely, meet
on that side on which are the angles less than the two right
angles.

Common Notions
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Things which
one another.
If equals be
If equals be
equal.
Things which
another.
The whole is

are equal to the same thing are also equal to
added to equals, the wholes are equal.
subtracted from equals, the remainders are
coincide with one another are equal to one
greater than the part.

Source:
Sir Thomas L. Heath, trans., "The Thirteen Books of Euclid's
Elements," Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 2 (Chicago:
William Benton, Publisher, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1952),
p. 2.
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states:
. . . The Greeks probably would have thought that there
was this difference between the axioms and the postulates as
regards their believability: that if a person were to doubt or
deny the postulates of geometry, he would of course be making a
mistake and he would thereby disqualify himself for thinking
about geometry; but he might nevertheless be able to think
soundly about other subjects (such as arithmetic, biology, or
music). Whereas, if a person were to doubt or deny the axioms
about magnitude [common notions], he would thereby show himself
unfit for thinking about practically every serious intellectual
subject; for all, or nearly all, subjects in one way or another
employ the notion of magnitude. '

Postulates and Axioms: Observations
on the Distinction
Reflecting on both the Aristotelian distinction between
axioms and postulates and Euclid's use of these two separate groups
of statements, several important observations can be made.

Knowledge Borrowed From Other Disciplines
Euclid could not have derived his propositions of geometry
without the aid of both his axioms and his postulates.

Any body of

knowledge concerned with magnitudes must employ Euclid's or some
other list of axioms of magnitude among its fundamental assumptions.
Accounting, for example, employs the concept of magnitude.

There

fore, it must include in its fundamental assumptions a list of axioms
of magnitude.

In addition, accounting is concerned with other areas:

for example, measurement, communications, economics, behavior, logic,
and ethics.

Accordingly, accounting must include axioms concerning

each of these areas among its fundamental assumptions.

These axioms,

■^Stephen F. Barker, Philosophy of Mathematics (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 20.
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like the axioms of magnitude, are shared with a great many other
disciplines.
That these groups of axioms, shared among other disciplines,
also form part of any complete list of the basic assumptions of
accounting is an important point.

Just as geometry could not be

fully developed without the axioms of magnitude, accounting cannot
be fully developed without axioms of magnitude, measurement, com
munications, economics, behavior, logic, ethics, and others.
Rudner has discussed a clue which helps in recognizing
when one discipline is assuming knowledge from another discipline.
This clue is the presence of nonindigenous terms in a theory.
Rudner states:
The importance of focusing attention on nonindigenous
terms in partially formalized theories rests in the fact that
their occurrence will usually indicate that some portion
(large or small) of the results of some other discipline
or area of knowledge is being presupposed in the theory. Thus,
for example, the occurrence of "temperature" in a presently
physiological theory would indicate that a portion of physics
was being systematically presupposed in the physiological
theory.16
To the extent that knowledge assumed from other disciplines escapes
explicit recognition in a listing of basic assumptions, that listing
is incomplete.

Knowledge Indigenous to a Discipline
In addition to the axioms of magnitude, to develop geometry
Euclid also needed postulates.

These postulates were thought to

■^Richard S. Rudner, Philosophy of Social Science (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), pp. 48-49.
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relate only to geometry.

Euclid’s postulates made geometry a

distinct body of knowledge, for example, distinct from physics.

With

out such a unique set of postulates nothing would distinguish one
body of knowledge from another.

Accounting, likewise, must employ

a group of fundamental statements unique to itself.

These fundamental

statements are essential if accounting or any other

discipline is to

exist as a separate body of knowledge.
In reality, however, it is easy to imagine Euclid's unique
postulates of geometry or accounting1s postulates employed in other
disciplines.

This situation occurs whenever one discipline utilizes

knowledge from another discipline.

However, this utilization does

not deny the separate existence of the other discipline.

The

uniqueness of that other discipline does not lie in the uses made of
its knowledge, but rather in the existence of the knowledge itself.
It is the unique postulates of a discipline that set it apart from
other disciplines as a separate and distinct body of knowledge.
In summary, when discussing the basic assumptions that
lie a body of knowledge, both axioms held in common

under

with other dis

ciplines and a discipline's own unique set of postulates must be
discussed.

Whether the terms "axioms" and "postulates" are used

interchangeably or not, two distinct sets of statements are inev
itably involved.

These two sets of statements are derived only after

another set of statements embodying the objectives of a discipline
have been specified.

Circular Reasoning
Another important observation on the Aristotelian and

Euclidean distinction between axioms and postulates can be made by
reflecting on their self-evidence, demonstrability, assentation, and
applicability.

Axioms were considered applicable to many fields.

Perhaps because of this widespread applicability they were regarded
as self-evident.

Hence axioms were readily assented to and needed

no demonstration.

On the other hand, postulates were considered

applicable to only one field.
regarded as self-evident.

Perhaps, because of this they were not

Therefore, postulates were not readily

assented to and were considered in need of demonstration.

The key

seems to be whether the particular statement was self-evident.
However, self-evidence apparently depends on universal acceptability,
which in turn depends on self-evidence.
This distinction between axioms and postulates appears to be
based either on circular reasoning or some other unspecified assump
tion.

There is no apparent reason why axioms and postulates cannot

both be considered self-evident.

Self-evidence of such statements

certainly appears, at first glance, to be desirable.

Therefore, the

following discussion ignores this distinction and treats both axioms
and postulates as candidates for self-evidence.

Reliability of this

self-evidence criterion for both axioms and postulates is examined.
In addition the susceptability of axioms and postulates to demon
stration is also considered.

Obtaining General Acceptance for
Axioms and Postulates
Before proceding to a discussion of how axioms and postulates
can obtain general acceptance, the need for such statements might be
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explained.

This is done by an analogy with language.

The Need for Axioms and Postulates
Axioms and postulates are needed because all knowledge must
be based ultimately on certain assumptions.

Without this, all know

ledge would involve either circular reasoning or an infinite series
of assumptions, each based on the assumption preceding it.
analogous situation also exists in language.

An

Certain terms in

language, whether natural language or artificial language, must remain
undefined.

To attempt to define these primitive terms would result in

the language either introducting an infinite series of terms or would
involve circular reasoning.
For example, assume that in studying a new language a reader
encountered the word "inscrutable" and was not sure of its meaning.
On looking this word up in the dictionary, he found only the word
"enigmatic," and was also uncertain of its meaning.

He then looked

that word up in the dictionary, found it defined as "puzzling," and
was uncertain of its meaning.
it defined as "mysterious."

So he looked up "puzzling" and found
With a new word introduced in each

definition this process could continue ad infinitum.
On the other hand, suppose on looking up the original word,
"inscrutable," he again found it defined by the word "enigmatic."

On

looking up the word "enigmatic," he discovered it defined by the word
"inscrutable."

If he does not know the meaning of either term, he is

caught in a hopeless dilemma.
circular reasoning.

This procedure is an example of

As long as the sequence of definitions leads
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back to the original word, circular reasoning occurs.

The only

solution is a listing of primitive or undefined terms.
The primitive terms of a language must be listed in advance
with no meaning assigned tothem.
terms.

They are then used to define other

These other terms, along with the primitives, are used to

define all the words of a language.
Just as the primitives must be used in a language, objectives,
axioms,

and postulates must be used as the basic assumptions that

underlie a discipline of knowledge.

Without the use of basic assump

tions, each statement about a discipline would have to be justified
either by an infinite series of other statements, or by circular
reasoning in appealing to one or more other statements already in the
set.

The only solution is to reductively identify a set of basic

assumptions concerning a concept of a discipline that will be treated
analogous to primitive terms in a language.

Basic Assumptions and Self-Evidence
The basic assumptions of a discipline need to be generally
accepted by both researchers in that discipline and researchers in
other related disciplines.

Relying on self-evident statements would

be one way to attain this general acceptance.

Axioms and postulates

must be self-evident to appeal to all reasonable men.

They also must

have sufficient content to be capable of being used to derive other
less obvious statements called theorems.

One could also use the self

evidence of these theorems as further evidence for accepting the
underlying basic assumptions.
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Stating all basic assumptions in a way making them selfevident certainly would be advantageous.

But Cohen and Nagel have

pointed out that what is self-evident to one person may not be selfevident to all persons.
are determining factors.

Cultural conditions and individual training
Furthermore, Cohen and Nagel point out that

at various times contradictory propositions concerning many topics
have been held to be self-evident.^
example of this point.

Geometry provides an excellent

Euclid's postulates appear to be self-evident.

Yet each of Euclid's postulates has at least one contradiction.

The

eventual denial of Euclid's fifth postulate led to Riemannian and
Lobachevskian non-Euclidean geometries.
Consequences of the three types of geometries question heavy
reliance on so-called "self-evident" basic assumptions.

Poincare has

pointed out:
There is a sort of opposition between Riemann's
geometry and that of Lobachevski.
Thus the sum of the angles of a triangle is: Equal to
two right angles in Euclid's geometry; Less than two
right angles in that of Lobachevski; Greater than two
right angles in that of Riemann.
The number of straights through a given point that
can be drawn coplanar to a given straight, but nowhere meeting
it, is equal:
To one in Euclid's geometry
To zero in that of Riemann;
To infinity in that of Lobachevski.^®
Despite the fact that the above statements of Riemannian and

l^Cohen and Nagel, op. cit., p. 131.
2®Henri Poincare, "Non-Euclidean Geometries and the NonEuclidean World," Readings in the Philosophy,of Science, eds.
Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,
Inc., 1953), p. 173.
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Lobachevskian non-Euclidean geometries do not appear self-evident,
these geometries do seem to be valid.

That they are not merely

logical exercises is evident when one realizes it was Riemannian
non-Euclidean geometry that Einstein used in his theory of rel
ativity. 21

Reliance on the self-evidence of a statement, though

desirable, is risky.

Analytic and Synthetic Statements— A Solution?
Applying one of Kant's ideas offers a possible solution to
this delimna concerning self-evident statements.
the concepts of analytic and synthetic judgments.

Kant originated
Modern philosophers

prefer to talk about analytic and synthetic statements. A statement
is analytic if and only if understanding the statement is sufficient
to know its truth value.

An example of an analytic statement is:

"All bachelors are unmarried."
"Assets equals equities."

Another example in accounting is:

If one simply understands the statement's

concepts, then one knows the statement is true.

On the other hand,

in a synthetic statement, the mere understanding of the concepts in
the statement is never sufficient to enable one to know whether the
statement is true.

In a synthetic statement some outside element

must be added to determine the statement's truth value.
of a synthetic statement is:

"No pigs fly."

An example

Knowledge about pigs

and flying must be added from outside the statement to determine its
truth value.
Kant explained analytic and synthetic statements in a second

^Barker, op. cit., p. 50.
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way which he and many modern philosophers consider equivalent to
Kant’s first explanation.

According to this explanation, a statement

is analytic if it is true solely by virtue of its logical form:
example, "All dogs are dogs."

for

A statement is also analytic if it can

be transformed by definitions into another statement that is true
because of its logical

form.

22

It would be very helpful if basic assumptions could be stated
as analytic statements.

Their truth value could then be known through

understanding the concepts involved.

No empirical evidence would be

necessary to verify analytical statements.

However, analytic state

ments may be self-evident but they do not contain sufficient content
to convey anything meaningful.

If analytical statements used for

axioms and postulates do not have any meaningful content, then no
meaningful theorems can be derived from them.

Synthetic statements,

on the other hand, can contain sufficient content to be meaningful,
but appeal must be made to empirical evidence to determine their truth
value.

Demonstration of Basic Assumptions:
As a Logical Proof
In a deductive system, axioms and postulates are basic
assumptions.

If the axioms or postulates could be derived from some

other statements in the system, they would be theorems rather than
basic assumptions.

Any logical proof then must appeal to statements

22wesley C. Salmon, Logic (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 97-101; and Barker, pp. cit.,
pp. 7-10; and others.
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outside the particular system under study if axioms or postulates
are to remain basic assumptions.
Axiom or postulate statements are basic assumptions only in
relation to a particular deductive system.

It is possible to derive

an assumption in one system from a given set of assumptions in a
second system.

This second system could then be used as a logical

proof or demonstration of a particular axiom or postulate.

However,

a logical proof is valid only if the basic assumptions are valid,
assuming the logic is correct.

Therefore, a logical proof only shows

that the given assumption in one system is valid if the basic assump
tions of the other system are valid.

One could then conceivably

derive a basic assumption of the second system from basic assumptions
of a third system.

But the validity of this proof depends on the

validity of the basic assumptions of the third system.
then proves nothing.

This process

The earlier analogy with language showed this

process could be carried on ad infinitum, or circular reasoning could
be employed to end the process.
generally considered undesirable.

Both of these alternatives are
The only remaining solution is to

accept one set of axioms and postulates as basic assumptions.

This

set might as well be the assumptions contained in the first system.
An appeal to a second system might be worthwhile, if evidence
has been gathered which supports the assumptions and theorems of that
second system.

Subsequent assumption and theorem verification in the

second system would yield evidence that the first system's assumptions
and theorems were valid.

Although such a procedure proves nothing, it

does furnish evidence of the validity of the first system.

This
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evidence is, however, based on an empirical demonstration of the
second system.

Demonstration of Basic Assumptions:
As an Empirical Proof
The word "demonstrate" can also be used to connote empirical
proof.

It should be noted that the word "proof" is used here very

loosely.

Empirical evidence can never prove anything, it can only

disprove something.

This point is discussed in Chapter 1.

No matter

how many times a given statement has been empirically tested and
validated, it is always possible that the next test may disprove the
statement.

Each empirical test only gathers further evidence that a

given statement is true.

With each successful test of a statement

one’s confidence of its validity increases.
Once it has been decided to test a set of basic assumptions,
two alternatives are open.
can be tested directly.

First, the basic assumptions themselves

Secondly, the basic assumptions can be

tested indirectly by testing their derived theorems.

Direct Testing of the Basic Assumptions
From logic one knows that if the basic assumptions are valid,
then the theorems deductively derived from the basic assumptions must
also be valid.

Since there are fewer basic assumptions to test, val

idation of a theory would be easier if only the basic assumptions had
to be tested.

But there is a danger in relying solely on a test of

the basic assumptions.

An example from geometry points to this danger.

If the assumptions of Euclidean geometry had been tested,

47
they would probably have been accepted, since they agree with one's
view of the physical world.

However, if the assumptions of non-

Euclidean geometry were tested, they might have been rejected, since
a contradiction or denial of Euclid's fifth postulate contradicts
one's view of the physical world.

Because of the subsequent val

idation of Einstein's theory of relativity, which utilized Riemannian
non-Euclidean geometry, one has evidence of the validity of one form
of non-Euclidean geometry.
Both Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries appear to be
logically correct.

Since different empirical evidence seems to con

firm both, which evidence is to be believed?
be believed.

In reality both must

Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries are both valid,

as they are simply descriptions of. different concepts of geometry.
Since they describe different concepts of geometry, the assumptions
are also different.

Each concept of geometry is a description of

different parts of the real world; each concept is valid within its
limits.
Concerning empirical testing of the basic assumptions, Cohen
and Nagel have pointed out that attempting to establish the truth
value of the basic assumptions empirically is seldom used in science:
. . . It follows that axioms need not be known to be
true before the theorems are known, and in general the axioms
of a science are much less evident psychologically than the
theorems. In most sciences, as we shall see, the material
truth of the theorems is not established by means of first
showing the material truth of the axioms. On the contrary, the
material truth of axioms is made probable by establishing
empirically the truth or the probability of the theorems.^3

^Cohen and Nagel, op. cit., p. 132.
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A simple test of only the basic assumptions must then be
rejected.

Such a test is too closely tied to the concept of self

evidence, which an earlier discussion showed to be an unreliable
criterion for accepting or rejecting basic assumptions.

Subsequent

discussion in this chapter concerning theoretical concepts also
provides further evidence that a test of only the basic assumptions
is unreliable.

Indirect Testing of the Basic Assumptions
The second alternative to be considered involves testing the
basic assumptions indirectly.

This alternative is accomplished by

testing the statements (theorems) logically implied by the basic
assumptions.

If the rules of logic are properly followed in deduc

tively deriving the theorems from the basic assumptions, then the
truth of the theorems depends solely on the truth of the basic
assumptions.

If sufficient evidence can be gathered showing that

the theorems are valid, it also helps to establish the validity of
the basic assumptions.

Again it should be noted that such evidence

never proves a basic assumption or a theorem valid.

It only increases

one’s confidence that a given basic assumption or a theorem is valid.
The following discussion will examine some other problems in valida
ting a set of basic assumptions.

Lessor-Order Problems
Hempel has stated the case requiring empirical testability
as follows:
. . . no statement or set of statements T can be
significantly proposed as a scientific hypothesis or theory
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unless it is amenable to objective empirical test, at least
"in principle." This is to say that it must be possible to
derive from T, in the broad sense we have considered, certain
test implications of the form "if test conditions C are real
ized, then outcome E will occur;" but the test conditions need
not be realized or technologically realizable at the time when
T is propounded or contemplated.24
From a set of assumptions, T, it is possible to derive a
great many theorems.

For example, Euclid derived 465 theorems from

his initial assumptions, his ten axioms and postulates, plus a few
other unstated assumptions.

This is not to say that every theorem

has to be tested separately, for many theorems may be testable
together.

It is clear that such testing is not simple.

Furthermore,

most tests must be performed several times under similar and varying
conditions.

The extent of such testing, of course, depends on the

complexity of the theory involved.

If it is as complex as a theory

of financial accounting, the complexity of the testing is consid
erable.
Hempel also pointed out that a theory may not be testable at
a given time because of technological limits.
testable only "in principle."

A theory needs to be

The inability to test a theory with

current knowledge or under current conditions does not invalidate a
theory, nor does it make the theory an improper subject for study.
All of Einstein's theory could not be tested when he first developed
it.

Parts of it are, in fact, still being tested today.
If the theroy is new, the inability to test it currently must

be expected.

Its testing may require unavailable data, or physical

^Hempel, op. cit. , p. 30.
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conditions that occur infrequently.
which has not yet been built.

Testing may require equipment

In all these cases, it should be

sufficient to point out how the theory can be tested.
The preceding problems, though troublesome, can be overcome.
The following discussion looks at some contemporary philosophical
problems that at present have no acceptable solution.

Higher-Order Problem
Every scientific concept is not empirically testable.

This

fact seriously complicates the verification of scientific theories.

Dispositional and Theoretical Concepts.— The natural sciences
and the social sciences have been unable to get along without dispo
sitional and theoretical concepts which are not empirically testable.
Rudner discusses these two concepts.

In general, dispositional con

cepts refer to unobservable characteristics of observable things.

It

is a claim that something has a disposition or potential for showing
a particular characteristic, rather than actually showing that char
acteristic.

For example, combustible is a dispositional concept;

burning is not.

Other examples of dispositional concepts include

many "ible," "uble," and "able" words.

In particular, words such as

"soluble," "observable," "magnetic," "elastic," "attitude," "reflex,"
"habit," "response," "repetoire," "personality," "hardness," "con
ductor" are all dispositional concepts.

Theoretical concepts, refer

to unobservable characteristics of unobservable things.

Examples of

such concepts include electron, superego, institutional inertia,
cultural lag, length, volume, mass, charge, habit strength, demand,
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age, preference, and variables.25

The essence of these two types of

concepts is that both involve nonobservables.

Scientist Versus Philosopher View on Observables.— The dis
tinction between an observable and a nonobservable is not sharp.
Carnap issues a warning that should be heeded when one encounters
a discussion of observables and nonobservables.

Carnap states:

. . . Philosophers and scientists have quite different
ways of using the terms "observables" and "nonobservables." To
a philosopher, "observables" has a very narrow meaning. It
applies to such properties as "blue", "hard", "hot". These are
properties directly perceived by the senses. To the physicist,
the word has a much broader meaning. It includes any quantita
tive magnitude that can be measured in a relatively simple,
direct way. A philosopher would not consider a temperature of,
perhaps, 80 degrees centigrade, or a weight of 93-1/2 pounds,
an observable because there is no direct sensory perception of
such magnitudes. To a physicist, both are observables because
they can be measured in an extremely simple way.^6
Carnap also points out that measurements that are complicated and
indirect, such as determining the mass of a molecule or an electron,
are considered nonobservable to the

p h y s i c i s t .

27

Carnap's distinction

between observables and nonobservables is adopted here.

That is,

things are considered observable if they can be directly perceived by
the senses or measured by relatively simple techniques.
It is obvious that dispositional concepts and theoretical
concepts play a very important and currently indispensable role in
scientific theories.

However, since they are not observable or

25Rudner, op. cit., pp. 21-23.

York:

26Rudolf Carnap, Philosophical Foundations of Physics (New
Basic Books, Inc., 1966), p. 225.
27Ibid., p. 226.
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empirically verifiable characteristics of things, they are not
empirically testable.

Because of this fact they should not be used

as primitive terms in scientific theories.

While they still could

be introduced into theories as defined terms, they provide excep
tional definitional problems.

It appears, at least at the present

time, that science cannot get along without the use of dispositional
and theoretical concepts in scientific theories.

Therefore, some

thing less than complete testability of theories and likewise assump
tions must be

accepted.

^8

Accounting Concepts.— The problems posed for accounting are
obvious.

Many accounting concepts are either dispositionals or theoret-

icals, depending on the particular things to which they refer.

For

example, when concepts such as revenue or value are used in connection with
specific observable assets, dispositional concepts are being employed.
When these same concepts are used in connection with an unobservable
business entity, theoretical concepts are being employed.

Further

more, when assets are defined as "service potentials," the concepts
become theoreticals rather than dispositionals.

Other examples of

such unobservable concepts in accounting include income, earnings,
depreciation, expense, gopdwill, opportunity cost, amortization.
Also included are all conepts with ethical connotations, such as
fairness, usefulness, truth, objectivity, and understandability.
Such ethical considerations,

while necessary in nearly every body of

28Rudner, pp. cit,, pp. 21-23.
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knowledge, are indispensable in a service activity such as accounting.
To the extent that these concepts enter into theories of
accounting through the basic assumptions, these concepts make theories
less than completely testable.

While it would be preferable to avoid

such concepts in accounting, the very nature of the discipline deems
such avoidance almost impossible.
In summary, while synthetic statements offer meaningful con
tent, the presence of dispositional and theoretical concepts in those
statements inhibit their empirical testability.

When such concepts

appear in objectives, axioms, and postulates, these concepts are
carried over into the theorems derived from these basic assumptions,
and the empirical testability of the theorems is inhibited.

A Partial Solution
Hempel has discussed a partial solution to this problem.

In

addition to basic assumptions of a theory which contain the dispo
sitional and theoretical concepts (he calls them internal principles),
Hempel identifies another type of basic
principles.

assumptions

called bridge

He explains these two as follows:

. . . For the internal principles of a theory are
concerned with the peculiar entities and processes assumed by
the theory . . . and they will therefore be expressed largely
in terms of characteristic "theoretical concepts," which refer
to those entities and processes. But the implications that
permit a test of those theoretical principles will have to be
expressed in terms of things and occurrences with which we are
antecedently acquainted, which we already know how to observe,
to measure, and to describe. In other words, while the internal
principles of a theory are couched in its characteristic
theoretical terms . . . the test implications must be formulated
in terms which are "antecedently understood," as we might say,
terms that have been introduced prior to the theory and can be
used independently of it. Let us refer to them as antecedently
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available or pretheoretical terms. The derivation of such test
implications from the internal principles of the theory evidently
requires further premises that establish connections between the
two sets of concepts; and this . . . i s accomplished by appro
priate bridge principles. . . . Without bridge principles, the
internal principles of a theory would yield no test implications,
and the requirement of testability would be violated.^9
Bridge principles connect nonobservable concepts with concepts that
are observable and measurable or with previously established theories
and their observable and measurable

aspects.

The adjective term "bridge" used by Hempel is only one term
among many describing this type of connecting statement.

Scientists

uniformly attest to the need for such connecting statements in theory
construction, but there is a lack of uniformity as to what to call
them.

For instance, Carnap and Nagel call such statements "corre

spondence rules," Bridgman calls them "operational rules," and
Campbell calls them the "Dictionary."31

Summary Remarks
It is shown in this chapter that all theories must be based
on certain basic assumptions.

This basis is necessary to avoid either

an infinite series of statements or circular reasoning.

"Proving" a Theory
In order to establish the truth of a theory, several alter
natives are proposed.

Reliance on self-evidence of either a theory's

basic assumptions or its theorems is rejected because self-evidence

29nempel, op. cit., pp. 74-75.
31

Carnap, op. cit., p. 233.

30Ibid., pp. 73-74.

55
is not a reliable test.

The use of analytic statements is also

proposed, but rejected, because of a lack of sufficient meaningful
content.

Reliance must then be placed on synthetic statements.
Synthetic statements could be tested or demonstrated by

appealing to a second deductive system.

However, testing in this

manner must utilize one deductive system as given to avoid circu
larity or an infinite series of appeals to different deductive sys
tems.

Because of this reference, the second method of demonstration,

an empirical test of the theorems of the theory, is preferred.
an indirect test is not without problems.

Such

The presence of dispo

sitional and theoretical concepts in these statements is found to
complicate the testing.
not directly testable.

Dispositional and theoretical concepts are
Therefore, neither are the internal state

ments that contain them.

To test a theory other statements must be

added at the level of basic assumptions that tie the internal state
ments to testable phenomena.

This second kind of statement is

called a bridge statement.
In all, five different varieties of basic assumptions have
been discovered.

These may be summarized as follows:

(1)

objectives,

(2)

internal axioms,

(3)

bridge axioms,

(4)

internal postulates,, and

(5)

bridge postulates.

Together these varieties of basic assumptions describe a particular
concept.
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Describing a Concept
A thorough description of a particular concept of accounting
must proceed the derivation of the basic assumptions.

After the

concept has been described, the basic assumptions underlying the con
cept are derived reductively.

The basic assumptions are required to

have certain aesthetic qualities.

They must also be consistent,

independent, reproductive, and complete.

In addition, the basic

assumptions may have the appearance of trivial statements or may
employ idealizations and thus in appearance may not be exact decriptions of the real world.
The first statements derived about a concept are the objec
tives or goals of the particular concept.
either attainable or unattainable.

The objectives may be

Their purpose is to guide or

give direction to the axiom and postulate statements.
After the objectives are defined, the axioms and postulates
of the concept are reductively derived.

Axioms employed are basic

assumptions underlying other related disciplines from which knowl
edge is utilized.

Accounting, for example, assumes knowledge con

cerning measurement, magnitudes, communications, behavior, ethics,
logic, and others.

Since knowledge in these areas is employed in

accounting, the basic assumptions or postulates of these areas
become basic assumptions or axioms of accounting.

As already stated,

these axioms are broken down into two classes regarding their test
ability.

Internal axioms employ theoretical concepts and hence are

not directly testable.

Bridge axioms are employed to connect

internal axioms to measurable and observable phenomena.
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Finally, postulates are employed.
assumptions underlying a discipline.

Postulates are the basic

Whereas axioms represent basic

assumptions borrowed from other disciplines, postulates represent the
basic assumptions of a unique discipline.

The postulates of account

ing serve as axioms in theories constructed in other disciplines that
assume accounting knowledge.
unique discipline.

The postulates of accounting make it a

Here again, both internal postulates and bridge

postulates are found.

Completing the Picture
This chapter began explaining the structure of a deductive
theory.

The nature of basic assumptions in such a theory is thor

oughly discussed here.

The following chapter examines the remaining

structure of a deductive theory.

The nature of the complete system

of basic assumptions and theorems is discussed.

Chapter 3
THE AXIOMATIC OR DEDUCTIVE

This chapter continues to apply

APPROACH

the techniquesof theory

construction to the study of the nature

and function of basic

assumptions in a theory or discipline.

The subject of Chapter 2 was

the basic assumptions themselves.

This chapter is concerned with the

entire structure of a deductive theory:
theorems.

both assumptions and

A few comments providing a historical perspective of the

deductive approach are presented first.

Following this perspective,

successive sections of this chapter deal with the nature, charac
teristics, and advantages of the deductive approach to theory con
struction.

Origin and Significance of the
Deductive Approach
The history of the deductive approach begins with Aristotle,
384-321 B.C.

Although earlier philosophers were concerned with the

indirect acquisition of knowledge, Aristotle first developed logic.
He also developed the idea of a deductive system.!

The Greek math

ematician Euclid put the deductive approach to its first great use in
systematizing geometry.

!j. M. Bochenski, The Methods of Contemporary Thought,
trans. Peter Caws (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company,
1965), p. 69.
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The Deductive Approach and Geometry
The Egyptians first developed geometry.

They found many

practical uses for the principles they had discovered inductively;
namely, land surveying, architecture, and engineering.

The Greeks,

aware of what the Egyptians were doing with their geometrical prin
ciples, became interested.

Unlike the Egyptians, however, the Greeks

were not interested in the practical applications of geometry.
Greeks were more philosophical.
ancient Greeks.

The

Philosophy had begun with the

Their interest was theoretical; the Greeks wished to

prove deductively the geometrical principles the Egyptians

employed.^

Prior to Euclid, several Greeks had successfully proven many
of the Egyptian geometrical principles.

A large part of Euclid's work

probably consisted of refining and arranging these earlier proofs.
His main contribution was his use of the deductive approach.

Euclid

successfully gave deductive proofs for 465 theorems of geometry,
ostensibly utilizing only ten initial assumptions.

In reality a few

additional assumptions appeared in Euclid's proofs, but went unde
tected until the nineteenth century.

These added assumptions probably

arose and went unnoticed due to his familarity with geometry.

These

added assumptions were inadvertent and reference to them is not meant
to detract in any way from Euclid's accomplishment.

Had he been aware

of them, he could have corrected the problem.

^Stephen F. Barker, Philosophy of Mathematics (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), pp. 15-16.
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Impact of the Deductive Approach
The impact of Euclid's accomplishment has been phenomenal.
Barker summed up Euclid's work when he wrote:
. . . Then about 300 B.C. Euclid wrote his classic
book, The Elements, in which he drew together and presented
in systematic form all the main geometrical discoveries of
his predecessors. This great book is one of the most influ
ential classics in the literature of Western thought. Through
ancient times, through the medieval era, and in the modern
period right up into the nineteenth century, Euclid's Elements
served not only as the textbook of geometry but also as a
model of what scientific thinking should be.3
Wilder's appraisal is similar:

"The influence of Euclid's work has

been tremendous; probably no other document has had a greater influ
ence on scientific thought."^
Euclid's work is considered the classic example of the
deductive approach.
is increasing.

In mathematics the use of the deductive approach

Barker has stated:

"...

one of the striking fea

tures of twentieth century mathematics is its greatly increased use
of the axiomatic approach in mathematical studies besides geometry."5
In areas other than mathematics use of the deductive approach^ has
met with less success.

Spinoza attempted in his Ethics to use the

3lbid., p. 16.
^Raymond L. Wilder, Introduction to the Foundations of
Mathematics (2nd ed.; New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), p. 4.
^Barker, op. cit., p. 57.
^By the deductive approach this author means that basic
assumptions are explicitly stated either in words or symbolic logic.
The assumptions are then combined to yield theorems. The deductive
approach does not refer simply to deductive narrative discussions.
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deductive approach, but "his attempt was a lamentable

failure.

Isaac Newton in his Philosophise Naturaljs Principia Mathematics
(1687) deduced theorems and corollaries using the deductive approach.
He began with eight definitions and three axioms of motion.
logic was not nearly as rigorous as Euclid's.8

His

Many other areas in

physics have been formulated as deductive systems.

Similar attempts

have also been made in biology and psychology.9
These are but a few instances in which the deductive approach
has been used.

However, the further one moves away from mathematics,

the less successful its utilization has been.
natural.

This situation is only

Compared to mathematics, many other sciences and social

sciences are still in their infancy.

Deductive logic is a tool of

the mathematician; one he uses every day.

Deductive logic has not

become so engrained in the thought of researchers in other disciplines.
The deductive approach used today in mathematics is vastly
different from what it was in Euclid's day.

Today when mathematicians

utilize the deductive approach, they are dealing with a very formal
system.

Symbols are employed instead of words.

symbols have no assigned meaning.

Initially these

This reduces the possibility of

unstated assumptions being introduced in the system.

Only after the

^Bochenski, loc. cit.
^Dudley Shapere, "Newtonian Mechanics and Mechanical Expla
nation," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New York:
The Macmillan Company and The Free Press, 1967), Vol. 5, p. 491.
^Irving M. Copi, Symbolic Logic (3rd ed.; New York:
Macmillan Company, 1967), p. 180.
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system has been axiomatized, with many theorems derived, is meaning
assigned.

Once a meaning has been assigned to the symbols, the system

is called an interpreted system or a model.

The symbols can be inter

preted in alternative ways providing the basic assumptions are truth
ful in each interpretation.

Each interpretation yields a model.

Accounting and the Deductive Approach
Researchers in accounting and other sciences and social
sciences have not shown

a great deal of interest in employing the

highly formal deductive

systems used by some mathematicians and

logicians.

Some mathematicians have even objected to such highly

formalized s y s t e m s . H o w e v e r , the deductive approach can and has
been utilized in accounting without the use of symbolic logic.
Ijiri and Mattessich and in a less rigorous fashion, Moonitz, have
all employed the deductive approach in accounting.
Accounting theory has reached the point where its logic
needs systemization.

If this systemization can be accomplished, and

if accounting principles can be
assumptions, accounting

derived from a set of accounting

will be well on its way to developing a

stronger theory structure.

The following sections examine the

deductive approach more closely.

The Deductive Approach
The deductive or axiomatic approach represents a rigorous
utilization of deductive logic.

lOWilder, op. cit., p. 45

It requires an explicit statement of
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all initial assumptions utilized in the deductive system.

Description of the Deductive Approach
The deductive approach may be described briefly as follows:
starting from a set of statements serving as initial assumptions
about some concept, an attempt is made to derive logically all other
possible statements about the concept.

Wilder has used an analogy

in describing the axiomatization of a concept:
The process may be compared with that of making colors.
Suppose T is a collection of colors, and that we are given
certain rules for mixing colors to produce new colors; select
a collection A of colors from T which will be sufficient, by
using the given rules for mixing, to produce all colors of T.
In this analogy we have substituted colors for statements and
mixing of colors for implication.H
In this analogy, T is the set of all possible statements about a
concept.

Rarely are all the statements about a given concept known.

But a sufficient number of statements are usually known to describe
a concept adequately.

The rules for mixing colors in the analogy

are simply the rules of logic.

Collection A of colors (or state

ments) is a subset of T such that when combined with the rules of
mixing (or of logic) it is possible to produce all the possible
colors (statements) in T.

The process of identifying the set A of

initial colors (statements) is the process of reduction.

From a

given set of statements describing a concept, the process proceeds
reductively to identify a subset of statements about the concept.
When this subset of statements is combined with the rules of logic,
that subset deductively yields all the statements about the concept.

•^Ibid., p. 30.
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From this analogy it is possible to identify several components of a
deductive system.

These components are discussed next.

Components of the Deductive Approach
In discussing basic assumptions, the preceding chapter has
already mentioned some components of a deductive system.

Statements

at the basic assumption level and the rules of logic have been dis
cussed.

Also mentioned briefly are two types of terms making up those

statements:

primitive terms and defined terms.

It is now possible to

give a more complete description of the components of a deductive
system.

These components are listed below:
(1)

a set of initial statements about a concept

(2)

a set of derived statements about a concept

(3)

rules of logic,

(4)

a set of primitive terms,

(5)

a set of defined terms,

(6)

a set of universal terms,

(7)

rules of definition, and

(8)

rules of grammar.

Each of these components is needed and thus becomes a part of a deduc
tive system.

These components can roughly be divided into two groups:

one concerning statements and the other concerning terms.

Statements in a Deductive System
The set of initial statements about a concept are the basic
assumptions.

These statements represent the subset of all possible

statements about a concept from which all other possible statements
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about the concept are derived.

As pointed out in the previous

chapter, at least five different types of basic assumptions exist.
These are the objectives, the unique internal and bridge postulates
of a discipline, and the internal and bridge axioms borrowed from
other disciplines.

These statements are referred to collectively

as basic assumptions or statements of the basic assumptions.
The basic assumptions, when combined with the rules of logic,
yield the set of derived statements about a concept.

This derived

set of statements is alternatively called the theorems or principles
of a discipline or theory.

Assuming the rules of logic are correctly

followed, the sole determinant of the truth value of the theorems is
the truth value of the basic assumptions.

These two types of state

ments, the basic assumptions and the theorems, are the only two types
of statements permitted in a deductive system.

Together they describe

fully the particular concept involved.
The rules of logic function to specify all possible ways the
basic assumptions and previously derived theorems can be combined to
form new theorems.

These combinations of basic assumptions and

theorems are deductively valid.

Thus, the rules of logic divide a

system's derived statements into two subsets:

those statements that

are deductively valid and those statements that are deductively
invalid.

In actual practice only the deductively valid statements

are referred to as derived statements or alternatively theorems or
principles.
Logic is concerned only with the form of an argument.

If an

argument has the appropriate form, it is considered deductively valid.
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Logic, therefore, says nothing about the truth of the assumptionlevel statements.

An argument in the above sense is a group of

statements in which a conclusion is deductively implied by certain
basic assumptions.

Terms in a Deductive System
In general all the terms appearing in the statements of a
deductive system are of three types.

They are either primitive

terms, defined terms, or universal terms.

Primitive Terms in a Deductive Theory
The previous chapter has already shown the need for primitive
terms in a system.

Primitive terms are those which remain undefined

to avoid either an infinite or circular series of definitions.

In

one sense selection of the terms to remain undefined in a theory is
arbitrary.

That is, terms undefined in one deductive system may be

defined terms in another deductive system describing the same concept.
Therefore, no term is undefinable; rather, certain terms are chosen
to remain undefined in a given system.

Of course, the terms selected

must be ones capable of defining all other technical terms in a system.
The selection of certain terms to serve as primitive terms
does not imply that their meaning is not known.

Quite the contrary,

if no one knew what the primitive terms meant, then no one could make
sense out of the system's statements.

What is meant is that no

explicit definitions of the terms are given in the system.

Some

meaning will be implicitly derived from the way the terms are used in
the system.

Also, if necessary, the primitive terms can be defined
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in a separate deductive system or systems according to the primitive
terms of those other systems.

However, as with basic assumptions,

ultimately some set of terms must be accepted as primitives if an
infinite series of definitions or circularity in definitions is to
be avoided.

Defined Terms in a Deductive Theory
To define terms in a given deductive system it is necessary
to utilize the system’s primitive terms, other previously defined
terms, and universal terms.

The only ones usually defined in a

theory are technical terms, or terms that are used in a particular
way in a theory.

Universal Terms in a Deductive Theory
The statements of a deductive system, in addition to con
taining primitive and defined terms, also contain universal terms.
Universal terms are non-technical terms and include those commonly
found in everyday language.

Many common nouns, verbs, adjectives,

adverbs, articles, conjunctions, and prepositions are considered
universal terms.

Because of their familarity, these terms are pur

ported to be universally understood.

In contrast many terms appearing

in theories as primitives or defined terms are often technical in
nature.

Compare, for example, some universal terms (the, is, all,

there, if, then) with some terms that could appear as primitive or
defined terms in a theory of accounting (entity, revenue, asset,
equity, cost).

It is not always easy to decide which terms in a

theory should be considered universal terms and which should be

defined.

Even relatively simple terms can be interpreted

differently.

quite

Care must be taken by a researcher to define any terms

which may be interpreted incorrectly.
In one sense universal terms are treated much like primitive
terms because they remain undefined in a deductive system, and there
fore may not represent a separate category of terms.

On the other

hand, when the primitive terms of a theory are listed, universal
terms do not appear on the list.

For this reason they may be con

sidered a separate class of terms.

Rules of Definition
Definitional rules determine when one term or expression may
properly be substituted for another term or expression.

Generally,

the term or expression on the left is referred to as the definiendum.
The meaning of

the definiendum is unknown.

meaning by the

term or expressionappearing on the right, called

definien.

definiendum may be separated from the definien by the

The

symbol "=df"*

It is defined or given a
the

This symbol indicates that the two expressions can

readily be substituted for each other while maintaining the truth
value of the statement in which they are contained.
also may be assumed.

The symbol "=df"

For example, the term "bachelor" can be defined

as an "unmarried male."

If "bachelor" were introduced into a deduc

tive theory, the following definition would appear:
Definition:

bachelor

unmarried male.

This definition indicates that anytime the expression "unmarried male
appears in a statement, the term "bachelor" may be substituted for it
maintaining the statement's truth value.

Such a definition is an
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explicit definition.

In a deductive system, whenever a defined term

is first introduced, it must be presented in an explicit definition.

Rules of Grammar
It is possible in forming statements to combine a system’s
primitive terms, defined terms, and universal terms in many possible
ways.

Some of these statements are permitted in a given system;

other statements are not.
role.

The rules of grammar play a very important

Their function is to divide into two groups all of the possible

ways the terms of a 'system can be combined.

One group represents

combinations of terms that are permitted in a system.
this group are said to be well formed.
statement:

"Assets equal equities."

Statements in

An example might be the
The other group represents

combinations of terms that are not permitted in a system.
might be:

"A the asset."

An example

Such statements are nonsensical and convey

no meaning.
It might be logically argued that a discussion of the com
ponents of a deductive system should also include a discussion of
the letters that make up the terms and the rules specifying acceptable
combinations of those letters to form terms.

This discussion could

also include the symbols used to make letters and the rules specifying
the permitted combinations of those symbols.
such a discussion has to stop somewhere.

Ultimately, however,

Something always has to be

taken as given.
From another point of view the detail in which the preceding
components of a deductive system are discussed may seem excessive.
Everyone knows about terms, definitions, logic, and grammar.

However,
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in a deductive system constructed entirely with symbolic logic, such
components are vital.
assigned no meaning.

In such a system, symbols are initially
Grammar rules, definitional rules, and logical

rules must be stated if one is to know how to combine symbols to form
new statements.

With symbolic logic the rules of logic, definitions,

and grammar take on new meaning.

For example, in symbolic logic a

sentence may be defined as any series of symbols preceded by the
letter "W."
Even for deductive systems not using symbolic logic, the
recognition of such rules is valuable.

Definitional rules state how

new terms are to be introduced into the system.
rules helps avoid unclear definitions.

Following these

The rules of logic specify

how an argument may proceed without exceeding its assumptions.

Characteristics of a Deductive System
In the last chapter the characteristics of basic assumptions
were discussed.

These characteristics included a desired aesthetic

quality, consistency, independence, reproductivity, and completeness.
Since basic assumptions are part of a deductive system, the char
acteristics of basic assumptions are also characteristics of the
deductive system.
characteristics.

There is no need to repeat the discussion of these
However, the deductive system, when viewed in its

entirety, has additional characteristics.

The discussion of these

characteristics is necessary to complete the analysis of theory con
struction begun in Chapter 2.

First, a desirable characteristic,

full formalization, is discussed, as are some of its implications.
Secondly, two other previously discussed characteristics, consistency
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and completeness, are expanded and a possible conflict between the two
is examined.

Full Formalization:

The Ideal

To assert that a discipline or a particular theory in a dis
cipline is fully formalized is a strong assertion.

As used here full

formalization means that every statement in a particular deductive
system is either a basic assumption (an objective, axiom, or pos
tulate) , or that the statement is explicitly and deductively derived
from the basic assumptions.

Furthermore, every technical term

appearing in the statements must be either a primitive term or a
defined term.

Described thus far is the completeness criterion of a

set of assumptions discussed earlier.

In addition, full formalization

requires that the given deductive system be fully articulated.

As

interpreted in this study, fully articulated means that all the
theorems have been derived that can technically be derived in a given
deductive system.

To the extent that a deductive system is not fully

formalized, knowledge technically contained within the system remains
undiscovered.
Full formalization acts as a constraint on the discipline's
development.

If it is desired to introduce a new set of fundamental

statements into a deductive system, these statements must be intro
duced at the basic assumption level.

This new set of statements may

be introduced to replace an older set of statements which has been
cast aside in the light of new knowledge.

The new set of statements

also may be introduced to achieve full formalization for a part of a
theory structure or discipline that had previously been only partially
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formalized.

Or the area may have previously been omitted from the

theory or discipline entirely.
An area may have been omitted entirely for a number of rea
sons.

Some new scientific breakthrough previously unrecognized may

have led to a new set of statements.

Perhaps previous knowledge of

the area may have been so uncertain that any statements concerning
the area would have been mere speculation.
statements may have had equal support.

Contradictory sets of

Therefore, the area was

previously omitted from the system until the area had been advanced
further.

Another reason could be that a previously developed set of

statements may have been thought inapplicable to a system of know
ledge .
Full formalization is seldom achieved in theories, much less
in an entire discipline.

Rudner has pointed out three reasons why a

theory may not achieve full formalization.

First, full formalization

may conflict with other goals in theory construction such as pre
diction, control, and testing of a theory.

Second, in the early

stages of theory construction, insistence on full formalization may
be too rigid a requirement.

Finally, there is the danger of over

allocation of efforts to attain full formalization to the detriment
of other equally important areas.

Rudner points out that these

limitations are meant to apply only to the initial formulator of a
theory and not to the philosopher who later attempts rigorously to
reformulate the theory.12

l^Richard S. Rudner, Philosophy of Social Science (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 52.
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Deciding to what degree a theory is to be formalized
basically involves a cost-benefit analysis.

The cost of attempting

various degrees of formalization must be weighed against the expected
benefits to be derived.

Consistency and Completeness
Consistency and completeness of a set of basic assumptions
has already been discussed in Chapter 2.

Consistency and completeness

of the entire structure of a deductive theory is discussed here.

Consistency
A set of assumptions is consistent if no assumption in the
set contradicts another assumption.

Consistency assumes a broader

meaning when applied to an entire deductive system including both
assumptions and theorems.

A deductive system is consistent if

neither the assumptions nor the theorems derived from the assumptions
contradict any other assumption or theorems of the deductive system.
Consistency is very important.

Copi has pointed out that if a system

contains contradictory statements and thus is inconsistent, the sys
tem cannot possibly serve to systematize knowledge.13

An inconsistent

deductive system is useless for theory construction.
One further point should be noted.

Although some theorems

often are not obvious implications of a set of basic assumptions, it
is true that the theorems of a deductive system do not contain any
knowledge that is not already found in the basic assumptions.

l^Copi, op. cit., p. 187.
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Therefore, it can be argued that only the basic assumptions need to
be checked for inconsistencies.

Though true, such a check relies

heavily on identifying self-evident inconsistencies.

And self

evidence was found earlier to be an unacceptable criterion for eval
uating the truth value of basic assumptions.

Both assumptions and

theorems should be checked for inconsistencies.

Completeness
A set of basic assumptions is complete if it contains all
the assumptions needed to derive the theorems of the system.

A

deductive system is complete if every true statement about a concept
that can be expressed in the system's primitive terms is either an
assumption or a theorem.^

A deductive system is incomplete if there

exists one or more true statements about a concept expressible in the
primitive terms of that system that cannot be derived as a theorem of
the system.

Completeness of a deductive system is very desirable.

If a system is incomplete, then knowledge technically available
about a concept cannot be derived from the system.
therefore, may remain undiscovered.
goes beyond mere full formalization.

This knowledge,

Completeness, in this sense,
A deductive system is fully

formalized if all theorems that may be derived from the assumptions
are derived.

Completeness requires that all true statements about a

concept expressible in the primitive terms of a deductive system be
derivable from the basic assumptions of that system.
Whereas inconsistency in a deductive system destroys the

■^Barker, op. cit., p. 94.
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usefulness of the system, incompleteness is not as damaging.

An

incomplete deductive system may be very useful; although, not as
useful as it could be if it were complete.

Godel's Proof15
It thus seems highly desirable for a given deductive system to
be both consistent and complete.
possible.

However, this situation is not always

In 1931 Godel was able to demonstrate that for one kind of

deductive system, consistency and completeness are incompatible.

He

was concerned with those systems such as Principia Mathematic, which
attempted to develop all the formulas for the natural numbers.

Godel's

conclusions show that in such systems there are always true statements
about the concept which cannot be derived from a given set of assump
tions.

The deductive system, then, is incomplete.

One such system

may be more complete than another such system; however, no system is
both complete and consistent.

Godel's proof shows there are limita

tions in the deductive approach.

In particular, it apparently is impos

sible to develop a consistent and complete axiomatization of the
entire field of mathematics or even of each subfield of mathematics.
However, Wilder has pointed out that it is still possible and, in fact,
has been done quite successfully, to axiomatize special parts of
mathematics and logic.^

^Ibid., pp. 94-97; and Wilder, op. cit., pp. 270-275; and
Ernest Nagel and James R. Newman, Godel's Proof (New York: New
York University Press, 1958), pp. 3, 58, 59, and 98.
^Wilder,

op. cit., pp. 274-275.
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Advantages of the Deductive Approach
Utilization of the deductive approach, whether the system is
highly formalized or not, offers several advantages.

The discussion

of these advantages assumes that the deductive system is fully for
malized and internally consistent.

In deductive systems less than

fully formalized, these advantages apply in lesser degrees, depending
on the degree of the system's formalization.

Major Advantages
One major advantage of the deductive approach is that it
forces a researcher to recognize all of the basic assumptions utilized
in the construction of a particular theory.

Then the deductive

approach restricts the researcher to those basic assumptions.

If the

researcher wants to add something else to a theory, something that is
not technically contained in the theory's current basic assumptions,
then that something must be added at the level of the basic assump
tions.
Also, except for the primitive terms, each new technical
term introduced into the deductive system must be defined explicitly
upon introduction.

Once a technical term had been so defined, it

retains its meaning throughout the entire system.

Misunderstandings

concerning the intended meanings of such key terms are thus reduced.
Once the basic assumptions underlying a theory structure or
a discipline are recognized, a deductive approach pursues these
assumptions to their logical ends.

An attempt is made to derive all

theorems of a given set of basic assumptions.

The formalized system
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represents an internally consistent standard of comparison for actual
practice.

Inconsistencies in actual practice can be pointed out by

using this comparison.

For example, if.all other things are equal,

revenues and expenses from the same event cannot logically be recog
nized in different ways unless their recognition is based on dif
ferent basic assumptions.
Finally, a deductive approach encourages an efficient break
down of a discipline into homogeneous subtheories.
may be narrow or broad.

These subtheories

The individual subtheories can then be

integrated with other subtheories in a building block approach to
yield broader, more encompassing theories.

However, such a building

block approach does not mean that each block or subtheory is unre
lated.

Most subtheories share some basic assumptions with other

subtheories.

For example, some ethical basic assumptions are shared

in almost every accounting subtheory.

Lesser Advantages
A deductive theory represents a systemization of knowledge
about a particular concept.
teaching device.

The theory thus represents a useful

However, the student must be aware that despite

the theory's apparent logic, it represents only one theory about a
concept.

Other theories may be less aesthetically appealing and yet

more descriptive, explanative, and predictive.
In a deductive system one statement proceeds to the next
statement in a logical manner.

While the logic of any deductive

system is a distinct strong point, logic also is a potential weak
ness of all deductive systems.

That is, the validity of a deductive
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system is totally dependent on the validity of the system's
According to Wilder:

logic.

"If it should turn out that the logical

machinery itself reveals flaws, then what faith can be placed in
the reliability of the theorems

deduced?"-^

Summary Remarks
Chapter 2 discusses the nature of basic assumptions in a
deductive theory.

This chapter concentrates on the theorems and

the entire structure of such a theory.

Taken together, these two

chapters achieve their objective of describing the nature and function
of basic assumptions in a theory or discipline.

Summary and Conclusions
Specifically the origin and significance of the deductive
approach is briefly sketched.

Begun by Aristotle and classically

employed by Euclid, the deductive approach is today employed in both
the sciences and social sciences.

Generally, non-mathematicians

avoid the complexities of symbolic logic.
The deductive approach is described by way of a borrowed
analogy with the mixing of colors.

This description clearly points

out the components of a deductive system which are:

(1 ) initial

statements or basic assumptions of which five types were identified
in Chapter 2, (2) derived statements or theorems, (3) logical rules,
(4) primitive terms, (5) defined terms, (6 ) universal terms, (7) def
initional rules, and (8 ) grammar rules.

l^Wilder, op. cit., p. 45.

Each of these components is

briefly discussed.
Characteristics of a deductive system are then discussed.
In addition to the characteristics of a set of basic assumptions
presented in Chapter 2, full formalization is added and consistency
and completeness are expanded.

Godel's proof shows that a deductive

system cannot be both consistent and complete.
Several advantages of the deductive approach are mentioned.
Forcing a researcher first to recognize all his assumptions and then
to pursue those assumptions to their logical ends are the chief
advantages of the approach.

Other advantages are the efficient break

down of a discipline and the pedagogical benefit of systemization of
a discipline or concept.
The deductive approach to theory construction so successfully
employed in mathematics offers definite advantages to theory con
struction in accounting.

However, the goal of deriving all accounting

principles from one set of basic assumptions is not possible as Godel's
proof has shown.

Consequently, future accounting research efforts

should be concentrated on individual theories in accounting rather
than on attempting to determine the basic assumptions of all of
accounting.

This is an attainable and much more realistic goal.

Preview of Future Chapters
A complete discussion of theory construction has been given.
The remaining chapters of this study illustrate that the techniques
of theory construction can be applied in accounting.
in two ways.

This is done

First, in Chapters 4 and 5, the theory construction
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techniques are employed in constructing an outline of a theory of
financial accounting measurement.

Emphasis is placed on identifying

the five different types of basic assumptions that might appear in
such a measurement theory.

A few key theorems are also derived.

Though key technical terms are explicitly defined, no attempt is made
to determine primitive terms.

This would require that a fully for

malized theory of financial accounting measurement be given, and this
is beyond the scope of this study.
Secondly, that the techniques of theory construction have
wide applicability to accounting theory construction is shown in
Chapter 6 .

A diverse sample of accounting topics is examined there

in light of theory construction techniques.

Chapter 4

MEASUREMENT

The objective of Chapter 4 and 5 is to demonstrate that the
techniques of theory construction are applicable to accounting theory
construction.

This is done by applying these techniques in con

structing an outline of a theory of financial accounting measurement.
But, in order to construct a theory of measurement in accounting one
must know something about measurement theory.

This chapter reviews

some of the major writings on measurement theory.
This rather extensive summary of measurement theory is needed
for two other reasons.

First, a foundation must be laid in this

chapter for showing in Chapter 5 that the theory of financial account
ing measurement developed there is measurement on a ratio scale.
Second, because several of the examples in Chapter 6 involve fiat
measurement, this classification of measurement which is very impor
tant in accounting needs to be explained.
In this chapter a definition of measurement is developed
first.

In order to do this an examination of certain areas of agree

ment and of disagreement in the measurement literature is required.
Secondly, two major measurement classification systems are studied.
Criticisms and modification of the two systems are presented.
Included here is the background material necessary for showing that
the financial accounting measurement rule, developed in Chapter 5, is
81
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measurement on a ratio scale and a brief description of fiat meas
urement.

Finally, the nature of the measurement unit is discussed,

including the one commonly used in financial accounting:

the dollar.

What Is Measurement?
The following section develops a general definition of
measurement.

In doing so a partial definition of measurement is

offered, centering on existing areas of agreement concerning meas
urement.

Following this partial definition is an examination of a

major area of disagreement concerning measurement:
rules constitute measurement rules.

what kind of

The opinions of several meas

urement theorists are presented, as are the opinions of two major
accounting authors who have studied measurement literature.

Finally,

the general definition of measurement assumed in this study is pre
sented.

Measurement— A Partial Definition
That measurement is the assignment of numerals to an object
or event in order to represent a particular property of the object
or event, is commonly agreed upon in measurement literature.

Stevens

points out measurement is possible only because an isomorphic rela
tionship (a one-to-one correspondence) can be established between the
property of an object or event measured on the one hand, and a number
or series of numbers on the other .1

1-S. S. Stevens, "Mathematics, Measurement and Psychophysics,"
Handbook of Experimental Psychology, ed. S. S. Stevens (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1951), p. 1.
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An isomorphic relationship exists when there is a rule which
associates one element of one system with only one element of another
system.

There are two types of isomorphism:

complete isomorphism.

partial isomorphism and

In partial isomorphism, the one-to-one corre

spondence exists between only some of the relations and operations of
the two systems.

In complete isomorphism, the one-to-one correspond

ence exists between all the relations and operations of the two
systems.
In measurement, the isomorphism exists between a system of
empirical operations and the system of numbers.

Because not all

relations among numbers have meaning in the physical world, the iso
morphism is only partial.

Many operations of mathematics have no

counterpart in the physical world.
The assigned number becomes a surrogate for the property in
question.

This number is a most useful surrogate, because numbers

are readily susceptible to mathematical operations.

The mathematical

operations appropriate in any given instance are derived from the
nature of the property represented and the method of numerical
assignment.

Stevens reports:

The type of scale achieved when we deputize the numerals
to serve as representatives for a state of affairs in nature
depends upon the character of the basic empirical operations
performed on nature. These operations are limited ordinarily
by the peculiarities of the thing being scaled and by our choice
of concrete procedures, but, once selected, the procedures
determine that there will eventuate one or another of four types
of scale: nominal, ordinal, interval, or r a t i o . 2

2Ibid., p. 23.
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Stevens’ classification of measurement by scales is discussed shortly,
along with other classification systems.

A brief example highlighting

the preceding discussion is now presented.

An Example
Assume that one has a metal rod.

This rod possesses a number

of properties, including a certain length, weight, and density.

A

scientist could assign a numeral to the metal rod representing the
property of the rod’s length.

Another numeral could be assigned

representing the property of the rod’s weight.

Still another numeral

could be assigned representing the property of density.

In each case

a numeral is assigned to represent some property of the metal rod.
In the case of length or weight, a numeral representing one
of these properties can be added to another numeral representing the
same property.
erties.

In other words, length and weight are additive prop

When two objects of equal length or weight are added, the

result is an object twice as long or twice as heavy.
an additive property.

Density is not

When two objects equally dense are combined,

they do not yield an object twice as dense.

Thus, the property of

density is not additive.

Area of Disagreement
While there is agreement on the aspect of measurement dis
cussed above, disagreement remains on what kind of rules constitute
the measurement rules under which the numerical assignments can pro
perly be made.

The controversy centers on whether classification by

numerical assignment is measurement.

85
Stevens' View— Classification Is Measurement
Stevens takes the broadest view of measurement.
measurement as

He defines

. . the assignment of numerals to objects or events

according to rule---any
matter how absurd it
'random' assignment:

rule."^

sounds.4

Stevens would allow the rule no
"The only procedure excluded is

if there is no criterion for determining

whether a given numeral should or should not be assigned, it is not
measurement.

a rule.

Random assignment, therefore, is assignment without

"With no rule in force, the same numeral might be assigned

to different classes, and different numerals might be assigned to
the same class'1^ in classification or nominal measurement.

Others

do not agree with Stevens' view that classification is measurement.

Classification Is Not Measurement
Classification, also termed measurement on a nominal scale
according to Stevens, is objected to by many writers.

Some consider

classification a premeasurement concept.

Ellis— Restrictions Must Be Placed on Measurement Rules
Ellis feels that Stevens' concept of measurement is too

3s. S. Stevens, "Measurement, Psychophysics, and Utility,"
Measurement: Definitions and Theories, eds. C. West Churchman and
Philburn Ratoosh (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1959), p. 19.
^Robert R. Sterling, Theory of the Measurement of Enterprise
Income (Wichita, Kansas: The University Press of Kansas, 1970), p. 69.
^Stevens, "Measurement, Psychophysics, and Utility," op. cit.,
p. 24.
6Ibid., pp. 25-26.
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broad.

He believes that some restrictions should be placed on the

kinds of rules used to set up scales and hence that qualify as meas
urement

rules.^

According to Ellis, if one has a rule for making

numerical assignments, it does not necessarily follow that one has
an accompanying scale.

The rule must at least prohibit different

numerical assignments from being made to represent the same property,
unless that property has changed to another determinative or specific
form.

Ellis' Modification of Stevens' Definition.— Ellis then
proposes to modify Stevens' definition of measurement.

Ellis states:

For these reasons, then, it is necessary to modify
Stevens' definition of measurement. In particular, it is
necessary to place some restriction on the kinds of rules
that are permissible. For we require that the rule must be
capable of defining a scale; and we have a scale of meas
urement only if the following conditions are satisfied:
(a) we have a rule for making numerical assignments;
(b) this rule is determinative in the sense that,
provided sufficient care is exercised the same numerals (or
ranges of numerals) would always be assigned to the same things
under the same conditions;
(c) the rule is non-degenerate in the sense that it
allows for the possibility of assigning different numerals
(or ranges of numerals) to different things, or to the same
thing under different conditions.
The conditions (b) and (c) are necessary to ensure that
numerical assignments made according the the rule will be
informative— the third condition being included in order to
exclude such degenerate rules as "assign the number 2 to every
thing ."8
Based on the above, Ellis then offers the following

7Brian Ellis, Basic Concepts of Measurement (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1966), p. 39.
8Ibid., pp. 40-41.
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definitions:
(a) Measurement is the assignment of numerals to things
according to any determinative, non-degenerate rule.
(b) We have a scale of measurement if and only if we
have such a rule.
(c)
same scale,
applicable,
ments being

Two procedures are procedures
if and only if, whenever they
they would always lead to the
made to the same things under

for measuring on the
are deemed to be
same numerical assign
the same conditions.9

Arbitrary Exclusion of Classification as Measurement.— Ellis
admits, however, that even the above restriction does not logically
rule out measurement on the nominal scale.^

In order to rule out

nominal measurement Ellis has to take the admittedly arbitrary
position that the nominal scale is not a scale for the measurement
of a quantity.
A quantity is something either greater than, equal to, or less
than something else in some respect.

Examples of quantities include

properties such as weight, length, density, intelligence, probability,
and even prettiness.^
Ellis merely assumes away the problem.

He simply includes

a condition that specifically excludes nominal scale measurement
among his conditions for having a scale for the measurement of a
quantity. ^

He rules out nominal scale measurement by requiring that

when the things measured are arranged in order of the numerals assigned

9 Ibid., pp. 41-42.

10 Ibid., p. 42.

Brian Ellis, "Measurement," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
ed. Paul Edwards (New York: The Macmillan Company and The Free Press,
1967), Vol. 5, p. 242.
l^This requirement is Ellis' condition iii, see footnote 15.
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to them, they are simultaneously arranged in order of the quantity,
q, that is m e a s u r e d . C o n c e r n i n g this arbitrary exclusion of
nominal scales as scales for the measurement of quantities, Ellis
states:
. . . For there are such things as nominal scales which
could conceivably be used for the measurement of quantities;
and on such a scale the order of the numerical assignments
need not correspond to the order of the quantity c[ being meas
ured. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether we should describe
this as a scale for the measurement of c[. It seems more likely
that we should say that it is a scale for the measurement of
equality or inequality in £. However, since scientific lan
guage gives us no firm guide in the matter, we are at liberty
to make whatever choice we please. My inclusion of condition
(iii)[14] as a necessary one is, therefore, rather arbitrary;
but it is defensible on the grounds that the line has to be
drawn somewhere, and this is a convenient place to do it.-^

Ellis— Measurement Must Be Informative
Ellis also objects to certain measurement rules because they
are not informative.

Such rules as "assign to each object the first

number that comes into your head" or "assign to each object in a
series the next number in some monotonic increasing sequence of
rational numbers" supply number surrogates carrying no informational
content.^

Sterling's Objections
Sterling voices similar objections to Stevens' definition of
measurement.

13

First, he objects to calling the nominal scale a

Ellis, Basic Concepts of Measurement, op. cit., p. 43.

l^See footnote 1 2 .
l^ibid., pp. 39-40.

-^Ibid., pp. 43 -4 4 .
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measurement scale.

He does so because the numbers assigned by a

measurement rule on a nominal scale
rank of the s c a l e s . S e c o n d l y ,

. .do not represent the order or

Sterling points out that Stevens'

definition of measurement is not delimiting.

"All characteristics

can be assigned numbers, and therefore everything can be
if Stevens' definition is accepted.

m e a s u r e d , "18

Sterling's third criticism of

Stevens' definition of measurement questions the informational con
tent of some measurement rules.
of Ellis'.

This criticism is identical to that

As Sterling points out, a rule such as "... assign the far

left object the numeral 1.7, and by adding a positive constant, assign
greater numerals to the objects moving from left to right"19 yields
very questionable informational content.

An object's initial name

(book or pencil) is more informative than a number assigned in the
above manner.

However, the lack of informational content in such an

assignment probably is the result of a language bias.

Campbell's Probable View
Campbell, whose classification of measurement is discussed
later with Stevens', also would probably object to nominal scale
measurement.

Sterling states:

"Yet Stevens lists the numbering of

football players as a measurement on a nominal scale. . . . Campbell
would certainly disagree, since he makes explicit his idea that num
bering of houses (street numbers) is not a measurement."20

■^Sterling, op. cit., p. 70.
^Ibid., p. 69.

^Loc. cit.

Campbell

^Loc. cit.
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begins one of his books by stating:
Measurement has been defined as the assignment of
numerals to represent properties. But this definition is
obviously too wide. The assignment of numerals to represent
telephone numbers or the articles in a salesman's catalogue is
not measurement; nor— and here is a more definite representation
of properties— the assignment of numerals to colours in a dyer's
list. 2 -*The examples Campbell describes above are examples of classification
or nominal scale measurement.

Thus, Campbell rules out classification

by itself as constituting measurement.

Exclusion of the Nominal Scale Is Arbitrary
There is considerable opinion that classification does not
constitute measurement.

However, the arguments for excluding the

nominal scale are only based on opinion or preference.

As Ellis

admitted in the earlier quote, his exclusion of the nominal scale was
". . . rather arbitrary; but it is defensible on the grounds that the line
has to be drawn somewhere, and this is a convenient place to do it.
Stevens also realized this and stated:

9 9

" . . . the oft-debated question

whether the process of classification underlying the nominal scale
constitutes measurement is one of those semantic issues that depends
upon taste."^3

There is no logical reason for ruling out the nominal

scale.

^Norman R. Campbell, An Account of the Principles of
Measurement and Calculation (London: Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd.,
1928), p. 1.
22Ellis, Basic Concepts of Measurement, op. cit., pp. 43-44.
^^Stevens, "Measurement, Psychophysics, and Utility,"
op. cit., p. 25.
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An Argument for Nominal Scale Measurement
Excluding nominal scale measurement cannot be justified for
such arbitrary reasons as those given above.
including the nominal scale as measurement.

Good reasons exist for
Mattessich presents this

opposite view:
. . . If one regards measurement, like Stevens . . . it
follows that the most basic measurement is classification, a
fundamental discriminatory process, whereby the various cate
gories can be identified and distinguished through numerals.
Such a broad definition seems not only justifiable but even
desirable because it permits the preservation of a logical
entity or continuity. ^
Later Mattessich again notes:
. . . the undeniable fact remains that every meas
urement is classification. The answer to the reverse question,
whether every classification is measurement, depends, as we
have seen, on the viewpoint. Do we consider a "simple order"
imposed upon subsequent classes as indispensable to measurement
and are we prepared, as a price for our insistence, to dicho
tomize what seems to be a logical entity? If so, do we not
restrict measurement to too limited an area? Do we not impede
progress, especially in the social s c i e n c e s ? 2 5
Thus, Mattessich prefers to consider classification as
measurement because of the logical transition its inclusion offers.
As classification is inherent in all measurement, why not consider
classification by itself a form of measurement?

This logical

transition is apparent in moving from classification to classification
with rank ordering, to classification with rank ordering and equal
intervals, and so on.

It is not important that classification is a

^ R i c h a r d Mattessich, Accounting and Analytical Methods
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1964), p. 58.

25Ibid., p. 61.
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relatively primitive and weak form of measurement.

What is important

is the logical entity the inclusion of classification offers.

Also,

its inclusion as measurement eliminates the necessity of putting
arbitrary restrictions on what will be considered acceptable meas
urement rules.

Measurement Defined
Because of the logical transition that the inclusion of
nominal scales offers, this author prefers to consider classification
as part of measurement.
so is the alternative.

This position is admittedly arbitrary, but
Accordingly, the definition of measurement

adopted in this study is as follows:
Measurement— The assignment by rules of numerals to objects
or events in order to represent particular
properties of the objects or events.

Alternative Systems for the Classification
of Measurement
Stevens and Campbell offer two major systems for the classi
fication of measurement.

Ellis, Torgerson, and Coombs have offered

modifications or classification systems similar to Stevens.

Ellis

and Torgerson have also offered modifications or measurement classi
fication systems similar to that of Campbell.

The purpose of this

section is to briefly examine the suggestions of these measurement
theorists.

The examination permits classification of the financial

accounting measurement system presented in Chapter 5.

Furthermore,

valuable insight is gained from observing how financial accounting
measurement is classified according to each of these perspectives.

93

Stevens' System^
In the previous section, Stevens* definition of measurement
is presented and discussed.

According to Stevens, measurement takes

place when there is a rule, any rule, for assigning numerals to
objects.

Since numerals can be assigned to objects by different rules,

it is possible that different measurement rules may lead to different
measurement scales and different kinds of

m e a s u r e m e n t . 27

Basis of Stevens' Classification
Stevens describes five different kinds of measurement scales:
nominal, ordinal, interval, ratio, and logarithmic interval.

This

classification of measurement scales is based on the mathematical
properties of the scales.

In particular, Stevens classifies scales

by the range of mathematical transformations that leave the form of
the scale i n v a r i a n t . T h e invariance can be either of two types.
If the statistic is dimensionless, its numerical value remains
fixed whenever the scale is transformed by the appropriate mathematical

This discussion on Stevens' classification of scales is
taken mainly from these articles:
S. S. Stevens, "On the Theory of Scales of Measurement,"
Science, Vol. 103 (1946), pp. 677-680.
S. S. Stevens, "Mathematics, Measurement and Psychophysics,"
Handbook of Experimental Psychology, ed. S. S. Stevens (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1951), pp. 1-49.
S. S. Stevens, "Measurement, Psychophysics, and Utility,"
Measurement: Definitions and Theories, eds. C. West Churchman and
Philburn Ratoosh (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1959), pp. 18-63.
27stevens, "Mathematics, Measurement and Psychophysics,"
loc. cit.
^^Ellis, "Measurement," op. cit., p. 244.
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transformation for that statistic.

Dimensionless statistics occur

in a ratio in which the dimensions of the numerator are cancelled
by the dimensions of the demoninator.

If the statistic has a

dimension, its numerical value changes as a result of the mathematical
transformation.

Stevens' classification of scales is shown in

Table 2 on pages 95 and 96.

Five Types of Scales
Shown in Table 2 are the four most important scale types in
Stevens' classification.

His fifth type, the logarithmic interval

scale, has no important applications at the present time.

Nominal Scale
Measurement on a nominal scale often is referred to as
classification.

Classification results when objects are grouped

according to some property they hold in common.

With measurement

on a nominal scale, numbers are assigned to the objects based on the
class to which they belong.
stated as follows:

A nominal measurement rule might be

"Do not assign the same numeral to different

classes or different numerals to the same class."29

A typical

example of this measurement type is the numbering of football players.
In this instance each class contains only one object.
times, several objects may be found in each class.

At other

Mattessich points

out that a business firm's basic chart of accounts is a nominal

29 S. S. Stevens, "On the Theory of Scales of Measurement,"
Science, Vol. 103 (1946), pp. 677-680.
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Table 2

Stevens' Measurement Scales

Scale

Basic
Empirical
Operations*

Mathematical
Group
Structure **

(1 )

(2 )

(3)

Nominal

Determination of
equality

Permutation group x' = f(x)
[f(x) means any one-to-one
substitution]

Ordinal

Determination of
greater or less

Isotonic group x* = f(x)
[f(x) means any increasing
monotonic function]

Interval

Determination of
equality of
intervals or
differences

General linear or affine
group x' = ax + b
a > 0

Ratio

Determination of
equality of
ratios

Similarity group x' = cx
c > 0

*The basic operations needed to create a given scale are all
those listed in column 2 down to and including the operation
listed opposite the scale. In other words, the column 2
listing of the basic operations needed to create each type of
scale is cumulative: to an operation listed opposite a
particular scale must be added all those operations preceding
it.
**Column 3 gives the mathematical transformations that leave the
scale form invariant. Any numeral x on a scale can be replaced
by another numeral x^, where x' is the function of x listed in
column 3.
***Column 4 lists, cumulative downward, some of the statistics
that show invariance under the transformation of column 3.
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Table 2 (continued)

Scale

(1 )

Permissible
Statistics
(invariantive)***

(4)

Typical
Examples

(5)

Nominal

1. Number of cases
2. Mode
3. Contingency
correlation

1. Numbering of football
players
2. Assignment of type or
model numbers to classes

Ordinal

1. Median
2. Percentiles

1. Hardness of minerals
(Mohs scale)
2. Quality of leather, lumber,
wool, etc.
3. Pleasantness of odors
4. Street numbers
5. Intelligence test raw score

Interval

1. Mean
2. Standard
deviation
3. Product-moment
correlation

1. Temperature (Fahrenheit or
[Celsius] Centigrade)
2. Position
3. Time (calendar)
4. Energy (potential)

Ratio

1. Geometric mean
2. Coefficient of
variation
3. Decibel trans
formations

1. Numerosity
2. Length, weight, density,
work, resistance, time
3. Temperature (Rankine or
Kelvin)
4. Pitch scale (Mels)
5. Loudness scale (Sones)
6 . Brightness (Brils)

Sources:
Compiled from tables presented by Stevens in the following:
S. S. Stevens, "On the Theory of Scales of Measurement,"
Science, Vol. 103 (1946), p. 678.
S. S. Stevens, "Mathematics, Measurement and Psychophysics,"
Handbook of Experimental Psychology, ed. S. S. Stevens (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1951), p. 25.
S. S. Stevens, "Measurement, Psychophysics, and Utility,"
Measurement: Definitions and Theories, eds. C . West Churchman and
Philburn Ratoosh (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1959), p. 25.

scale.30
Concerning the nominal scale, Stevens points out:

"The

nominal scale represents the most unrestricted assignment of numerals.
The numerals are used only as labels or type numbers, and words or
letters would serve as well."3^

Accordingly, the numeral assinged to

a class has no significance other than that of designating a separate
and distinct class.

Numerals do not indicate order.

The same

numeral assigned to two objects indicates that the objects fall into
the same class based on some property.

A different number assigned

to some objects indicates that the objects are different in respect
to the property measured.
The least restrictive of any of Stevens' measurement scales
is the range of mathematical transformations that leave the form of
the nominal scale invariant.
Table 2.

This range is shown in column 3 of

The nominal scale remains invariant under permutation group

transformations.

With n objects taken together, the number of

permutations of the n distinct objects is nj_ or n(n-l)(n-2 ) . . .
(3)(2)(1).
B, and C.

For example, suppose one has three distinct objects, A,
And suppose someone wanted to assign three numerals, 1, 2,

3, to these three objects to indicate they are in different classes.
This may be done in six different ways [3! = (3)(2)(1) = 6 ].

The

different assignments are shown in Table 3 on the following page.

on

Mattessich, op. cit., p. 63.
Ol

Stevens, "On the Theory of Scales of Measurement," op. cit.,
p. 678.
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Any of the numerical assignments indicates the objects are in dif
ferent classes.

The numerals assigned contain no informational

content, with the exception that the objects are in different classes
and hence differ in respect to the property measured.

The fact that

more information is conveyed by using a class name ("assets" or
"mammals") instead of a numeral is the result of a language bias.

If

one were accustomed to using numerals instead of words, the opposite
would be true.

Table 3
Permutation Group Transformations
and the Nominal Scale

Assignment of Objects A, B, and C With Numerals 1, 2, and 3

(1 )

(2 )

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6 )

A = 1

A = 1

A = 2

A = 3

A = 2

A = 3

B = 2

B = 3

B = 1

B = 1

B = 3

B = 2

C = 3

C = 2

C = 3

C = 2

C = 1

C = 1

Source:
Original.

Ordinal Scale
Stevens' ordinal scale not only allows one to determine if
some objects are equal in respect to some property, but also to
rank the objects in order of the property measured.
only one or several objects in a given class.

There may be

On an ordinal scale

the numeral assigned to each class of objects represents the position
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of that class with respect to the other object classes.

When the

objects are arranged in order of the property measured, they are
also arranged in numerical order.

The ordinal scale has no natural

zero point, because the properties measured on such a scale have no
natural zero point.

In addition, each class does not necessarily

have equal or regular class intervals.
The above can best be described by an example.

Suppose

objects A, B, and C have been assigned the numerals 1, 2, and 3,
respectively, by a measurement rule on an ordinal scale.

The numerals

indicate that C is greater than B and B is greater than A in respect
to the property measured.

However, object C is not necessarily three

times greater in possession of the property than object A.
Examples of the ordinal scale are given in Table 2 (pages
95-96).

Mohs 1 scale for determining the hardness of minerals is an

example typically cited.

On Mohs 1 scale numerals aife assigned to

minerals, based on their hardness.

If mineral B scratches mineral A,

then mineral Bis harder than mineral A.
a higher numeral.

It is consequently assigned

When the minerals are arranged in order of hardness,

they are also arranged in numerical order.

The quality of leather,

lumber, wool, and other products is also measured on an ordinal scale.
Ordinal scales have the structure of the isotonic group.
Numerals initially assigned, x-^, are determined by any monotonically
increasing function.

In a monotonic function a different value of x

always leads to a different value of x'.

If the function is mono-

toncially increasing, then larger values of x always lead to larger
values of x*.

An example of a monotoncially increasing function would

1 00

be x 1 = 2x.

In other words, the slope of a monotonically increasing

function is always upward.

Thus, the transformation of an ordinal

scale by a monotonically increasing function does not change the
order of the numerals initially assigned.

Interval Scale
Measurement on the nominal scale provides only for the deter
mination of equality.

With the introduction of the ordinal scale,

the ability to determine greater than or less than relations makes
the rank-ordering of properties possible.
duces equal class intervals.

The interval scale intro

Equal differences can now be determined.

However, the choice of a zero point is still arbitrary.

Thus the

equality of ratios cannot be measured.
Typical examples of the interval scale shown in Table 2,
include the Fahrenheit and Centigrade temperature scales.

The zero

point on both scales is chosen arbitrarily.

It does not represent

the empirical property of zero temperature.

Though the class inter

vals on these scales are equal, the absence of a natural zero point
prohibits the assumption that one temperature is twice, three times,
and so on, another temperature.
Interval scales have the structure of the linear group.
may be transformed by any equation of the following form:
where a > 0.
equation.

They

x 1 = ax + b

This equation is simply the generalized form of a linear

For example, the transformation equation to convert from

Centigrade, C, to Fahrenheit, F, is F = 9/5 C + 32.

Ratio Scale
The fourth type of scale discussed by Stevens is the ratio
scale.

They exist where equality, rank-order, equality of intervals,

and equality of ratios in the underlying operations are possible.
Ratio scales do have a natural zero point.
Typical examples of ratio scales are shown in Table 2.
Numerosity is the most common and simplest ratio scale.
scale of cardinal numbers used for counting.
exemplify ratio scales.

This is the

Length and weight also

Temperature measured on the absolute scale,

where absolute zero is not arbitrary, also is a ratio scale.
Stevens does not mention one very important example— the
money system.

Economic objects and events are measured on the ratio

scale of dollars.

"Dollars" is the name of the monetary unit.

is said on the monetary unit later in this chapter.)

(More

The property of

economic value is susceptible to the empirical operations of classi
fication (determining equality), rank-ordering, and for determining
the equality of intervals and ratios.
zero point that has empirical meaning.

Economic value has a natural
Each of these last two state

ments is empirical and is easily verified by one's own experience.
Multiplication by a constant is the only type of mathematical
transformation that applies to ratio scales.
formation that keeps the scale form invariant.

It is the only trans
An example of such a

transformation is converting from yards, £, to feet, f_, by multiplying
by 3; f = 3y.

Two other examples include converting one currency into

another and adjusting for general price-level changes by multiplying
and/or dividing by price indexes.

1 02

Logarithmic Interval Scale
Stevens also mentions the possibility of a fifth scale, the
logarithmic interval scale.

This scale remains invariant under the

following mathematical transformation:
where k and n are both positive.
scale Stevens states:

x 1 = kx11 or the power group

Concerning the logarithmic interval

"The formal properties of such a scale maybe

interesting, but, like many mathematical models, it has thus far
proved useless to the empirical business of science."32

Measurement Scales and Statistics
One final note in passing should be made
in Table 2.

concerning column4

The basis of Stevens1 scale classification, namely

invariance under mathematical transformations, has important impli
cations concerning statistical operations appropriate to each scale.
Stevens points out:

"The criterion for the appropriateness of a

statistic is invariance under the transformation in column 3,"33
should be noted that column 4 is cumulative downward.

it

That is, the

statistics appropriate to an interval scale include all those listed
for the nominal, ordinal, and interval scales.
For example, Stevens points out that on the nominal scale if
the measurement results in assigning only one object to each class
(numbering football players), the only relevant statistic is the

^^Stevens, "Measurement, Psychophysics, and Utility," op.
cit., pp. 31-32.
33stevens, "On the Theory of Scales of Measurement," op.
cit., p. 678.
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number of players assigned a numeral.34

if more than one object is

asigned to each class, then the mode could be calculated.

Computing

the mean or the standard deviation assumes that distance has meaning.
But distance has meaning only on interval and ratio scales.

There

fore, calculating the mean, or standard deviation for a measurement
made on nominal and ordinal scales is not appropriate.
Stevens sums up measurement and statistics as folows:
The basic principle is this. Having measured a set
of items by making numerical assignments in accordance with a
set of rules, we are free to change the assignments by what
ever group of transformations will preserve the empirical
information contained in the scale. These transformations,
depending on which group they belong to, will upset some
statistical measures and leave others unaffected. In other
words, for guidance in setting bounds on the statistical
treatment of empirical measurements, we must look to the
principle of invariance. The empirical operations that
underlie the scale determine what transformations can be
made without the sacrifice of information, and the per
missible transformations determine, in turn, the appropriate
statistical measures, i.e., those that preserve the requisite
invariance.35
Ellis offers a modification of the basis of Stevens'
classification.

The modification draws heavily upon Coombs' classi

fication of measurement scales.

Accordingly, Coombs' classification

is discussed next, followed by Ellis' critique of Stevens'.

This

rather lengthy discussion is necessary because in Chapter 5 it is
used to show that financial accounting measurement is measurement on
a ratio scale regardless whether Stevens or Ellis is correct.

Stevens, "Measurement, Psychophysics, and Utility," op.
cit., p. 29.
~^Ibid., p. 30.
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Accounting measurement must be done on a ratio scale if traditional
methods of adjusting for general and specific price-level changes
(multiplication by a constant) are to be allowed.

Coombs' System36
Coombs has developed a classification of measurement scales
quite similar to that of Stevens.

In fact, many consider Coombs'

system simply an expansion of Stevens'.

Basis of Classification
The basis of Coombs' classification is not invariance of the
scale form under transformation.

Rather, it is according to the kinds

of application of arithmetic which the scales represent.^7
distinguishes between six major types of scales:

Coombs

nominal, partially

ordered, ordinal, ordered metric, interval, and ratio scales.

Only

his partially ordered and ordered metric scales are discussed here.
His other scales are quite similar to those of Stevens discussed
earlier.

Partially Ordered Scale
As noted previously, the greater than or less than relation
on an ordinal scale holds for all pairs of objects taken from different

Of.

The following discussion of Coombs is taken from:
Clyde H. Coombs, "A Theory of Psychological Scaling,"Engineer
ing Research Bulletin No. 34 (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Engineering
Research Institute, University of Michigan, May, 1952).
C.
H. Coombs, "The Theory and Methods of Social Measurement,
ResearchMethods in the Behavioral Sciences, eds. L. Festinger and
D.
Katz, (New York:
Dryden Press, 1952).
37Ellis, Basic Concepts of Measurement, op. cit., p. 52.
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classes.

In a partially ordered scale this greater than or less than

relation holds for only some of the pairs of classes.

For example,

assume that the quality of a given raw material is graded based on
two characteristics.

First, a heavier weight indicates a better

quality; second, a smoother finish indicates a better quality.
Object A being both heavier and smoother than object B is judged to
be a better quality.

Likewise, object B being both heavier and

smoother than object C is judged a better quality.
objects are measured on an ordinal scale:
than C.

These three

A greater than B greater

However, if a fourth object, D, is added that is heavier

than object B but lighter than object A, and smoother than object C
but rougher than object B, the scale becomes a partially ordered
scale.

For without knowing the relation between smoothness and

heaviness, it is impossible to rank-order object D.

Dual Basis of Scale Classification
Coombs breaks every scale down into two elements, the objects
and the distance between objects.

Both elements may be scaled on a

nominal, partially ordered, or ordered scale.

This breakdown allows

Coombs to distinguish subclasses of the major scale types discussed
above.

Writing the scale that applies to the object first and the

scale that applies to the distance between objects second, Coombs
distinguishes between the following types of scales falling below the
interval scale:
(1 )

nominal-nominal,

(2 )

partially ordered-nominal,
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(3)

nominal-partially ordered,

(4)

ordered-nominal,

(5)

partially ordered-partially ordered,

(6 )

nominal-ordered,

(7)

ordered-partially ordered,

(8 )

partially ordered-ordered, and

(9 )

ordered-ordered.38

For example, an ordered-ordered scale is one on which both the objects
and the distance between objects can be rank-ordered.

In other words,

it is possible to determine (1) whether A is greater than or less than
B, and B is greater than or less than C; and (2) whether the distance
between A and B is greater than or less than the distance between B
and C.

A nominal-nominal scale is pure classification.
Coombs points out that this breakdown of scale types could be

greatly extended by considering second-order differences between
objects.

For example, one could consider the difference between the

distance between objects A and B and objects B and C is greater than
the difference between the distance between objects C and D and
objects D and E.39

Metric Scale
Two of the scales listed, the ordered-partially ordered scale
and the ordered-ordered scale, are referred to as an ordered metric

90

Clyde H. Coombs, "A Theory of Psychological Scaling,"
Engineering Research Bulletin No. 34 (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Engineer
ing Research Institute, University of Michigan, May, 1952), p. 4.
^Loc. cit.
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scale.

Coombs describes the ordered metric scale:

. .
can be said
that for at
vals ab, be
in general,

. By an ordered metric is meant a scale of which it
of any triplet of classes that a > b > c and also
least some intervals between classes, e.g., the inter
. . . ij . . . kl, either ij > IcT or kf > ij, where
jk singifies the distance from j to k . ^

Stevens, however, has pointed out that the ordered metric scale need
not be considered a new scale.
scale.^

It is simply an unfinished interval

Thus, it is possible to distinguish different subclasses of

interval scales.

This is done in Table 4 on the next page, showing

the major classes of Coombs' classification and the arithmetic formulas
that apply to each class.

In general, if a given set of formulas apply

to some property, then it is possible to say that the property is meas
urable on the particular type of scale the formulas indicate.

An Example of Coombs' Classification Criteria
As an example of the application of Coombs' criteria, consider
the following.

A calendar is considered an interval scale.

Let a, b,

c, and d be the calendar dates that events A, B, C, and D occurred,
respectively.

As is seen below the arithmetic formulas for interval

scales have analytic interpretations.
(1)

The temporal location of event A may be said to occur
either later, at the same time, or earlier than event B.

(2)

The temporal duration between the occurrence of events
A and B may appropriately be greater than, equal to, or

40c. H. Coombs, "The Theory and Methods of Social Measurement,"
Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences, eds. L. Festinger and
D. Katz (New York: Dryden Press, 1952), p. 478.
^Stevens, "Measurement, Psychophysics, and Utility," op. cit.,
p. 36.
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less than the temporal duration between events C and D.
Thus, calendar time is measured on at least an interval scale.

In

order to show that calendar time is not measured on a ratio scale,
one need only show that the formula a ^ nb has no analytic inter
pretation, and this is the case.

It makes no sense to say that the

temporal location of event A is n times the temporal location of
event B.

With Coombs' system in mind, Ellis' critique of Stevens'

measurement classification system is discussed.

Table 4
Coombs' Classification of Major
Measurement Scales

Scale

These Arithmetic Formulas Have
Analytic Applications

Nominal Scale

a

£b

Ordinal Scale

a

—

Interval Scale:
Nominal-Interval

>
a < b,
>
a < b,

>

Ordinal-Interval

Ratio Scale

<

b

>
a < b,

7

1c-d |

>
|a-bjl ^

1c-d |

|a-b I
I

|,

>
1a-b |
1 ^

I

j

—

.

jc-d|, a

£ nb

(n = any rational number)

Sources:
Adapted from Brian Ellis, Basic Concepts of Measurement
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1966), pp. 244-245; and
Brian Ellis, "Measurement," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed.
Paul Edwards (New York: The Macmillan Company and The Free Press,
1967), Vol. 5, pp. 63-64.
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Ellis' Critique of Stevens'
Classification System
Ellis finds the basis of Stevens' classification of meas
urement scale, invariance of the scale form under mathematical
transformation, somewhat ambiguous.^

Ellis centers his attack on the

contention held by Stevens". . . that a scale form is preserved under
a given transformation if the new scale produced could serve 'all of
the purposes' of the original s c a l e . [ I t a l i c s not in the original.]

Stevens' Classification of the Fahrenheit
and Centigrade Temperature Scales^
Ellis looks first at Stevens' classification of the Fahrenheit
and Centigrade temperature scales as linear interval scales.

Accord

ing to Ellis, showing that Centigrade is converted to Fahrenheit or
vice versa by means of a linear function does not show they are linear
with respect to each other.^

In a similar manner, the fact that two

scales used to measure some property are of the same type, e.g., both
interval scales, does not mean they must be linear with respect to
each other.

The scales could be dissimilar.^

Ellis argues that in order to show that the Fahrenheit and Centi
grade temperature scales are linear interval scales, one ". . . must

^Ellis, Basic Concepts of Measurement, op. cit., p. 58.
^Loc. cit.
4^The following discussion is taken from Brian Ellis, Basic
Concepts of Measurement (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1966), pp. 58-63.
45Ibid., p. 60.

46Ibid., p. 67.
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show that the purposes of these scales could not be served by a
scale which is non-linear with respect to either. . . ."47
not in the original.]

[Italics

But Ellis believes that a non-linear scale,

such as Dalton's, can serve all these

p u r p o s e s . 48

Ratio Scales
In the case of ratio scales, Ellis again finds fault with
Stevens'.

Ellis points out that length, mass, and time interval can

all be measured fundamentally.
examples of ratio scales.

They are also cited by Stevens as

However, it is possible to construct non

linear scales for fundamentally measurable quantities which can serve
all the purposes of linear scales.

Hence, doubt arises as to whether

they are really ratio scales by Stevens' criterion.49

Absolute Temperature Scale
In a similar manner, Ellis again questions Stevens' cate
gorization of the absolute temperature scale as a ratio scale.

Ellis

can find no reason, except mathematical simplicity, why the absolute
temperature scale cannot be transformed by any monotonically increas
ing function.

The fact that the absolute temperature scale has a

natural zero point cannot be used as proof that it is a ratio scale.
First, other non-ratio scales also have fixed zero points.

Further

more, transformations of the absolute temperature scale need not be

47ibid., p. 60.
49ibid., p. 61.

482oc. cit.
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limited to those transformation functions that leave the zero point
unchanged.

If other transformation functions yield new scales that

can do the job, then zero preserving transformations are not
m a n d a t o r y .50

In Defense of Stevens
Ellis has pointed out that Stevens, like Coombs, may actually
have been thinking about the kinds of arithmetic application a scale
represents.^

If this is the case, then Stevens’ criterion for scale

form invariance may be restated as Ellis suggests.
Ellis reformulates Stevens’ criterion for scale form invar
iance under mathematical transformation as follows:
If a scale X is transformed into a scale Y, then Y has
the same scale form as X if and only if propositions belonging
to the same classes of arithmetical formulae may be interpreted
in the same way on both X and Y — those formulae which are
theorems yielding analytic statements under the given inter
pretations, and those which contradict theorems yielding self
contradictory statements.52
This reformulation results in Stevens’ classification being
derivable from Coombs'.

Many of the problems with Stevens' classi

fication system disappear.^3

Ellis, in applying his reformulations

of invariance, shows the following to be true:
(1)

Nominal scale:
(a)

If a scale is classified a nominal scale by Coombs'
classification, then it is also a nominal scale by

50ibid., pp.
52loc. cit.

62-63.

51 Ibid., p.

^^Ibid., p. 6 6 .

65.
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Stevens' classification.
(b)

If there is to be no change in the scale form
under transformation, then only single-valued
functions with a single-valued inverse can be
used to transform the function.

(A permutation

transformation is a subclass of this type of
function.)
(2)

Ordinal scale:
(a)

An ordinal scale by Coombs' classification is an
ordinal scale by Stevens' classification.

(b)

Transformation functions are restricted to strictly
monotonically increasing functions.

(3)

Interval scale:
(a)

Both nominal-interval and ordinal-interval scales
by Coombs' classification are linear interval
scales by Stevens' classification.

(b)

Transformation functions are restricted to linear
increasing functions.

(4)

Ratio scale:
(a)

A ratio scale by Coombs' classification is a ratio
scale by Stevens' classification.

(b)

Transformation functions are restricted to the class
of similarity functions.54

-*^Ibid., pp. 65-66.
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Ellis has modified Stevens’ criterion for scale form invar
iance.

In so doing some of the problems with Stevens' classification

of the absolute temperature scale as a ratio scale are

r e m o v e d . ^5

Thus, showing that a scale for the measurement of a property
is a ratio scale by Coombs’ classification, also shows it is a ratio
scale by Stevens1.
correct.

This assumes that Ellis’ criticism of Stevens1 is

However, it is possible that the criticism is not valid.

Ellis admits to this possibility in pointing out that Stevens may
have left unstated better reasons underlying his classification
system.

^6

If Ellis' criticism is invalid, then Stevens' criteria of

invariance under mathematical transformation can be used to determine
the scale type.

Earlier in this chapter Stevens' criteria was

employed to show that the dollar scale is a ratio scale.

In the fol

lowing chapter Coombs' criteria is also used to show that the dollar
scale is a ratio scale.

Torgerson's Classification of Types of

Scales^?

Torgerson offers another classification of scales similar to
Stevens'.

This is presented below.

He further offers a classifi

cation of different kinds of measurement similar to Campbell's.

This

will be presented after Campbell's classification is discussed.

Tor

gerson also wrote on multidimensional scaling, which will not be
discussed in this study.

55 Ibid., p. 6 6 .

56 Ibid., p. 63.

The following discussion of Torgerson's classification of
measurement is taken from W. S. Torgerson, Theory and Methods of
Scaling (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958), pp. 15-21.
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Four Types of Scales
Torgerson distinguished four types of scales:
ordinal with a natural origin, interval, and ratio.

ordinal,
His classifi

cation does not recognize the nominal scale as constituting meas
urement, and therefore differs from Stevens’.

Also, in contrast to

Stevens, he recognizes an ordinal scale with a natural origin.

Both

Torgerson's ordinal scale with a natural origin and his ratio scale
have a natural origin.
scale do not.

His other ordinal scale and his interval

Like Stevens, the class size on his interval scale

and ratio scale is equal; it is not on either of his ordinal scales.
Torgerson's identification of ordinal scales that have a natural
origin emphasizes the point made earlier by Ellis.

The presence of

a natural origin cannot be used as proof that a scale is a ratio
scale.

Some non-ratio scales also have natural zero points.

Transformations
Torgerson related his scales of measurement to transformation
groups.

His ordinal scale can be transformed by any monotonically

increasing function.

For the ordinal scale with a natural origin,

transformation functions are limited to those monotonically increas
ing functions that do not change the origin.

On the interval scale,

only linear transformations of the form y = ax + b, where ja is
greater than zero, are permitted.

For the ratio scale, only trans

formations that do not change the natural zero point are permitted.
This further restricts the selection of transformation functions to
those of the form y = ax.

The transformations applicable to
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Torgerson's ordinal, interval, and ratio scales are identical with
those for Stevens' ordinal, interval, and ratio scales.
Campbell's classification of measurement is taken up next.
His classification is considerably different from the ones presented
thus far.

Campbell's Classification of Measurement^
Campbell distinguishes between two different kinds of meas
urement:

fundamental and derived.

These are discussed first, fol

lowed by a criticism by Ellis of Campbell's classification system.

Fundamental and Derived Measurement
Fundamental measurement does not depend on prior measurement.
Magnitudes normally measured fundamentally include length, period of
time, mass, number, and electrical resistance.

Campbell points out

other magnitudes such as volume, force, energy, and charge may also
be measured fundamentally.

However, normally in practice they are

not so measured.
Campbell's second kind of measurement, derived measurement,
depends on the prior fundamental measurement of other magnitudes.
Stevens distinguishes between these two different kinds of measurement.

-*^The following discussion of Campbell's classification of
measurement is taken from Norman R. Campbell, An Account of the
Principles of Measurement and Calculation (London: Longmans, Green
and Co., Ltd., 1928).
Norman R. Campbell, Foundations of Science (Formerly titled:
Physics: The Elements, 1921); (New York: Dover Publications, Inc.,
1957).
Norman R. Campbell, What Is Science? (New York: Dover Pub
lications, Inc., 1952— first published in 1921).
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He states:
The classical view of measurement, as Campbell presents
it, is essentially the view that direct or "fundamental" meas
urement is possible only when the "axioms of additivity" can be
shown to be isomorphic with the manipulations we perform upon
objects. Only a few properties, such as length, weight, and
electric resistance, are measurable in this fundamental way.
Most other magnitudes dealt with in physics are measured by
indirect or "derived" measurement— a process in which derived
magnitudes are defined by means of numerical laws relating
fundamental magnitudes. Thus density, the classical example,
is measured by the ratio of mass to volume.^9
Torgerson points out that Campbell's classification of meas
urement distinguishes only two different scales, the ordinal scale and
the ratio scale.

However, the ratio scale is the most important,

since the ordinal scale is rarely used in the physical sciences.60

Ellis' Criticism of Campbell
Ellis criticizes Campbell's classification of measurement and
proposes a modification to it.

These points are discussed next.

Criticisms of Derived Measurement
By derived measurement, Campbell means measurement of con
stants in numerical laws.

A numerical law is the expression of a

numerical relation between two or more magnitudes in the form y = f(x).
The numerical relation may be expressed by any one of many different
types of functions such as linear functions (y = ax + b), quadratic

^^Stevens, "Measurement, Psychophysics, and Utility," op.
cit., p. 2 2 .
^ W . S. Torgerson, Theory and Methods of Scaling (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958), p. 18.
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functions (y = ax2 + bx + c), trigonometric functions (y = a Sin bx),
and others.

In the above functions, a_, b^ and

stants, and x and 2.are variables.

are numerical con

A numerical term is considered a

constant in a numerical law only if:
(1 )

there are several other laws expressed by mathematical
functions of the same form;

(2 )

the laws all express the same physical relationship; and

(3)

the laws differ from each other only in the numerical
value of the constant.

Each law expresses a uniform association of properties differing only
in the numerical value of the constant.

If, as Campbell, one defines

a system as a uniform association of properties, then each different
numerical law relates to a different system.

Thus, several systems

are all characterized by laws of the same form but differing from
each other in the value of each law's numerical constant.

The value

of a numerical constant is considered both a property of a system,
and a measure of the magnitude that the numerical law defines.

For

example, density, d_, is expressed as a numerical relation between two
magnitudes, mass, m, and volume, v.
in a numerical law as follows:
stant.

These magnitudes may be expressed

m = dv, where d is a numerical con

Thus, the measurement of a substance's density depends on the

prior measurement of two other magnitudes, mass and volume.
is an example of derived measurement.

Density is measured by

Density
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measuring the constant, d^, in the above numerical

l a w . 61

Ellis points out that two or more quantities are always
required to evaluate such constants.
temperature,

But, there are other quantities,

for example, that are not fundamentally measurable.

Their measurement depends on only one other quantity.

Ellis further

notes that even density can be measured by reference to the meas
urement of only one quantity if a criteria of equality existed for
the other quantity.

Rather than changing Campbell's definition of

derived measurement to provide for the one quantity case (such as
temperature meaurement), Ellis adds a third kind, associative meas
urement.

Ellis then introduces the term "indirect measurement,"

which applies to measurement of a quantity depending on the prior
measurement of one or more other

q u a n t i t i e s .62

Ellis also finds

fault with Campbell's fundamental measurement.

Criticisms of Fundamental Measurement
Ellis points out that Campbell, in requiring additivity for
fundamental measurement, leaves out a type of measurement that is
neither direct nor fundamental.

For example, Mohs' measurement

scale for the hardness of minerals is neither derived (it does not
depend on the measurement of other quantities) nor fundamental (it
is not additive).

Ellis then introduces another term, "direct

6 lNormal R. Campbell, Foundations of Science (Formerly titled:
Physics: The Elements, 1921); (New York: Dover Publications, Inc.,
1957), pp. 328-346.

6?

Ellis, Basic Concepts of Measurement, pp. cit., pp. 53-57.
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measurement," of which fundamental measurement is one subclass.
Direct measurement includes all forms of measurement that do not
depend on any prior measurement.

In addition, Ellis introduces

elemental measurement, which is applicable any time a property can
be rank-ordered.^3
In summary, Ellis distinguishes four kinds of measurement:
elemental, associative, derived, and fundamental.

These are listed

in decreasing order as to their range of applicability with funda
mental measurement applying to the narrowest range of properties.
Torgerson presents a second classification of measurement
almost identical to Campbell's.

Torgerson simply adds a new kind of

measurement very important in the social sciences, which Campbell
does not recognize.

This modification is discussed next.

Torgerson's Classification of Kinds
of Measurement
6A
TorgersonOH presents a measurement classification system

almost identical to that of Campbell's.

Like Campbell, he distin

guishes between fundamental and derived measurement.

In addition,

Torgerson also discusses a third kind, measurement by fiat, which is
simply measurement by arbitrary definition.

As in all measurement

the property to be measured is linked to something observable.

In

particular, in fiat measurement the relation between the property to

^Loc. cit.
64

The following brief description of Torgerson's classifi
cation of the kinds of measurement is taken from Torgerson, op. cit.,
pp. 21-24.
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be measured and one or more observable properties is arbitrarily
defined.

The measurement of the observable property is taken to be

the measurement of the underlying nonobservable property.
Torgerson points out that there is nothing wrong or logically
incorrect about fiat measurement.

The major difficulty with it lies

in the tremendous number of ways in which a given concept can be
connected to observable, hence measurable properties.
Torgerson states:

For instance,

"We might measure strength of food drive by the

number of hours of food deprivation, by the amount of shock an animal
is willing to take in order to reach food, by the amout of weight
lost during a particular period of deprivation, and so on ."66

Fiat

measurement occurs frequently in psychology and other social sciences.
A number of important instances of fiat measurement in accounting are
presented in Chapter 6 .
The following section looks at the nature of a measuring unit.
The necessity for adjustments of a measuring unit is also discussed.
Understanding the nature of the measurement unit is important for
financial accounting measurement, which uses the dollar as its unit
of measure.

The Measurement Unit
One of the first tasks in developing a measurement system is
the determination of a measurement unit.

A brief examination of

temporal and length measurement provides valuable insight on the

65Ibid., pp. 23-24.

66Ibid., p. 24.
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nature of the measurement unit.

Temporal Measurement
The purpose of the measurement of time is the assignment of
a temporal location to an event.

Lenzen explains:

"The problem of

the measurement of time is to invent a procedure for assigning to
events numbers, called the times or dates of events.
In the measurement of time some periodic process is needed.
In general, any periodic process will do.

A pulse beat, a pendulum,

the vibration of an atom, the passing of a bus past a particular
location on its daily route, or the rotation of the earth are all
more or less periodic processes.
in measuring time.

All could be used as standard units

However, as will be seen shortly, certain types

of periodic processes have distinct advantages over others for use as
standard measurement units.

Length Measurement
In the measurement of length, the objective is to assign to
an object a number representing that object's property of length.
The unit of measure chosen does not have to be rigid, that is, one
that will not change in length.

A measuring rod on which the standard

unit of measurement is marked could be made of wood, rubber, a
variety of metals, plastic, or other substances.

Each of these

materials possesses a different degree of rigidness.

^Victor F. Lenzen, "Procedures of Empirical Science,"
Foundations of the Unity of Science, Vol. 1, No. 5, International
Encyclopedia of Unified Science, ed. Otto Neurath (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1938), p. 15.
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The standard measurement unit of length in the metric system,
the meter, for a long time was defined as the distance between two
scratches on a metal bar kept in a Paris vault.
has been replaced by another standard.

Today, this standard

The new metric system's

standard of length, as established at the Eleventh General Conference
on Weights and Measures, has become the wavelength of the orange-red
light of Krypton 8 6 .
Once a measurement standard has been established, such as
for time or length, this standard can be used to measure the time
of any event or the length of any other object possessing that pro
perty.

The advantages that invariant standard units of measure

offer over others is discussed next.

Advantages of an Invariant Standard Unit
In measurement, the use of a fixed standard unit of meas
urement, invariant over time, has obvious advantages over variable
standard units of measurement.

For example, a rubber measuring rod

could be used as the standard for measuring the length of objects.
But the measurement unit's variability could lead to different meas
urement results.

Thus, it would be possible for different measurements

to yield different numbers representing the length of a given object,
although the object's length remains unchanged.
undesirable.

This is obviously

Although the measurement rule would be very simple,

involving instructions for placing the rod along the object measured,
any scientific laws involving length measurement would be relatively
complicated.

Because in science simpler laws are preferred to more
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complicated laws, measurement standards that lead to simple laws and
theories

are preferred.

Thus, one is encouraged to use relatively

rigid rods for measuring length and processes with equal intervals for
measuring time.
Carnap sums up these points as follows:
You will remember that, in our discussion of periodicity,
we saw that there is no logical reason compelling us to base our
measurement of time on one of the periodic processes belonging to
the large class of equivalent processes. We chose such a process
only because the choice resulted in a greater simplicity in our
natural laws. A similar choice is involved here. There is no
logical necessity for basing the measurement of length on a
member of the one large class of relatively rigid bodies. We
choose such bodies because it is more convenient to do so. If we
chose to take a rubber or wax rod as our unit of length, we would
find very few, if any, bodies in the world that were relatively
rigid to our standard. Our description of nature would, there
fore, become enormously complicated. We would have to say, for
example, that iron bodies were constantly changing their lengths,
because, each time we measured them with our flexible rubber
yardstick, we obtained a different value. No scientist, of
course, would want to be burdened with the complex physical laws
that would have to be devised in order to describe such phenomena.
On the other hand, if we choose a metal bar as a standard of
length, we find that a very large number of bodies in the world
are rigid when measured with it. Much greater regularity and
simplicity is thus introduced into our description of the world.
This regularity derives, of course, from the nature of
the actual w o r l d . 68

The Financial Accounting Measurement Unit
For financial accounting measurement, the standard unit of
measure is the dollar.

The dollar can be used to measure the economic

value of any object possessing that property.

A dollar could be

defined in terms of purchasing power in some given base year.
is unnecessary.

68

York:

This

Such a definition is in terms of some base year

Rudolf Carnap, Philosophical Foundations of Physics (New
Basic Books, Inc., 1966), p. 93.
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whose choice is more or less arbitrary.

Brandis has pointed out

that the question "What is the value of the dollar?" is as meaningless
as asking "What is the length of the meter?"

The length of a meter

is a meter, and the value of a dollar is a dollar.
definition.^9

This is true by

of course, it is possible to measure changes in the

value of the dollar.

However, this again involves taking as standard

the purchasing power of the dollar in some base year.

Advantages of the Dollar
The dollar has several properties that make it an ideal choice
as a standard for the measurement of value.

It is a convenient medium

of exchange, and thus relieves people of the trouble of having to
trade goods for goods (barter).
value.

The dollar also serves as a store of

Thus, goods and services can be sold for money, with the money

used to immediately purchase other goods or services or held till a
later time.

The dollar also serves as a standard of deferred payment,

whereby money can be borrowed and repaid rather than goods and ser
vices being borrowed and repaid.

Adjustments of Measuring Units
Once a standard of measurement is established, the next pro
blem is to determine whether that standard of measurement needs to be
adjusted.

This may be necessary if the forces acting on the standard

69Royall Brandis, Principles of Economics (Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1968), p. 89.
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distort it is some way.

Carnap has stated:

Once we have chosen a standard of measurement, such as a
steel rod, we are faced with another choice. We can say that
the length of the particular rod is our unit, regardless of
changes in its temperature, magnetism, and so on, or we can
introduced correction factors depending on such c h a n g e s .
The consequences of following the first alternative, namely
not adjusting for distorting forces, leads to a simple measurement
rule but a very complicated system of laws and theories describing
the real world.

The second alternative leads to a more complicated

measurement rule, but a simpler system of laws and theories.

Carnap

further points out there is no logical reason impelling us to choose
either a l t e r n a t i v e . H o w e v e r , if all other things are equal,
scientists always prefer the simpler theory to the more complicated
theory, one would again choose to adjust the standard of measurement.
Carnap describes the procedure that could be used in adjusting
a standard of measurement, such as an iron rod.

He states:

. . . Instead of stipulating that the segment between
the two marks [such as the old international standard for the
meter] will always be taken as having the selected length 10
(say 1 or 100 ), we now decree that it has the normal length 1 Q
only when the rod is at the temperature T0 , which we have
selected as the "normal" temperature, while at any other
temperature T, the length of the segment is given by the
equation:
1 = 10 [ 1 + 3 (T - T0)]
where 3 is a constant (called the "coefficient of thermal
expansion") that is characteristic of the rod's substance.
Similar corrections are introduced in the same way for other

70Carnap, op. cit., p. 94.

^Loc. cit.
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conditions, such as the presence of magnetic fields, that
may also affect the rod's length. Physicists much prefer
this more complicated procedure— the introduction of cor
rection factors— for the same reason that they chose a
metal rod instead of a rubber one--the choice leads to a
vast simplification of physical laws .72

Adjustments of the Dollar
The dollar, conventionally accepted standard unit of meas
urement for economic values, can also be adjusted in a similar manner
for distorting influences.

This country has for many years been

faced with a steadily rising level of prices.

This general increasing

level of prices has had a similar

effect on the dollar as risingtem

perature has on a metal measuring

rod.

measurement to shrink.

It causes the standardunit of

Without adjustment, the value of any object

measured by the dollar is distorted.

Price-Level Changes
Non-cash assets of a firm can be adjusted for two price
changes:

general price-level changes and specific price-level

changes.

These price-level changes are discussed below.

General Price-Level Changes.— Adjustments for general pricelevel changes reflect the changes in the general price levels or in
the general purchasing power of money in the economy.

These two are

reciprocals.
A price index shows the relationship between prices in some
base year to prices in other years.

72Ibid., pp. 94-95.

Once again, the choice of a base
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year is usually arbitrary.

But a particular base year may be chosen

to accomplish some particular purpose.
The ideal way to measure changes in the general price-level
is to average the changes in t;he prices of everything the dollar can
buy.

But this is too time-consuming.

Instead a list of products is

selected thought to be representative of the way people spend their
money.

Then, the selected products are weighted to reflect their

relative importance in the spending patterns of people and a weighted
average of the prices is determined.

An index number is used to

express this weighted average in later years as a ratio of the
weighted average of prices in the base year.
Accounting financial statements are not usually restated to
present the economic value of the firm in terms of one year's prices,
but rather contain the value of items in terms of prices of different
years.

If the statements presented are restated to reflect price-

level changes, they are restated to reflect prices in the most
current year.
Adjustments for general price-level changes represent adjust
ments for changes in the measuring unit.

A measuring rod may be

adjusted for expansion or contraction due to temperature changes.
Likewise, the dollar can be adjusted for expansion or contraction in
its purchasing power.

If the economy is characterized by inflation

or a rising general level of prices, the command of the dollar over
products shrinks.

In other words, the dollar buys less and less.

If

the economy is characterized by deflation or a general falling level
of prices, the command of the dollar over products expands.
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Specific Price-Level Changes ."Specific price-level changes
reflect changes in the prices of specific products either above or
below the average change in the general level of prices.

In account

ing, recognizing specific price changes involves the use of current
market prices in the financial statements.

The following chapter

looks at the propriety of using current market prices as a measure
of current economic value.

Price-Level Adjustments
The main purpose of the preceding discussion was to briefly
analyze the nature of the measuring unit.

This discussion also con

sidered the nature of adjustments to the measuring unit for distorting
influences.

Obviously, there are many instances when a measuring rod

is not adjusted for the effects of temperature, magneticism, and so
on.

Whether adjustment should be employed in any particular instance

depends on the purpose the measurement is to serve and the concomitant
accuracy required.

This is true in the case of a measuring rod, the

dollar, or any other standard measuring unit.

Summary and Conclusions
This chapter looks at (1) the nature of measurement, (2) alter
native systems for the classification of measurement, and (3) the
measurement unit.

This analysis of measurement theory is necessary

before a theory of financial accounting measurement can be constructed
to demonstrate the techniques of theory construction.
The discussion of the nature of measurement led to the
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adoption of the following definition of measurement:
Measurement-?— The assignment by rules of numerals to
objects or events in order to represent
particular properties of the objects or
events.
This definition includes classification as measurement.

To exclude

classification from measurement is arbitrary and dichotomizes a
logical entity.
Next, the two traditional measurement classification systems,
Stevens' and Campbell's, are examined.
modifications of these systems.

Other systems discussed are

Stevens' classification leads to the

identification of four major different kinds of measurement scales:
nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio.

Ellis criticized the basis of

Stevens' classification, invariance of the scale form under mathe
matical transformation, and offers a modification to it.

Ellis'

modification draws heavily on Coombs' classification system which
itself is an expansion of Stevens' system.

Coombs adds a partially

ordered scale and an ordered metric scale to Stevens' four major
scale types and further breakdowns these scale types into subclasses.
Ellis' criticism casts doubt as to whether invariance under
mathematical transformation can reliably be used to classify scales.
Since the financial accounting measurement rule developed in Chap
ter 5 requires a ratio scale, it was necessary to explore Ellis'
criticism further.

Ellis, through his reformulation of the basis of

Stevens' scale classification system, was able to show that if a scale
is classified a given type by Coombs, then it must be the same type
under Stevens' system.

In particular, if a scale is a ratio scale

under Coombs’ classification system, it must be a ratio scale under
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Stevens'.

In Chapter 5 this is used to show that whether Ellis'

criticism of Stevens is correct or not, the financial accounting
measurement rule developed is measurement on a ratio scale.
The other major measurement classification system, developed
by Campbell, is discussed next.
damental and derived measurement.

Campbell distinguished between fun
Campbell's system seems to exclude

much of the measurement done in accounting and other social sciences.
With present knowledge very few concepts dealt with in the social
sciences are fundamentally measurable or capable of being linked to
fundamentally measurable properties.
Ellis found several problems with Campbell's classification
system.

In particular, Ellis found that some quantities

like tem

perature are not fundamentally measurable according to Campbell's
criterion.

And, some properties that Campbell says may be measured

by derived measurement can be measured by procedures that are neither
derived nor fundamental.

Rather, than modifying Campbell's definitions

of fundamental and derived measurement, Ellis simply adds two other
types of measurement:

elemental and associative.

Torgerson presented a measurement classification system almost
identical to Campbell's.

In addition to fundamental and derived meas

urement he identified fiat measurement.

Fiat measurement, measurement

by stipulation or definition, is used frequently in the social
sciences.

In Chapter 6 some of the selected examples used to further

demonstrate the techniques of theory construction involve fiat meas
urement .
Finally, the measurement unit is examined.

It is highly
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desirable that any measurement unit be relatively rigid.
to simpler theories.
dollar.

This leads

In accounting, the measurement unit is the

Like all measuring units the dollar is subject to distorting

influences.

General price-level increases can have the same effect

on the dollar as rising temperature has on a metal measuring rod.
Both cause the standard unit of measurement to shrink.

Adjustments

for changes in the general purchasing power of the dollar can remove
such distorting influences.
The following chapter continues on with the objectives of
Chapters 4 and 5 to demonstrate that the techniques of theory con
struction are applicable to accounting theory construction.

In

Chapter 5, the discussion of measurement theory is applied in a
theory of financial accounting measurement.
treated as a value measurement discipline.

Accounting will be

Chapter 5

AN OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING MEASUREMENT

The objective of Chapters 4 and 5 is to demonstrate that the
techniques of theory construction discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 are
applicable to accounting.

This is shown by applying those techniques

in constructing an outline of a theory of financial accounting meas
urement.

However, to do so one must be knowledgeable about meas

urement theory.

Thus, a brief summary of measurement theory was

presented in Chapter 4.

In this Chapter the background material on

measurement theory is combined with accounting and economic theory
to develop some basic assumptions and theorems that might appear in
a theory of financial accounting measurement.
In the first section of this chapter a number of existence
and environmental assumptions are discussed.

These assumptions are

developed to determine why products and business firms have the
property of economic value.

Secondly, economic value in an absolute

versus a personal sense is examined.
economic valuations is presented.
products is analyzed.

A method of observing personal

Thirdly, the supply and demand of

An equivalence relationship is established

between economic value and the market equilibrium price.

Fourthly,

the significance of the market equilibrium price is examined and an
approximate measure of it is presented.

The measurement of economic

value is tied to financial accounting measurement.
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An assumption of

value additivity is added.

Then, a summary and brief discussion of

each of the five different types of basic assumptions is presented.
Relevant conclusions concerning the use of the techniques of theory
construction in accounting are presented.

Existence and Environmental Assumptions
To study financial accounting measurement, one must first
look at the environment in which business firms operate.

The des

cription of the business-financial accounting environment that fol
lows is idealistic.

It is not meant to be a complete description of

the real business world.

It is only meant to be a generalized des

cription of significant factors.
The following basic assumptions^ about the business-financial
accounting environment can be made.
Existence Assumptions;
l.Ax.l -

Thereexists a finite set of business firms.

I.Ax.2 -

Thereexists a finite set of consumers.

I.Ax.3 -

Thereexists a limited supply of productive resources.

I.P.l

-

Thereexists an activity called "financial accounting
measurement."

I.Ax.4 - There exists purely competitive markets.
These assumptions state some of the conditions under which this theory

^Each type of assumption, corresponding to the five types of
assumptions presented in Chapter 2, is identified by one of the fol
lowing symbols:
Obj. = objective
I.Ax. = internal axiom
I.P. = internal postulate
B.Ax. = bridge axiom
B.P. = bridge postulate.
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applies.

For example, I.Ax.4 limits the applicability of this theory

to pure competition.

Each assumption is discussed briefly in the

following sections.

Pure Competition
As used in economic theory, pure competition represents an
idealization.
market.

It probably does not exist in its purest form in any

Certain agricultural markets, and perhaps the securities

market, most closely approximate purely competitive markets.

Characteristics of Pure Competition
Pure competition exists in a market characterized by the
following conditions:
1.

There are homogeneous products.

2.

Each buyer and each seller is so small relative to the

size of the market that he cannot individually affect the price of
what he is buying or selling.
3.

There are no barriers to entry or exit by a firm.

4.

There are no artificial restrictions placed on the demand,

supply, and/or prices of productive resources.

Reasons for Studying Pure Competition
Studying the idealization of pure competition is very useful.
Leftwich points out three important reasons why:
. . . First of all, the principles of pure competiton
furnish a simple and logical starting point for economic
analysis. Second, a larger measure of competition does exist
in the United States today, although perhaps not in pure form.
Third, the theory of pure competition provides a "norm" against
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which the actual performance of the economy can be checked
or evaluated.^
Thus, through studying pure competition, one is better able to under
stand competition that exists in the real world which is not pure
competition.

For the study of financial accounting measurement under

other forms of competition, understanding it under pure competition
is the logical starting place.

Also, to the extent that pure com

petition is approximated in any market, a purely competitive theory
of financial accounting measurement is applicable.

Objectives of Financial Accoutning
The most recent and comprehensive statement of the objec
tives of financial accounting is contained in the Statement of the
Accounting Principles Board No. 4 , "Basic Concepts and Accounting
Principles Underlying Financial Statements of Business Enterprises,"
issued in October, 1970.

In it the APB stated:

"The basic purpose

of financial accounting and financial statements is to provide
financial information about individual business enterprises that is
O

useful in making economic decisions. . . ."

Financial Accounting Objectives
Financial statements are generally regarded as the media by

^Richard H. Leftwich, The Price System and Resource Allocation
(4th ed.; Hinsdale, Illinois: The Dryden Press, Inc., 1970), p. 28.
^"Basic Concepts and Accounting Principles Underlying Finan
cial Statements of Business Enterprises," Statement of the Accounting
Principles Board No. 4 (New York: American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, 1970), p. 9.
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which this financial information is communicated.

The way financial

information is presented in financial statements is determined by
generally accepted accounting principles.

In turn, these principles

are based on basic assumptions underlying financial accounting.
Giving rise to the generally accepted accounting principles are what
APB Statement No. 4 calls "General Objectives."

These general objec

tives which determine the domain of financial accounting are sum
marized below:
1.

To provide users with reliable financial information

about economic resources and obligations of a business firm.
2.

To provide users with information concerning changes

in

net resources (resources less obligations) of a firm resulting from
profit-oriented activities.
3.

To provide users with financial information that assists

them in estimating or predicting the earning potential of the enter
prise.
4.

To provide users with other information about changes in

economic resources and obligations.
5.

To provide users with all other needed relevant infor

mation related to financial statements.^

The Financial Accounting Process
The APB subdivides the financial accounting process into
several subprocesses or operations.
1.

There are summarized as follows:

Selecting those events affecting the economic resources

^Ibid., pp. 33-34.
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and obligations of a firm that will be accounted for.
2.

Analyzing those events to determine their effect on a

firm's financial position.
3.

Measuring the effects of the events on the financial

position of a firm.
4.

Classifying the measured events according to the indi

vidual assets, liabilities, owners' equity, revenues, and expenses
affected.
5.

Recording the measured effects according to the indi

vidual assets, liabilities, owners' equity, revenues, and expenses
affected.
6.

Summarizing the individual measured, recorded effects

of each asset, liability, owners' equity, revenue, and expense by
aggregation and grouping.
7.

Adjusting the records for events that are already

recorded, classified,
data,

and summarized by using remeasurements, new

corrections, or any other adjustments required.
8.

Communicating the processed information to users in the

form of financial statements.^
The theory constructed in this study is concerned only with
items 3 and 7, that is, the measurement and remeasurement of the
resources and changes in the resources of business firms.

In the

theory of financial accounting measurement constructed here, financial
accounting is viewed as a value measurement discipline.

■’ibid., pp. 68-69.

It is
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concerned with measuring a property of resources called "economic
value."

Economic value is a type of value determined by supply and

demand.

It is distinct but related to other types of value such as

social, ethical, and aesthetic value.
In this study a theoretical basis is provided for using
current market prices of assets as a measure of the current value of
a business firm.

The historical purchase price of an asset repre

sents its economic value only at the time of purchase.
events change the asset’s value.

Subsequent

At any subsequent time, in order

to measure the new value of the asset, one has to assign to that
asset another number representing its new value.
In summary this study is concerned with one objective of
financial accounting:
Obj.l - An objective of financial accounting is to measure
the economic value and changes in the economic
value that have occurred in a profit-oriented
business firm in order to enable investors to
predict the future economic value of the firm.

Prediction of the Future
Users want accounting information to predict the future value
of a business firm.

Users are interested in how well management per

formed in the past as a guide to how well management will perform in
the future.
predicted.

Accounting data is a means by which the future can be
But, prediction of a firm's future is only a means.

Investors use accounting information to increase their incomes and
thus increase their consumption of goods and services and the con
comitant satisfaction that consumption brings.

A brief discussion of
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a number of important assumptions related to prediction follows.

I.Ax.5
I.Ax.5 - All prediction of the future is based on knowledge
of the past.
This assumption is basic to all prediction.

Man's only

source of knowledge about what may occur in the future is what did
occur in the past.

Investors base their decisions on knowledge of

what has occurred in the past.

One such source is the financial

statements prepared by business firms.

Investors take the data pre

sented in these statements and project it forward as an indication of
a firm's performance in the future.

I.Ax .6
I.Ax.6 - The more complete one's knowledge of the past the
better one's ability to predict the future.
If the past is man's only source of knowledge about the
future, then it also seems that the more complete man's knowledge of
the past, the better his ability to predict the future.

If this

assumption is correct, information on daily stock price changes would
be a better predictor than information showing those changes at one
month intervals.

Or, reports showing economic value changes as they

occur, as in current value accounting, would be better predictors of
a firm's future economic value than historical cost-based financial
accounting.
Elaborating on this second example, historical cost-based
financial accounting presents a less complete picture of what has
happened

in the past than current value accounting.

Many times in
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historical cost-based accounting only net value changes are reported;
that is, value changes that may combine both component value increases
and/or decreases.

That values of certain items fluctuate is no reason

to delay reporting these fluctuations.

If I.A.5 and I.Ax .6 are true,

then failing to report all value changes gives users less complete,
possibly misleading information on which to base their predictions.
I.Ax.5 and I.Ax.6 are reflected in the previously stated objective
for financial accounting of measuring the economic value changes that
have occurred in a business firm.

I.Ax.7
I.Ax.7 - The past is uncontrollable.
The assumption that past events are no longer subject to one's
control is readily observed in accounting.

The idea that sunk costs

are irrelevant in capital budgeting decisions reflects this assump
tion.

Another example is the case of economic value changes.

Once

such changes have occurred, they are no longer subject to one's con
trol.

They can be partially ignored as in historical cost-based

accounting, or they can be reported as in current value accounting.

I. Ax .8
I.Ax.8 - The future is uncertain.
No matter how likely or unlikely the occurrence of some event
may be, if it has not occurred, it may not occur.

What happens in

the future may be predicted but can never be known with certainty.
Economic value changes can be ignored because they may not ultimately
be realized in

a sale.

But, all fixture occurrences are uncertain.
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And, if as is assumed above, more complete data yield better pre
dictions, ignoring "unrealized" value changes may yield less efficient
predictions.

I.Ax.9
I.Ax.9 - Time is not efficacious.
This assumption asserts that things do not change merely
because of the passage of time, but because of the actions of some
other influence.

For example, a child may grow six inches in a given

interval of time.

The child’s increase in stature is not caused by

the passage of time.

Rather, the cause is related to the physiological

workings of human growth.
Economic value changes do not occur merely because of the
passage of time.

These value changes reflect supply of and demand for

goods and services.

And, supply and demand reflects the views of

society on the economic value of goods and services.

This idea is

expanded in the sections that follow.

Sufficient Reason
Sufficient reason has been described as an assumption under
lying reason itself.6
I.Ax.10 - Sufficient Reason - If something exists then there
is a reason for its existence.

^Richard Taylor, Metaphysics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 86-87.
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An Example of Sufficient Reason
An example can be given similar to the one used by
in illustrating this assumption.

Taylor^

If someone walking through a

forest came upon a perfectly round, shiny ball completely out of
place in its surroundings, he would not immediately question its
existence.

Rather, he would question the reason for its existence.

He would assume there is some explanation behind the existence of
the ball.

Furthermore, he would assume that this explanation is

capable of being discovered.

Even if this individual never dis

covered the explanation behind the existence of the ball, he would
still in all probability believe there is some explanation.

Indeed,

this belief in an explainable or knowable reason behind things is
one belief that has spurred scientists on in their attempt to explain
the physical world.

As Nagel has stated:

"...

the distinctive aim

of the scientific enterprise is to provide systematic and responsibly
supported explanations."^

This assumption can be applied to business

activity in the following special way.

Sufficient Reason and Business Activity
Business firms owe their existence to man.
firm to exist, man must create it.
must continually support it.

For a business

For it to continue to exist, man

It follows from the sufficient reason

^Ibid., pp. 85-87.

8
Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York:
Brace & World, Inc., 1961), p. 15.

Harcourt,
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assumption that there must be a reason why business firms exist.
First of all, business firms exist because the products they supply
are wanted and needed by consumers.

Consumers want and need these

products because their consumption provides satisfaction.
Secondly, business firms exist because they are supported
by investors.

As investors, people are like business firms.

Their

objective is to maximize the profits they receive from their invest
ments.

These profits enable people to increase their consumption of

products and thus the satisfaction they obtain from that consumption.

Products, Land, and Labor
The basic resources man has to work with are creations of
God.

The products made from basic resources are creations of man.

If man creates a product then there must be a reason.
is to satisfy his wants and needs.

This reason

This is true whether it is

for consumer goods and services or industrial goods and services.
As Boulding points out, the satisfaction of a consumer’s wants and
needs is the ultimate product of all economic activity.9
A product, which maybe a good or a ssrvice or both, is a
nonobservable.

One can observe a specific product, such as a desk,

but one cannot observe the total product.

The total product includes

nonobservable characteristics such as the reputation of the firm, the
psychological image of the product perceived by the consumer, and the
product’s warranty.

^Kenneth E. Boulding, Economic Analysis (New York:
Brothers Publishers, 1941), p. 637.

Harper &

144
The goods and services produced by business firms represent
bundles of the scarce productive resources:
capital.I®

land, labor, and

in consuming a product, a consumer is actually consuming

a bundle of scarce productive resources.

On the supply side, in

producing a product, a producer is simply combining scarce productive
resources.

If productive resources exist in limited supply, so too

must goods and services.

The following corollaries and definitions

are given.
Def.4 - Goods and Services - Bundles of scarce productive
resources.
■f

Cor.l - All goods and services exist in limited supply.
Def.5 - Product - Either a good or a service or both.
Def .6 - Production - The process of combining scarce
productive resources in order to form a product.
Cor.2 - All products exist in limited supply.

People and Economic Activity
It is obvious that economic activity could not take place
without people.

It is not as obvious that people play two dis

tinctive but related roles in economic activity.
as consumers of goods and services.

First, people act

Second, people act as business

l^Land, labor, and capital are normally defined in economics
as follows:
Def.1 - Land - The natural resources or gifts of nature in
the state they are obtained from nature.
Def.2 - Labor - The human effort, both mental and physical,
used in the production of goods and services.
Def.3 - Capital - The goods produced by man for use in
further production.
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firms.

As the owners of the scarce productive resources (i.e.,

land, labor, and capital) people act as business firms in supplying
these scarce resources to other business firms.
A specific person is an observable entity.
firm or a consumer is a nonobservable.

But, a business

In science, the existence

of nonobservables is frequently assumed.

Furthermore, the nonob

servables are assumed to have certain characteristics.

In Chapter 2

theoretical concepts are described as nonobservable characteristics
of nonobservable things.

A number of nonobservable charactertistics

of consumers and business firms are discussed below.

These char

acteristics constitute basic assumptions in the theory of financial
accounting measurement presented in this chapter.

Nonobservable Characteristics of Consumers
Consumers may be characterized by the following objective:
Obj.2 - The objective of all consumers is to maximize the
satisfaction of their wants and needs that they
derive from the consumption of goods and services.
The characterization of consumers as maximizers of satis
faction is an idealization.

As an idealization, a description is

offered of people under highly purified conditions, free from the
influence of many other complementing and conflicting objectives.
Under real world conditions these other objectives are assumed rela
tively insignificant when compared to the dominant objective of max
imizing satisfaction.
The world is characterized by a scarcity of productive
resources.

Business firms compete for the use of these scarce

V
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resources in order to produce various products.

In contrast to

the limited supply of productive resources, and hence products, there
exists unlimited wants and needs on the part of consumers.
always desire more products.

Consumers

But, the intensity of consumers' wants

and needs for different products varies.
The ability of consumers to satisfy their economic wants and
needs is dependent on their money incomes, which are limited.

With

unlimited wants and needs and only limited money incomes available
to satisfy those wants and needs, consumers must make a choice.

In

keeping with the objective of all consumers, they will choose to
satisfy their most intense wants and needs first if their money income
is sufficient to do so.

The greater the intensity of a particular

want and need, the greater the satisfaction derived from satisfying
that want and need.

The following internal assumptions follow from

this discussion.
I.Ax.11 - All consumers have unlimited wants and needs for
products.
I.Ax.12 - All consumers have finite money incomes available
to purchase products.
I.Ax.13 - The satisfaction a consumer derives from consuming
different products or different combinations of
products varies.
Def.7

- Combination of products - One subset of the set of
available products.

Theorem 1 (Th.l) follows from the preceding assumptions.
Th.l

- Consumers can never completely satisfy all their
unlimited wants and needs for products because they
have finite money incomes.
(From I.Ax.11 and
I.Ax.12)
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Business Firms
A nonobservable entity whose existence is very important in
our economy today is the profit-oriented business firm.

Business

firms have certain observable and nonobservable characteristics.
Observable characteristics include the firm's physical plant or
employees.

Nonobservable characteristics that could be considered

observable if they could be measured in a relatively simple way
include the possession of assets, which have a certain value, and
the ability to generate profits or incur losses.
Business firms also are frequently characterized as having
the following objective:
Obj.3 - The objective of all business firms is to maximize
profits.
Profit maximization is an idealization.

Business firms have many

other complementing and conflicting objectives.

But, as an ideal

ization, profit maximization is assumed to be the dominant objective
of all profit-oriented business firms.

This objective describes

their behavior under highly purified conditions in which the relative
influence of other complementary and conflicting objectives has been
removed.
Business firms control certain scarce productive resources.
This control may be through formal legal ownership or informally as
in the case of the relationship between labor and the business firm.
The term "control" simply means the right to use.
The value of any particular business firm is derived directly
from its ability to satisfy the wants and needs of consumers.

Even a
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business firm that sells only to other business firms derives its
value from the wants and needs of consumers of the business firms
which they supply.

A business firm exists because it supplies

final products or intermediate component products (capital) that are
desired by consumers.

The business firm’s ability to provide satis

faction is in turn directly derived from its control of certain
scarce productive resources.

These resources can in turn be combined

to form the scarce products that consumers and firms demand.

These

scarce resources include land, labor, and capital.

Labor is as

valuable to any business firm as land and capital.

Without all

three, a business entity could do nothing.

The scarce resources

under a business entity's control at any given time are part of its
assets.
The following assumptions and definitions follow.
I.Ax.14 - The economic value of a business firm is derived
from the ability of a business firm to satisfy
the wants and needs of consumers for products.
I.Ax.15 - The ability of a business firm to satisfy the
wants and needs of consumers for products is
derived from the scarce productive resources
under a business firm's control.
Def.8

- Control - The right to use.

Def.9

- Asset - A quantity of money or a claim to a
quantity of money or a scarce productive resource
under a business firm's control at any particular
time.

Money or a claim to money represents the ability to acquire
productive resources.

Thus, money or a claim to money can be con

sidered like productive resources.
theorem follows.

From the above the following
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Th.2 - The economic value of a business firm is derived
from the assets under a business firm’s control.
(From I.Ax.14, I.Ax.15, and Def.9)
In summary, the preceding discussion has attempted to
describe the essence of economic activity through a set of basic
assumptions.

In the following section other assumptions are added

concerning the measurement of economic value.

Absolute Vs. Personal Economic Value
Two alternative concepts of economic value are examined in
this section.

First, economic value in the absolute, perfect, or

all-encompassing sense is discussed.
personal concept is examined.

Secondly, economic value as a

It is this personal concept of

economic value that has relevance for this study.

The remainder of

this section proceeds to determine how such a personal conept of
economic value might be measured.

Finally, a distinction is made

between economic value and consumer satisfaction.

Absolute Economic Value
The assumption of sufficient reason asserts that for every
thing that exists, there is a reason for its existence.

From this

assumption it can be asserted that everything that exists has an
economic value in an absolute sense.

But there is no readily apparent

method by which economic value in this absolute sense is measurable.
In an absolute sense economic value is thought of as the
true economic value of some resource.

This view asserts that while

a resource may have a number of different economic values, there
exists one true economic value.

In order to know the true economic
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value of a resource, one would have to have perfect knowledge.

Not

just perfect knowledge as the term is used in economics, but truly
"perfect" knowledge.

Perfect knowledge here refers to knowledge of

every factor that has or will affect the value of a resource.

For

example, one must know the total supply of some resource existing
both presently and the amount that will exist in the future.

One

must know when, where, and how this resource will be obtained.

On

the demand side, one would have to know all possible present and
future uses of the resource including when, where, and how it will
be used.

The economic value determined with such "perfect" knowl

edge would clearly represent a perfect or true economic value.
such all-encompassing knowledge is clearly impossible.

But

Economic

value in this sense is too highly abstract to be of value for the
purposes of this study.

Personal Economic Value
Economic value may also be viewed in a personal way.

In this

sense, economic value is relative to the person doing the valuing at
any given time.

Thus, economic value is a personal thing.

An indi

vidual can value a resource based on the factors which he perceives
as affecting it.

Such a valuation clearly reflects the individual's

personal wants and needs if he is acting as a consumer.

And if he is

acting as an employee of a business firm, such a valuation reflects
both his personal wants and needs and the objectives of the business
firm in which he is employed.

The problem is to determine the per

sonal economic value consumers and producers place bn resources.
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How to Observe Personal Economic Value
If economic value is a personal thing and hence lies in the
eyes of the beholder, how will accountants be able to measure it?
Stevens provides a clue.

As an example of operationalism Stevens

has stated:
. . . I know nothing about your sensations except
what your behavior tells me. But what is equally true,
we know nothing about the charge of the electron except
for what its behavior discloses. We must be thoroughly
operational in both instances.H
Likewise, accountants can know nothing about how people value an
item except what their behavior reveals.

And their behavior is

observable in their actions of buying and selling goods and services
in the market place.

Thus, while economic valuations are a personal

thing, they are also observable in the behavior of people buying and
selling in the market place.

Why Personal Economic Value Exists
Economic value is a property of a product.

It is a property

that people give to a product because of their wants and needs.
Economic value exists because goods and services exist in limited
supply and the demand for those goods and services is unlimited.
People always perfer more to less goods and services.

Economic value

becomes an observable property through the actions of buyers and
sellers in an exchange transaction.

S. Stevens, "Measurement and Mail," Management Information:
A Quantitative Accent, eds. Thomas H. Williams and Charles H. Griffin
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Ind., 1967), p. 12.
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Boulding states:

"This capacity which a thing has for being

exchanged is called its value, just as the capacity which a thing has
for being extended is called its " l e n g t h . B r a n d i s has also dis
cussed this concept of economic value.

He states:

A frequent delusion about money is based upon the
notion that economic value exists in some sense outside of the
economic system and cannot really be measured in money terms,
that is, by prices. Economists, themselves, in the beginnings
of the subject had difficulty here. They wrestled valiantly
with the idea of "value-in-use" and "value-in-exchange" as two
different things, the latter being the money value or price of
something. We see now, however, that the only value that has
economic meaning is "value-in-exchange." This value is
expressed in money terms in a money-price system.
Thus, as used in this study, economic value refers to a value
determined in an exchange.

Such a value is measurable in monetary

terms on what could be called a dollar scale.

Measurement of the

economic value changes that have occurred requires measurement of the
current economic value of a firm’s assets.

This, in turn, requires

measurement in current monetary terms or in terms of current exchange
values.

And, it will be shown in an upcoming section that the

current exchange price shows the current valuation suppliers and
users place on a product.

A Bridge Assumption
The following bridge axiom connects the nonobservable economic

■^Boulding, op. cit., p. 256.
1^

Royall Brandis, Principles of Economics (Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1968), p. 113.

value to an observable activity.
B.Ax.l - A person's personal economic valuation of a product
is observable in that person's behavior of buying
and selling in the market place.
If the person is a consumer, then he is assumed to be attempting to
maximize his personal satisfaction.

If the person is an employee of

a business firm, then he is assumed to be attempting to maximize the
profits of that business firm.

In either case his actions reflect

the objectives of the role he is playing.

And his actions, in an

exchange, reflect his personal economic valuation in accordance with
his objectives.

Economic Value and Consumer Satisfaction
Economic value is not a measure of satisfaction.

Satisfaction

from consuming products would be obtained even if resources and prod
ucts were free.

That is, if every resource and product existed in

such an abundant supply that it was free for the taking, it would have
a zero economic value in an exchange but still provide theuser with
some positive level of satisfaction.
is the objective of consumers.

The attainment of satisfaction

Economic value is a relative measure

of how dear a particular good or service is to someone at a given
time.

The following section attempts to discover an observable

measure of an asset's economic value.

The Measurement of Economic Value
As described in the preceding section, economic value is a
property given to products by people.

In this section an attempt is
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made to find a way to measure economic value.

Demand, Supply, and Economic Value
In developing a theory of economic value measurement, buying
and selling in two markets must be considered.

These two markets

are the market for consumer goods and services and the market for
productive resources.

From the assumptions underlying the theory of

consumer demand, it is possible to derive individual and market
demand curves for final products.

Likewise, from the assumptions

underlying production theory it is possible to derive individual and
market demand and supply curves for productive resources (land, labor,
and capital).
here.
book.

The details of these derivations are not presented

They are contained in any standard microeconomic theory text
14

However, these assumptions are part of this theory of

financial accounting measurement.

The discussion here begins with

the end result of those theories, that is, individual demand and
supply curves.

Demand Curves for Consumers
A consumer attempts to maximize the satisfaction of his
unlimited wants and needs with a limited income through the purchase
of goods and services.

What a consumer purchases is what he desires

l^For example, see William J. Baumol, Economic Theory and
Operations Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
Inci, 1961); and C. E. Ferguson, Microeconomic Theory (rev. ed.;
Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1969); and Richard H.
Leftwich, The Price System and Resource Allocation (4th ed.;
Hinsdale, Illinois: The Dryden Press, Inc., 1970).
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most of the products he is able to purchase.

Thus, the prices he is

willing to pay represents his personal valuation of the economic
value of different products.
competitive markets.

Such prices are efficient in purely

They are efficient in the sense that a consumer

would not pay an inflated price if a lower price were available.

In

doing so he would be attaining a lower level of satisfaction.
Demand traditionally is defined as follows:
Def.10 - Demand - The different quantities of a product that
consumers or business firms are willing and able to
buy at different prices with all other determinants
of demand other than the price of the product in
question held constant.
Leftwich has pointed out that the demand curve is a maximum concept.
A demand curve shows for different quantities the maximum prices that
will be paid for a product per unit of time.-^

As such, a consumer's

demand curve for a particular product represents his subjective, per
sonal valuation of the maximum value of different quantities of a
product.
Market demand represents the aggregate of all the individual
consumers' demand curves.

Market demand reflects the personal val

uation of all users of a particular product.
consensus^

Thus, it represents a

valuation of different quantities of a product.

Demand Curves for Business Firms
A business firm's demand for a particular scarce productive

■^Leftwich, op. cit., p. 31.
•*-^As used here consensus refers to the collective opinion of
a group of people.
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resource depends on the price and productivity of that resource, the
price of what is to be made from that resource, the price and pro
ductivity of alternative resources, and the limited amount of money
the individual firm has available to acquire productive resources.
A firm's demand curve shows the maximum prices that the firm will
pay for given quantities of the resource.

Since each firm is a profit

maximizer these prices are efficient prices.

Each firm attempts to

minimize its costs because in pure competition an individual business
firm has no control over output prices.

Of course, some firms will

be more efficient than other firms.
A market demand curve shows the aggregate demand of all indi
vidual business firms for a particular productive resource.

As such,

a market demand curve represents a maximum consensus valuation of a
productive resource by all users of that resource.

Supply of Productive Resources and Finished Products
Both business firms and individuals act as suppliers. Business
firms supply intermediate goods (capital) to other business firms, and
they supply finished products to consumers.

Individuals act as busi

ness firms' suppliers of land, labor, and capital.

In the case where

individuals supply land or capital, the individuals are acting like
business firms.

Hence, the analysis of the supply of products by

business firms applies.

In the case where individuals act as sup

pliers of labor to business firms, indifference curve analysis, like
that used in consumer demand theory, can be used to analyze the supply
of labor offered by individuals at different wage rates.

What is
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involved is a trade-off between leisure time and money income.
The supply of a product is defined as follows:
Def.ll - Supply - The different quantities of a product
sellers are willing and able to place on the
market at all possible different prices with all
other determinants of supply other than price held
constant.
Leftwich points out that a supply surve shows the minimum price that
a business firm is willing and able to accept for placing different
quantities of a product on the market.

Accepting lower prices for

the quantities would make the firm less than normally profitable.
The supply curve of a business firm is a portion of its
marginal cost curve.

Hence, the quantity of a product supplied at

each alternative price depends on a firm's business costs.

And

costs depend on the relative demand for scarce productive resources,
which depends on the relative demand for final products.
The market supply curve for a particular productive resource
or final product shows the aggregate supply offered by all supplying
firms at each possible different price.

As such, the market supply

curve represents a consensus valuation of different quantities of a
product by all suppliers of the product.

Significance of the Equilibrium Price
Under Pure Competition
The discussion thus far has stressed the fact that aggregate
market supply and aggregate market

demand represents a consensus

valuation of products on the part of suppliers and users of those

•^Leftwich, op. cit., pp. 33-34.
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products.

This has important implications for economic value meas

urement .

Market Supply and Market Demand
The market supply schedule or curve shows at a given point
in

timethe quantities of a product that suppliers are willing and

able to supply at every different possible price.

The market demand

schedule or curve shows at a given point in time the quantities of a
product that users are willing and able to take off the market at
every different possible price.

The different prices on the market

supply curve represent the minimum unit price suppliers will accept
to put different quantities of a product on the market.

The dif

ferent prices on the market demand curve represent the maximum unit
price that users will pay for a given quantity of a product.

The

only point which lies on both the market supply and the market demand
curve is known as the equilibrium point.

Equilibrium Point
At the equilibrium point all market
According to Samuelson, the equilibrium price
which " . . .

forces are in balance.
represents the only price at

the amount that consumers are willing to go on buying

be just matched by the amount that producers are willing to go on
selling. S e l l e r s will not accept a lower price for the equilibrium
quantity.

And buyers will not pay more. Because of the balancing of

forces, once the equilibrium price and quantity are attained, there is

ISPaul A. Samuelson, Economics; An Introductory Analysis
(6th ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), p. 67.
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a tendency for the market to remain at that place.
The equilibrium price represents a consensus valuation of
the economic value of a particular quantity of a product by all
buyers and sellers of that product.

This consensus valuation

reflects the objectives, constraints, and all the determinants of
demand and supply existing in a particular market at a particular
time.

And the relative economic values of different products reflect

all the above factors.

Samuelson concludes concerning general

equilibrium:
. . . The final competitive equilibrium is an
"efficient" one. Output is being maximized, inputs
minimized; people who like applies are not being given
oranges, etc. From so efficient a final point, you can
no longer make everyone better off.^9

Equilibrium Price and a Bridge Assumption
to Economic Value
Thus, the equilibrium price and quantity represents a con
sensus valuation of a product at a given time.

With this in mind

the following axiom may be stated.
I.Ax.16 - The market equilibrium price of a product is
the economic value of a product.
This axiom is justified by the discussion of supply and demand for
products presented thus far.

The problem that now remains is to tie

equilibrium price, an internal, nonobservable assumption, into some
thing that is observable.
needed.

In other words, a bridge assumption is

If this can be done then the economic value of any product

l9Ibid., p. 619.
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can be measured.
At any given time a product may not be selling at its
equilibrium price.

The market may be in the process of adjusting

to the supply and demand forces.

Concerning the equilibrium price

Kenneth Boulding has stated:
. . . The equilibrium price in not necessarily the
actual price existing at a given instant of time. A price
may exist— i.e., there may be transactions taking place at a
certain ratio of exchange— and yet there may be forces operating
in the market which tend to bring about a change in that price.
. . . It is possible, even, that we may never reach the
equilibrium price, that in fact no actual price is ever an
equilibrium price. Before the forces which would bring together
the actual and the equilibrium prices have had time to work
themselves out, it is quite possible— indeed, almost inevitable—
that the circumstances will have changed, and with them the
equilibrium p r i c e . 2 0
Then, at any specific time there is no way of knowing whether the
market price is equivalent to the equilibrium price of a product.
However, under pure competition the tendency of the market price is
always to move around the equilibrium price.

At any given time, this

may involve moving either toward or away from the equilibrium price.
In light of this, the following bridge assumption may be made.
B.Ax.2 - The current market price of a product is an
approximation of the market equilibrium price
of a product.
Bridge axiom 2 and I.Ax.16 lead to a very important theorem.
Th.3

- The current market price of a product is an
approximation of the economic value of a
product. (From I.Ax.16 and B.Ax.2)

^^Boulding, op. cit., p. 62.
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The development of this single theorem has been the goal of this
chapter up to this point.

The application of this theorem in finan

cial accounting measurement is discussed next.

Financial Accounting Measurement
Financial accounting measurement is the assignment of a
numeral to an object or event in order to represent the economic value
of that object or event.

The numeral assigned is the current market

price the purchaser would have to pay to get an object under his con
trol (Th.3).

Economic value is measured on a monetary-dollar scale.

Scale Classification of the Dollar Scale
Several systems of scale classification are discussed in the
preceding chapter on measurement.

These included the systems of

Stevens, Coombs, Torgerson, Campbell, and Ellis.

Stevens, Coombs, Torgerson, and Ellis
Under Stevens', Coombs', and Torgerson's systems of class
ification of measurement scales, the dollar scale is a ratio scale.
This is an empirical question which is easily verified by reference
to one's experience.

It has already been shown in Chapter 4 that if

Stevens' criteria is employed, the dollar scale is a ratio scale.
Since Torgerson adopted Stevens' criteria, the dollar scale is also
a ratio scale by Torgerson.
If Coombs' criterion is employed, it must be shown for a
ratio scale that the following arithmetic formula has analytic
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application:
a = b,

|a-b|

|

|c-d|

a ^ nb , (n = any rational number);
where asset
asset
asset
asset

A
B
C
D

has
has
has
has

value a^
value b,
value c_, and
value d_.

Here, asset A is more valuable or less valuable than asset B only if
a < b.

Asset A is not more valuable and not less valuable than asset

B only if a = b.

The difference in value between assets A and B may

be = the difference in value of assets C and D.

And finally, the

value of asset A may be ^ to 11 times the value of asset B.
Thus, all the arithmetic formulas do have analytic inter
pretations.

And the dollar scale is a ratio scale by Coomb's class

ification.

Furthermore, following Ellis' reformulation of invariance,

the dollar scale is a ratio scale by Stevens' classification, since
it is a ratio scale by Coombs.
Thus, the only kind of mathematical transformations that
leave the dollar scale invariant is multiplication by a constant.
And multiplication by a constant is how the dollar scale is trans
formed in foreign exchange rate conversions and in conversions for
general and specific price-level changes.

Campbell, Torgerson, and Ellis
Campbell or Ellis undoubtedly would not recognize financial
accounting measurement as described above in their measurement class
ification systems.

Torgerson would call it fiat measurement.

That
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is, financial accounting measurement is measurement by definition or
convention.

Fiat measurement is quite common in accounting and the

social sciences.

Other instances of fiat measurement in accounting

are discussed in Chapter 6.

Additivity of Asset Values
The following assumption regarding the additivity of asset
values is made in this study:
B.P.l - The total economic value of a business firm is
equal to the sum of the individual asset values.
This assumption can be stated in equation form as follows:

Vt

=

+ P1tq1t + P2t<l2t +

Ct

+

•

• • + Pn^n*1

where V*- = the value of the firm at time jt
I*

C

= the cash and claims to cash held by the firm
at time _t

p^t = the market price of asset

1 at time t^

q^1- = the quantity of asset i^ at time t:.
Whether economic value is additive is open to question.
This study includes as assets of a firm all productive
resources (i.e., land, labor, and capital) under a firm’s control
at a given time.

This definition of assets includes items which

today accountants are just beginning to consider as assets.

For

instance, assets as productive resources under a firm's control
includes human resources, leased properties,, and purchase commitments.
To omit such resources is not to deny additivity; but, rather, to
omit important factors that should be considered when the firm is
valued in its entirety.
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It seems intuitively clear to many people that the individual
assets of a firm are not independent.
related.

Rather, the assets may all be

This interrelationship is not included in the additivity

assumption.

That is, the total economic value of a firm is not

V = f(x) + g(y) + h(x) + . . . + n(z) but V = f(x,y,z, . . ., n).
This objection to value additivity is difficult to answer.
Sterling assumes value additivity and also points out that
the four schools on income measurement that he examined:

the

Fisher tradition, the accounting tradition, present market price,
and Boulding’s constant, all assume value additivity.^1

As used

here and in these other studies the assumption of value additivity
is an idealization.

It is a valid assumption if under purified

conditions, from which all distorting influences are removed, asset
values are truly additive.

As an idealization, value additivity is

assumed to be the most significant assumption regarding a firm’s
total value.

All remaining distorting influences are considered

relatively insignificant.

A Financial Accounting Measurement Rule
Financial accounting measurement may be defined as follows:
Def.12 - Financial Accounting Measurement - The assignment
by rule(s) of numerals to the assets of a business
firm to represent the property of economic value.
The numeral to be assigned is the numeral that represents the current
market price of the asset in question.

21

Current market price includes

Robert R. Sterling, Theory of the Measurement of Enterprise
Income (Wichita, Kansas: The University Press of Kansas, 1970),
pp. 104-105.
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all costs necessary to get the asset from producer to user.

This

price may then be adjusted in order to determine the extent of dis
tortion of the measuring unit caused by inflation or deflation.
general price-level index is used for this purpose.
in Chapter 4.

A

This was explained

This adjustment allows separation of general and

specific price-level changes.

The following financial accounting

measurement rule is given.
The Financial Accounting Measurement Rule - Assign to every
asset that a given firm controls at a given time the
numeral that represents the current market price of
that asset at that particular time.

Summary and Conclusions
The objectives of Chapters 4 and 5 have been to demonstrate
that the techniques of theory construction discussed in Chapters 2
and 3 are applicable to accounting.

This was done by constructing

an outline of a theory of financial accounting measurement.

Each of

the five different types of basic assumptions are illustrated in this
theory.

Objectives
Objectives, the first type of basic assumptions, indicate
goals.

Three objectives were stated in the theory of financial

accounting measurement.
Obj.l - An objective of financial accounting is to measure
the economic value and changes in the economic
value that have occurred in a profit-oriented business
firm in order to enable investors to predict the
future economic value of the firm.
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Obj.2 - The objective of all consumers is to maximize the
satisfaction of their wants and needs that they
derive from the consumption of goods and services.
Obj.3 - The objective of all business firms is the maximi
zation of profits.
In economics, the actions of consumers and business firms are
described in accordance with their assumed objectives, Objectives 2
and 3, respectively.

Since this theory on financial accounting meas

urement is tied so closely to the economic theory of consumer behavior
and production theory, the objectives of these theories are also
objectives of this theory.
of financial accounting.
the preceding theory.

Objective 1 stated one assumed objective
Only this single objective was studied in

Objective 1 set the goal of this theory.

The

remaining assumptions indicate how this goal is accomplished.

Axioms and Postulates
The distinction between axioms and postulates is a conceptual
distinciton.

Axioms are assumptions borrowed from other disciplines.

Postulates are assumptions originating in a discipline.

Assumptions

can be further divided into internal assumptions and bridge assumptions.
Internal assumptions describe a particular concept in terms of
nonobservables.

Because they contain nonobservables, they are not

directly testable.

If a theory was stated solely in terms of objec

tives and internal assumtpions, it could never be tested or applied in
the real world.
reality.

Bridge assumptions provide the link with observable

Something is considered observable if it can be measured in

a relatively simple way.

167

Internal Axioms
A number of internal axioms, mostly borrowed from economic
theory, were identified in the theory.

These are shown below.

All

but one of the existence assumptions are classified as internal
axioms.

One existence assumption is classified as an internal

postulate.
Assumptions concerning the objectives and characteristics of
things, business firms, for example, are based on an added assumption
that the thing itself exists.

The existence assumptions assume the

existence of the concepts dealt with in a theory.
Internal axioms are also stated about prediction, consumers,
business firms, and economic value.

The outstanding feature of all

these internal axioms is that the objectives and characteristics
they describe are not observable.
Existence Assumptions;
I.Ax.l - There exists a

finite set of business firms.

I.Ax.2 - There exists a

finite set of consumers.

I.Ax.3 - There exists a
resources.

limited supply of productive

I.P.l

- There exists an activity called "financial
accounting measurement."

I.Ax.4 - There exists purely competitive markets.
I.Ax.5 - All prediction of the future is based on knowledge
of the past.
I.Ax.6 - The more complete one's knowledge of the past, the
better one's ability to predict the future.
I.Ax.7 - The past is uncontrollable.
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I.Ax.8

- The future is uncertain.

I.Ax.9

- Time is not efficacious.

I.Ax.10 - If something exists then there is areason
existence.

for its

Some Assumptions About Consumers
I.Ax.11 - All consumers have unlimited wants and needs for
products.
I.Ax.12 - All consumers have finite money incomes available
to purchase products.
I.Ax.13 - The satisfaction a consumer derives from consuming
different products or different combinations of
products varies.
Some Assumptions About Business Firms
I.Ax.14 - The economic value of a business firm isderived
from the ability of a business firm to satisfy the
wants and needs of consumers for products.
I.Ax.15 - The ability of a business firm to satisfy the wants
and needs of consumers for products is derived from
the scarce productive resources under a business
firm’s control.
Economic Value
I.Ax.16 - The market equilibrium price of a product is the
economic value of a product.

Bridge Axioms
Two bridge axioms are used in this theory.

They are:

B.Ax.l

- A person's personal valuation of a product is
observable in that person's behavior of buying
and selling in the market place.

B.Ax.2

- The current market price of a product is an
approximation of the market equilibrium price of
a product.

B.Ax.l linked the nonobservable assumptions about the objectives and
characteristics of consumers and business firms to the observable
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activity of buying and selling.

B.Ax.2 linked the nonobservable

equilibrium price to the observable market price.

The market price

of a product is observable because it can be measured in a relatively
simple way.

Internal Postulate
The existence assumptions contain one internal postulate,
that is, the assumption that the activity of financial accounting
measurement exists.

It is a postulate because such an assumption

must originate within the discipline of accounting.

Accountants

then apply knowledge from other disciplines, such as economics, to
develop a theory of financial accounting measurement.

This postulate

is an internal assumption because the activity of financial accounting
measurement is not observable.

Only the results of that activity are

observable.

Bridge Postulate
The theory of financial accounting measurement contained the
following bridge postulate:
B.P.l - The total economic value of a business firm is
equal to the sum of the individual asset values.
As pointed out in the chapter, this assumption is made both in
accounting and economics.
axiom or a postulate.

Therefore, it could be classified an

It is classified a postulate because it is

one of the most important assumptions underlying modern accounting
practices.
The assumption of value additivity is also described as an
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idealization.

Thus, if it were possible to conduct an empirical

test of value additivity under conditions from which all distorting
influences were removed, the test would show value additivity to be
a true empirical statement.
There might be some question as to whether this assumption
is really a bridge assumption.

But, the economic value of individual

assets has been linked to current market prices which are assumed
observable.

And, if current market prices can be considered observable

because they can be measured in a relatively simple way, then their
arithmetic sum can also be considered observable.

Theorems
Theorems, also called principles, are statements that follow
logically when two or more assumptions are combined.
attempt is made to derive a great many theorems.
the more important theorems are presented.

No specific

However, a few of

These are:

Th.l - Consumers can never completely satisfy all their
unlimited wants and needs for products because
they have finite money incomes. (From I.Ax.11 and
I.Ax.12)
Th.2 - The economic value of a business firm is derived
from the assets under a business firm's control.
(From I.Ax.14 and I.Ax.15)
Th.3 - The current market price of a product is an approx
imation of the economic value of a product. (From
I.Ax.16 and B.Ax.2)

The Financial Accounting Measurement Rule
All these assumptions and theorems lead to the following
financial accounting measurement rule.
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The Financial Accounting Measurement Rule - Assign to every
asset that a given firm controls at a given time the
numeral that represents the current market price of that
asset at that particular time.

Terms
A number of technical terms are defined in the preceding
theory.

These are shown below:
Def.l

- Land - The natural resources or gifts of nature in
the state they are obtained from nature.

Def.2

- Labor - The human effort, both mental and physical,
used in the production of goods and services.

Def.3

- Capital - The goods produced by man for use in
further production.

Def.4

- Goods and Services - Bundles of scarce productive
resources.

Def.5

- Product - Either a good or a service or both.

Def.6

- Production - The process of combining scarce
productive resources in order to form a product.

Def.7

-Combination of Products - One subset of the
available products.

set of

Def.8

-Control - The right to use.

Def.9

-Asset - A quantity of money or a claim to a quantity
of money or a scarce productive resource under a
business firm's control at a particular time.

Def.10 - Demand - The different quantities of a product that
consumers are willing and able to buy at different
prices, all other factors held constant.
Def.ll - Supply - The different quantities of a product
sellers are willing and able to place on the market
at all possible different prices, all other factors
held constant.
Def.12 - Financial Accounting Measurement ^ The assignment by
rule(s) of numerals to the assets of a business firm
to represent the property of economic value.
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No effort is made to distinguish primitive terms from defined
terms because only an outline of a theory of financial accounting
measurement is presented.

Without completing the theory it would be

impossible to say that a given set of primitive terms are capable of
defining all technical terms in the theory.

Also since no set of

primitive terms is unique, alternative sets of primitive terms could
be given.
With these limitations in mind a number of terms that might
appear as primitive terms in this theory include:
money, right, and financial accounting.

satisfaction,

This list, though incomplete,

does indicate the types of terms that could be used as primitive
terms in a theory of financial accounting measurement.

Conclusions
The preceding discussion demonstrates how the techniques of
theory construction might be applied in constructing a theory of
financial accounting measurement.

In so doing these techniques are

shown to be applicable to accounting theory construction.
is by no means complete.

The theory

Additional assumptions could be given

directly underlying the topics discussed in the theory.

Additional

assumptions could also be given in related areas such as the assump
tions underlying the ratio scale.

But the objective of constructing

this theory is not to propose a theory of financial accounting meas
urement.

The objective is to demonstrate the applicability of theory

construction techniques to accounting theory construction.
has been done.

And this

The uses of the different types of basic assumptions
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is demonstrated along with the use of idealizations.

The following

chapter shows that the techniques of theory construction have wide
applicability to accounting theory construction.

Chapter 6

METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR ACCOUNTING
THEORY CONSTRUCTION: SOME
SPECIFIC EXAMPLES

In Chapters 1, 2, and 3 theory construction was discussed in
detail.

In Chapters 4 and 5 this discussion was applied in devel

oping a theory of financial accounting measurement.

In this chapter

the discussion of theory construction is applied to a number of
specific cases taken from recent accounting literature.

These cases

include the materiality concept in accounting, depreciation accounting,
two recent APB opinions, a criticism of Chambers’ Accounting, Eval
uation and Economic Behavior^ by Leftwich, and a conceptual comparison
with Moonitz's "The Basic Postulates of Accounting."
could be cited.

Many more cases

But these cases are representative of the broad spec

trum of accounting problems to which the conclusions of this study
are applicable.

Nonobservables and Fiat Measurement
One of the most important implications of this study is the
discovery of the need for internal assumptions and bridge assumptions
in theory construciton.

Internal assumptions deal with nonobservables.

The great majority of the concepts dealt with in social sciences are

^Raymond J. Chambers, Accounting, Evaluation and Economic
Behavior (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966).
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nonobservables.

In order to have testable theoies these nonob

servables must be linked to observables.
used for this purpose.

Bridge assumptions are

Fiat measurement is one example of the use

of bridge assumptions.
In fiat measurement nonobservables are linked to observables
by definitions.

A concept is defined by a bridge assumption to be

measured in a certain way.
sciences.

Fiat measurement is common in social

The strength of fiat measurement is evident in the power

of prediction it affords.

In psychology, intelligence, a nonob

servable, is linked by appropriate definition to something observable,
ultimately an intelligence test score.

The example of a theory of

economic value measurement presented in this study also involves fiat
measurement.

Economic value is defined by fiat by an appropriate

bridge assumption to be measured in a certain way.
Frequently with fiat measurement different theories are
encountered as to how a concept should be measured.

For instance,

there are a number of ways to measure hunger or intelligence.

In

accounting economic value can be measured in many different ways.
For example, economic value can be measured by discounted future
value, replacement value, historical cost value, or liquidation value.
These value concepts can be considered observables to the extent that
they are measurable in a relatively simple way.
The use of bridge assumptions to link observables to nonob
servables is applicable to other areas in accounting.
nonobservable concepts are

Whenever

encountered, bridge assumptions are

needed to measure these nonobservables.
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Materiality
An example of an inherently nonobservable concept is mate
riality.

An event or a stimulus may be considered material if it

brings about a response from a decision-maker.
been a troublesome area for accountants.

Materiality has long

It is especially trouble

some because of the many forms materiality takes in accounting.
Examples include what is a material financial interest in a firm; a
material departure from generally accepted accounting principles; a
material source of revenue; a material gain or loss; and a material
change in revenues, expenses, gains, or losses.

There is nothing

inherent in the concept of materiality that helps accountants deter
mine when something is material.

Social scientists rarely deal with

concepts as precise as are many of the concepts dealt with in the
physical sciences.

Development of a General Theory of Materiality
A well-constructed theory of materiality should contain
internal assumptions concerning materiality and bridge assumptions
linking materiality to observables.
riality are, of course, possible.

Many theories concerning mate
The most desirable theory of

materiality would be one applicable to all areas of accounting,
possibly even areas outside of accounting.

But initially determining

such a general theory of materiality is unlikely.

More likely, there

could be developed initially a number of specific theories concerning
specific instances of materiality in accounting.

Then, ultimately,

a link between some or all of these specific materiality theories
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might be found.

And a general theory of materiality could evolve.

Such a general theory of materiality would probably incor
porate axioms from psychology concerning perception of material
relationships.

Of course, such a theory may have to await the devel

opment of such axioms in psychology.

The broader the materiality

theory, the greater the number of testable implications.

For example,

one testable implication of a theory of materiality might involve
predicting investor reactions to fluctuations in net income where
material fluctuations might evoke certain types of reactions.

An Example of Some Possible Assumptions in a
Descriptive Theory of Materiality
A theory of materiality could be approached from either a
normative or a descriptive viewpoint.

The two would yield the same

results only if it can be assumed that what is, should be.
A particular descriptive theory concerning materiality and
earnings per share might contain assumptions such as the following:
Statement 1 - If a change in earnings per share is material,
then investors will react to the change.
Statement 2 - If earnings per share changes by 6.5%, then a
change in earnings per share is material.
Theorem 1

^Proof:

- If earnings per share changes by 6.5%, then
investors will react to such a change.2

Let A = "a change . . . material,"
B = "investors . . . change,"
C = "earnings . . . 6.5%."
Then if C, then A (Statement 2) and if A, then B
(Statement 1), then if C, then B (Theorem 1).
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Each of these

statements^

is analyzed below.

Statement 1
If Statement 1 appeared in a theory of materiality and
earnings per share, it would be considered an internal assumption.
It relates to nothing observable.

Yet it provides significant insight

concerning the concept of materiality.

Statement 2
Statement 2 is a bridge assumption.
way

It provides an observable

to measure when a change in earnings per share is material.

State

ment 2 ties the nonobservable Statement 1 into something observable in
the real world.

One might next wonder if Statement 2 is an example of

fiat measurement.
Fiat measurement is measurement by arbitrary rule or stipu
lation.

In other words, if fiat measurement was involved a 2% change

or a 10% change could just as easily have been used in Statement 2.
The

question centers around how the 6.5% change was determined.
In this particular case the 6.5% change

evidence.

Thus, fiat measurement is not used.

is based on empirical
Rose, Beaver, Becker,

and Sorter determined empirically in a study of earnings per share
that the change in the intensity of a stimulus that is needed before
the stimulus can be detected is a constant 6.5%.

They based their

findings on the Weber-Fechner law used in psychophysics.

Psychophysics

^These statements, as well as the assumptions used in other
examples in this chapter, could be stated in terms of two or more
simpler assumptions. But, this is true of any assumption in any
theory.
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is the study of response of organisms to stimulus.

The Weber-

Fechner law states that the change in intensity of a stimulus needed
before it can be detected by an organism is a constant function of
the amount of the stimulus present.

Their study was based on the

measurement of differential thresholds.^
Of course, the 6.5% is based on rather limited empirical
evidence.

As with all empirical evidence it is possible that a

future empirical test of Theorem 1 may disprove Statement 2.
Statement 2 should be contrasted with another bridge assump
tion frequently used by accountants in dealing with material events.
Although relying heavily on judgment many accountants use the
following assumption:
Statement 2a - If earnings per share changes by 10%, then
a change in earnings per share is material.
In this case the 10% change is not based on empirical evidence.
Rather, it is determined by fiat.
Finally one other question must be raised.
an idealization.

Statement 2 is

As such, it is meant to be applied under highly

purified conditions.

But is it a proper use of an idealization?

The answer is yes.

Statement 2 ignores other influences

that may distort what actually happens from what is predicted by
Theorem 1.

Statement 2 is considered the most significant factor.

Of course, some of these other factors could be incorporated into an

^J. Rose, W. Beaver, S. Becker, and G. Sorter, "Toward an
Empirical Measure of Materiality," Empirical Research in Accounting:
Selected Studies 1970, Supplement to Volume 8 of The Journal of
Accounting Research, pp. 138-148.
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expanded version of the theory as basic assumptions.

They might be

incorporated as constraints oh Statement 2.

Theorem 1
Theorem 1 is derived with the aid of logic from Statement 1
and Statement 2.

If one accepts the rules of logic, then Theorem 1

is valid, if statements 1 and 2 are valid.

The empirical confirmation

does not prove the validity of the statements.
gather evidence.

It only serves to

Empirical research never proves anything to be true.

If the test should show Theorem 1 to be invalid, then state
ments 1 or 2 or both have been proven invalid.
remembered that Statement 2 is an idealization.

However, it must be
Therefore, one must

be careful in evaluating the outcome of any such empirical test.

If

other factors not accounted for by the theory caused the negative
confirmation, then the assumptions of the theory must still be regarded
as valid.

It may be necessary to expand the theory to take in some

of those external factors.

Depreciation Accounting
Depreciation accounting is an area in which bridge assumptions
can be applied.

The Committee on Terminology after careful consid

eration describes depreciation accounting as follows:
Depreciation accounting is a system of accounting which
aims to distribute the cost or other basic value of tangible
capital assets, less salvage (if any), over the useful life of
the unit (which may be a group of assets) in a systematic and
rational manner. It is a process of allocation, not of valuation.^

^Committee on Terminology, "Review and Resume," Accounting
Terminology Bulletin No. 1 (New York: American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, 1953), p. 25.
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There are many different theories concerning patterns of cost
expiration.

These theories include increasing charge, decreasing

charge, equal charge, and production-based depreciation methods.

Each

of these theories is based on slightly different interpretations of the
most significant factors involved in the fixed asset’s cost expiration.
Some of these factors include time, output, and repairs.
Cost expriration is a nonobservable.
expiration must be determined by fiat.

The pattern of cost

In this case, the particular

depreciation formula used, such as straight line or sum-of-the-years'
digits, provides the observable bridge.

Some Assumptions in a Possible Theory
of Depreciation Accounting
A particular theory of depreciation accounting might contain
among its basic assumptions the following three statements:
Statement 1 - If the estimated useful life of a tangible
capital asset extends over one accounting
period, then the cost or other basic value of
a tangible capital asset, less salvage, should
be allocated to operations over the estimated
useful life of the tangible capital asset.
Statement 2 - If the cost or other basic value of a tangible
capital asset, less salvage value, should be
allocated to operations over the estimated use
ful life of the tangible capital asset, then
any allocation of the cost or other basic value
of a tangible capital asset should be in pro
portion to the economic benefit received from
the asset.
Statement 3 - If any allocation of the cost or other basic
value of a tangible capital asset should be in
proportion to the economic benefit received from
the asset, then whenever the economic benefits
of an asset are greater during the earlier life
of the asset a decreasing charge depreciation
formula should be used.

182
From these statements the following theorems can be derived:
Theorem 1 - If the estimated useful life of a tangible capital
asset extends over one accounting period, then any
allocation of the cost or other basic value of a
tangible capital asset should be in proportion to
the economic benefit received from the asset.6
Theorem 2 - If the estimated useful life of a tangible capital
asset extends over one accounting period, then
whenever the economic benefits of an asset are
greater during the earlier life of the asset a
decreasing charge depreciaton formula should be
used.7

An Analysis of the Assumptions
Statements 1 and 2 are internal assumptions.
nothing observable.

They relate to

Statement 3 is a bridge assumption.

Statement 3

provides an observable method of measuring depreciation expense.

When

ever the economic benefits of an asset are relatively greater during the
earlier life of the asset, a decreasing charge depreciation method is
utilized.

Through an appropriate definition the phrase "decreasing

charge"depreciation method can be replaced by a specific formula for
such a depreciation method.

Examples of such formulas include formulas

for the sum-of-the-years' digits depreciaton method and the double
declining balance method.

Fiat measurement is also involved.

The

choice of a particular depreciation formula is solely by stipulation.

6proof:

Let A = "the estimate . . . period,"
B = "the cost . . . asset,"
C = "any . . . asset."
Then if A, then B (Statement 1) and if B, then C
(Statement 2), then if A, then C (Theorem 1).

^Proof;

Let D = "whenever . . » used."
Then if A, then C (Theorem 1) and if C, then D
(Statement 3), then if A, then D (Theorem 2).
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Except that the formulas do yield a decreasing depreciation expense,
the depreciation formulas themselves are quite arbitrary.
An entire theory of depreciation would contain other assump
tions and theorems.

But any such theory would still generalize con

cerning the cost expiration of capital assets.

No theory is likely

to encompass all the possible aspects of capital asset cost expiration.
Thus, all such theories would probably employ idealizations.

APB Opinion 15
Another example of applying bridge assumptions in fiat meas
urement occurs in APB Opinion 15.

The APB applied fiat measurement

in the recent Opinion 15 on Earnings per Share.

The APB makes the

following assumption in that Opinion.
Internal Assumption - All common stock equivalents should be
regarded as common stock in computing
earnings per share.®
They define a common stock equivalent as follows:
. . . A common stock equivalent is a security which is
not, in form, a common stock but which usually contains pro
visions to enable its holder to become a common stockholder and
which, because of its terms and the circumstances under which
it was issued, is in substance equivalent to a common stock.^

®"Earnings per Share," Opinions of the Accounting Principles
Board No. 15 (New York: American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, 1969), p. 229. Actually this statement is an over
simplification of the APB’s statement. They are concerned only with
common stock equivalents that have a dilutive effect (dilutions in
earnings per share of 3% or greater— see APB 15, p. 221). The above
assumption could be expanded or other assumptions added to incorporate
this qualification.
^"Earnings per Share," op. cit., p. 225.
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One particular type of common stock equivalent, convertible securities,
is analyzed in this section, illustrating the use of internal and
bridge assumptions in Opinion 15.

Two Assumptions in APB Opinion No. 15
The following two statements are made or implied by the APB
in Opinion 15.
Statement 1 - If the cash yield to the holder of a convertible
security at the time of issuance is signifi
cantly below what would be a comparable rate for
a similar security of the issuer without the
conversion option, then the convertible security
should be considered a common stock equivalent.
Statement 2 - If at the time of issuance the cash yield of a
convertible security based on its market price
is less than 66-2/3 % of the then current bank
prime interest rate, then the cash yield to the
holder of the convertible security at the time
of issuance is significantly below what would
be a comparable rate for a similar security of
the issuer without the conversion option.
Statement 1 and Statement 2, if combined logically, yield a third
statement, Theorem 1, shownbelow.
Theorem 1

■^Proof:

- If at the time of issuance the cash yield of a
convertible security based on its market price
is less than 66-2/3 % of the then current bank
prime interest rate, then the convertible
security should be considered a common stock
equivalent.^0

Let A
= "cash yield . . . conversion option,"
B
= "the convertible security .. . equivalent,"
C
= "at the time . . . rate."
Then if C, then A (Statement 2) andif A, then B
(Statement 1), then if C, then B (Theorem 1).
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These two statements and Theorem 1 are discussed individually below.

Statement 1
Statement 1 is paraphrased directly from Opinion 15.^
order of the statement here has simply been reversed.

The

Statement 1 is

an internal assumption in the theory concerning earnings per share
that the APB is developing.

This statement is an internal assumption

because it relates to nothing directly observable.

It is a basic

assumption statement because it describes the conditions under which a
convertible security should be considered a common stock equivalent.

Statement 2
Statement 2 is not found directly in Opinion 15.
is implied by other statements in the Opinion.
example of a bridge assumption.

Rather, it

Statement 2 is an

It provides an observable way to

measure whether the cash yield on a convertible security is signi-=
cantly below what would be a comparable rate for a similar security
without the conversion option.
urement.

It is also an example of fiat meas

Nothing is inherent in the 66-2/3 % cutoff rate that makes

it the one correct rate to use.

That rate is simply determined by fiat.

Finally Statement 2 is also an idealization.

The APB states:

The Board believes that the current bank prime interest
rate in general use for short-term loans represents a practical,
simple and readily available basis on which to establish the
criteria for determining a common stock equivalent, as set forth
in the preceding paragraph. The Board recognizes that there are
other rates and averages of interest rates relating to various
grades of long-term debt securities and preferred stocks which

^''Earnings per Share," op. cit., p. 229.
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might be appropriate or that a more complex approach could be
adopted. However, after giving consideration to various
approaches and interest rates in this regard, the Board has
concluded that since there is a high degree of correlation
between such indices and the bank prime interest rate, the
latter is the most practical rate available for this
particular purpose.^
One must question whether Statement 2 reflects a proper use
of an idealization.

All idealizations describe conditions which

are not found precisely in nature.

Idealizations are true statements

only under highly purified conditions where many distorting influences
are simply ignored.
Two criticisms are leveled at Statement 2 in Appendix B of
Opinion 15.

These criticisms of what has been called the cash yield

method are that ". . . i t does not differentiate between issuers— that
is, it is based on the same borrowing rate for all issuers, without
regard for their credit ratings or other risks inherent in their
activities.

Second, it is based on the current bank prime interest

rate, which is essentially a short-term borrowing rate."-^
Risk is obviously involved in the first criticism.
plays a predominate role in the second criticism.

Risk also

One reason why a

short-term borrowing rate would be different from the long-term bor
rowing rate is risk.
of future events.

Long-term borrowing requires long-term prediction

The future is uncertain.

And, in general, the

further the future horizon, the greater the uncertainty.

And, the

greater the uncertainty the greater the risk.
Of course, risk is only one factor giving rise to a difference

•*-^Loc. cit.

-^^Ibid., p. 258.
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in long-term and short-term interest rates.

But the above exam

ination does serve to point out that the APB may he properly using
an idealization.

They are simply using the cash yield method under

highly purified conditions.

These conditions ignore risk and other

factors responsible for the difference.

While not a literally true

statement, neither is this idealization literally false.

Such uses

of idealizations are quite common in science.
Finally, Theorem 1 is paraphrased in reverse order directly
from Opinion 1 5 . ^

It is shown above that Theorem 1 is a theorem

derived from one stated assumption and one unstated assumption in
Opinion 15.

Before drawing any conclusions, another APB opinion is

analyzed.

APB Opinion 18
Another example of the application of bridge assumptions in
fiat measurement appears in APB Opinion 18, "The Equity Method of
Accounting for Investments in Common S t o c k . T h e

following section

examines the APB's criteria for determining when the equity method
should be used.

Some Assumptions Behind APB Opinion 18
Two statements are made or implied by the APB in Opinion 18
concerning when the equity method should be used.

From these two

14Ibid., p. 229.
15"The Equity Method of Accounting for Investments in Common
Stock," Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board No. 18 (New York:
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1971), pp. 355-356.
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statements a third statement, Theorem 1, may be derived as follows:
Statement 1 - If an investor has the ability to exercise signif
icant influence over the operating and financing
decisions of an investee, then the equity method
of accounting for investments in common stock
should be used.
Statement 2 - If an investor directly or indirectly holds 20%
or more of the voting common stock of an inves
tee, then an investor has the ability to exercise
significant influence over the operating and
financing decisions of an investee.
Theorem 1

- If an investor directly or indirectly holds 20%
or more of the voting common stock of an inves
tee, then the equity method of accounting for
investments in common stock should be u s e d . -*-6

Statement 1
Statement 1 is an internal assumption in the APB theory on the
equity method of accounting for common stock investments.
stated directly in Opinion 18.

It is not

Rather, it is implied by other statements.

This is not to say that Statement 1 is a theorem. It is one of the APB's basic
assumptions that is needed to derive some of their other statements.
Statement 2
Statement 2 is a bridge assumption.

It provides an observable

way to measure whether an investor has the ability to exercise signif
icant control over an investee.^

lbProof;

It is paraphrased directly from

Let A = "an investor has . . . investee,"
B = "the equity . . . used,"
C - "an investor directly . . . investee."
Then if C, then A (Statement 2) and if A, then B
(Statement 1), then if C, then B (Theorem 1).

17Actually Statement 2 is a simplication of the APB's position.
They add the qualification that in the absence of evidence to the con
trary Statement 2 holds. This qualification could he handled by other
assumptions indicating the conditions under which the statement does
not hold.
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Opinion 18.1®
was not.

The assumption is directly stated whereas Statement 1

Statement 2 also is an example of fiat measurement.

is nothing sacred in the adoption of the 20% cutoff point.
centages of ownership could have been used instead.

There

Other per

The 20% point

was simply determined by fiat.
Statement 2 is also an example of an idealization.

In this

case the APB recognized that the ability to exercise influence over
an investee may be indicated in several ways other than simply the
extent of ownership by an
other criteria.

i n v e s t e e . 19

But they are ignoring these

The 20% criteria is apparently deemed to be the most

significant factor in determining influence over an investee.

In

general, any other factors which might result in such influence appar
ently are assumed to be present only when the 20% ownership criteria
is also present.

Theorem 1
Theorem 1 is the direct result when Statement 1 and Statement
2 are combined logically.
Opinion 18.

This theorem is not stated directly in

Rather, it is simply implied.

Leftwich and Chambers
Chambers attempted to construct a broad theory of accounting
in his book Accounting, Evaluation and Economic Behavior.

This book

represents one of the most significant and extensive attempts at

l®”The Equity Method of Accounting for Investments in Common
Stocks,” op. cit., p. 355.
19

Loc. cit.
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theory construction undertaken in accounting to date.

As in any

first attempt at theory construction, improvements can undoubtedly
be made.
Richard Leftwich criticizes Chambers' book on two counts:
his rationality assumption and his homeostasis assumption.

These

two criticisms are now evaluated in light of the discussion of
theory construction presented in this study.

Rationality
Chambers presents a picture of man as a rational human being.
Man possesses limited capacities and always considers the cost versus
the benefits of obtaining additional data concerning alternative
courses of action.

Chambers' rational man is an optimizer who con

tinually adapts his behavior to maximize his utility.

Leftwich's Objections
Leftwich objects to Chambers' assumption of rationality on
two grounds.

First, Leftwich believes that the picture Chambers

presents of man as an optimizer is invalidated by the limitations of
man that Chambers specifically recognizes in his basic assumptions.
Secondly, Leftwich points out that empirical evidence shows that man
is not a maximizer but only a

satisfier.20

Before Leftwich discusses Chambers' concept of rationality, he

^Richard W. Leftwich, "A Critical Analysis of Some Behavioral
Assumptions Underlying R. J. Chambers' Accounting, Evaluation and
Economic Behavior," University of Queensland Papers (St. Lucia,
Australia: University of Queensland Press, Vol. 1, No. 7, August 12,
1969), p. 233.
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examines three contexts in which the term "rationality" could be
used:

in an idealistic context, a normative context, or in a des

criptive context.

He concludes that Chambers uses rationality in a

descriptive context.

And since empirical evidence shows that man is

not rational in the sense in which Chambers uses the word, Leftwich
concludes that Chambers' assumption of rationality is invalid.

Left

wich rejects rationality in the idealistic sense because he believes
it conflicts with Chambers' assumptions regarding man's limited
91

capabilities.

An Evaluation of Leftwich's Objections
This author disagrees with Leftwich's contention that Chambers
uses rationality in a descriptive sense.
rationality is an idealization.

Chambers' assumption of

Chambers mixes an idealized concept

of rationality with less idealized descriptions of some of man's
other limited capabilities.

This fact is not grounds for saying

Chambers' concept of rationality is not idealistic.

Chambers'

idealistic assumption of rationality is simply a generalization of an
aspect of man's behavior that is too complicated to completely
describe.

Unrealistic Assumptions
Leftwich discusses the use of idealistic concepts.

He quotes

Nagel's distinction of three senses in which unrealistic assumptions
are used in theory construction.

21lbid., pp. 228-236.

These three senses are as follows:
1. A statement can be said to be unrealistic because
it does not give an "exhaustive” description of some object,
so that it mentions only some traits actually characterizing the
object but ignores an endless number of other traits also pre
sent . . . .
2. A statement may be said to be unrealistic because
it is believed to be either false or highly improbable on the
available evidence. . . .
3. In many sciences, relations of dependence between
phenomena are often stated with reference to so-called "pure
cases" or "ideal types" of the phenomena being investigated.22
Leftwich contends that Chambers' rationality assumption is unrealistic
in the second sense.

The Trivial Case
Leftwich rejects the rationality in the first sense saying
"Chambers' assumption of rationality is immune from the lack of
realism of the first type because it is a comprehensive description
of human action."^

But all assumptions are unrealistic in this sense.

Nagel states in the sentence immediately following the one Leftwich
quotes:

"However, no finitely long statement can possibly formulate

the totality of traits embodied in any concretely existing thing; and
it is difficult to imagine what a statement would be like that is not
unrealistic in this sense, or what conceivable use such a statement
could

have.

"24

Thus, Leftwich rejects the use of unrealistic assump

tions in the first sense.

But he does so for the wrong reason.

22ibid., p. 230 or Ernest Nagel, "Assumptions in Economic
Theory," American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings (May,
1963), pp. 214-215.
^Leftwich, op. cit., p. 230.

24jjagel, pp< cit., p. 214.
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The Idealistic Case
Leftwich also rejects the possibility that Chambers was
using unrealistic assumptions in the third sense.

Leftwich states:

. . . It might appear that Chambers’ assumption can be
defended on the grounds that it describes the behavior of man
under a set of idealistic conditions in accord with Nagel's
third type of unrealistic assumption. However, even if Chambers
does use his assumption as a "pure case", it is not valid
because he neglects to set up the ideal conditions under which
it holds true. The most crucial element of his non-ideal
conditions is the explicit recognition of the limitations of man.
In Chambers' model, the use of any idealistic assumption
with regard to human behavior is also out of place for the very
reason that the use of normative assumptions is out of place, i.e.
because Chambers is attempting to deduce a theory of accounting
from the environment as it is, not as it could or should be.25
The fact that Chambers mixes assumptions regarding man's
limitations with an unrealistic assumption that man is rational is no
reason to reject Chambers' use of unrealistic assumptions in the
idealistic sense.

Undoubtedly, Chambers is using rationality in the

same sense, idealistically, that it has been used in economic theory.
Nagel points out that any difference between the actual
results and the results predicted by a idealistic theory can be
attributed to the factors that an idealistic theory leaves out.
While idealistic assumptions are not literally true of anything,
neither are they literally false.^6
Leftwich notes above that Chambers fails to mention the
idealistic conditions under which rationality applies.
fault in Chambers' theory, hut one easily corrected.

25Leftwich, loc. cit.

This is a
Hempel and

2f>Nagel, op. cit., pp. 215-216.
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Nagel have both discussed the needs for such statements of initial
conditons.

They disagree as to whether there must be at least one

statement of initial conditon, which specifies the circumstances in
which the other assumptions in the theory apply.
require at least one statement of initial
reasons of formal logic.

Hempel does not

c o n d i t i o n ,

27 Nagel does for

As Nagel points out, it is impossible to

derive the statement "x is B" from the simplest form of universal law,
"for any x, if x is A, then x is B^.

So from a logical point of

view, Chambers should have included as statements of initial conditons
the circumstances under which his theory applies.

The Third Case--Empirically False Assumptions
If the assumptions of a theory conflict with empirical evidence,
then the theory is inadequate no matter how well it predicts.

It is

a rather thin line between assumptions that are unrealistic because
they conflict with empirical evidence, and assumptions that are unre
alistic because they are used idealistically.
No further attempt is made here to justify rationality.
Chambers’ theory assumes axioms from economic theory describing man's
behavior.

Hence, rationality must be interpreted idealistically, as

it is used in economic theory.

If, as Leftwich suggest, man is not

rational, then the assumption of rationality is unrealistic because

2?Carl G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York:
The Free Press, 1965), p. 248.
^Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York:
Brace and World, Inc., 1961), p. 32.

Harcourt,
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it is untrue.

And, if this is the case, then Chambers' theory, and

most of economic theory, must be changed.

Leftwich's second criticism

of Chambers is discussed next.

Homeostasis
Leftwich criticizes Chambers' assumption of homeostasis.
Leftwich points out that:
. . . Firstly, the validity of the homeostasis model is
not universally accepted as a general theory in psychology.
Secondly, irrespective of its validity, the homeostasis model
is not particularly useful as a general descriptive or explan
atory tool in p s y c h o l o g y . 29
In light of what has been said in this study, if Leftwich is
right then his criticism is valid.
are description and explanation.

Two of the objectives of science
If a theory does not adequately

serve these two functions, it must be of doubtful utility in accom
plishing the third objective of science, prediction.
If homeostasis is used idealistically in psychology as
rationality appears to be used

in economics,

accepted as a valid axiom in Chambers' study.

then homeostasismay be
On the other hand, if

as Leftwich implies, homeostasis is viewed in psychology as an
empirically false statement, then it should be removed from Chambers'
theory.
This concludes a brief evaluation of Leftwich's two criticisms
of Chambers.

The true validity of Leftwich's criticism awaits future

empirical evidence regarding man's rationality and homeostasis.

29Leftwich, op. cit., p. 227.
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Conceptual Comparison With Moonitz
Moonitz in Accounting Research Study No. 1 , "The Basic
Postulates of Accounting,"

on

presented concepts that from the tradi

tional viewpoints are considered basic assumptions underlying finan
cial accounting.

Other

authors^!

lists of accounting's assumptions.

have also presented their respective
Some of their assumptions mesh,

some conflict, and some supplement Moonitz's assumptions.

But con

ceptually, most of the types of concepts that are identified as basic
assumptions underlying accounting are similar to Moonitz's.
His postulates are as follows:
Postulate A-l. Quantification. Quantitative data are
helpful in making rational economic decisions, i.e.,
in making choices among alternatives so that actions
are correctly related to consequences.
Postulate A-2.
Exchange. Most of the goods and services
that are produced are distributed through exchange, and
are not directly consumed by the producers.
Postulate A-3. Entities (including identification of the
entity). Economic activity is carried on through specific
units or entities. Any report on the activity must
identify clearly the particular unit or entity involved.
Postulate A-4. Time period (including specification of
the time period). Economic activity is carried on during
specifiable periods of time. Any report on that activity
must identify clearly the period of time involved.
Postulate A-5. Unit of measure (including identification
of the monetary unit). Money is the common denominator

S^Maurice Moonitz, "The Basic Postulates of Accounting,"
Accounting Research Study No. 1 (New York: American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, 1961).
31
p. 2.

For example, see most of the studies listed in Chapter 1,
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in terms of which goods and services, including labor,
natural resources, and capital are measured. Any report
must clearly indicate which money (e.g., dollars, francs,
pounds) is being used.
Postulate B-l. Financial statements.
(Related to A-l.)
The results of the accounting process are expressed in a
set of fundamentally related financial statements which
articulate with each other and rest upon the same under
lying data.
Postulate B-2. Market Prices.
(Related to A-2.) Account
ing data are based on prices generated by past, present or
future exchanges which have actually taken place or are
expected to.
Postulate B-3. Entities.
(Related to A-3.) The results
of the accounting process are expressed in terms of
specific units or entities.
Postulate B-4. Tentativeness. (Related to A-4.) The
results of operations for relatively short periods of
time are tentative whenever allocations between past,
present, and future periods are required.
Postulate C-l. Continuity (including the correlative con
cept of limited life). In the absence of evidence to the
contrary, the entity should be viewed as remaining in
operation indefinitely. In the presence of evidence that
the entity has a limited life, it should not be viewed as
remaining in operation indefinitely.
Postulate C-2. Objectivity. Changes in assets and lia
bilities, and the related effects (if any) on revenues,
expenses, retained earnings, and the like, should not be
given formal recognition in the accounts earlier than the
point of time at which they can be measured in objective
terms.
Postulate C-3. Consistency. The procedures used in
accounting for a given entity should be appropriate for
the measurement of its position and its activity and should
be followed consistently from period to period.
Postulate C-4. Stable unit. Accounting reports should be
based on a stable measuring unit.
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Postulate C-5. Disclosure. Accounting reports should
disclose that which is necessary to make them not mis
leading. 32

Internal and Bridge Axioms and Postulates
The conception of the nature of basic assumptions developed
and applied in this study is somewhat different from that employed by
Moonitz and others.

Moonitz did not make the distinction between

axioms and postulates made in this study.
tions borrowed from other disciplines.
cipline's own original assumptions.

Axioms represent assump

Postulates represent a dis

This is only a minor point

because the axiom-postulate dichotomy described here represents only
a conceptual distinction.
Of greater importance is the distinction between internal
assumptions and bridge assumptions employed in this study.

Such a

distinction is necessary if a set of assumptions is to be applicable,
at least in principle, to the real world.
In rejecting the axiomatic approach Moonitz stated:

"This

method, however, will probably prove incapable of dealing with the
empirical part of accounting, especially with respect to valuation
problems."^3

It is the use of bridge assumptions that enables account

ants to deal with the empirical part of accounting.

Bridge assumptions

tie internal assumptions of a theory into empirically verifiable and
measurable facts.

^Moonitz, op. cit., pp. 52—53.
33ibid., p. 3.
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Moonitz's "Problem-Oriented" Approach
It might be argued that the above criticisms of Accounting
Research Study No. 1 are not valid because Moonitz did not follow the
axiomatic approach.

In fact, in the quote just cited he rejected the

axiomatic approach.

Moonitz described his approach as the problem-

oriented 34 approach.
approach.

But in reality this approach is the deductive

And the deductive approach is synonymous with the axiomatic

approach.
Moonitz's postulates represent concepts that are important in
accounting.

However, they are not the fundamental and basic assump

tions of accounting as the term "basic assumption" is used in this
study.

Moonitz simply identified concepts he felt are important in

accounting.

He did not thoroughly employ reduction to determine the

assumptions underlying these concepts.

This point is expanded in

the following section.

Selected Examples From ARS No. 1 and ARS No. 3
ARS No. 3, "A Tentative Set of Broad Accounting Principles for
Business Enterprises,"35 is an attempt to determine the principles
underlying accounting for business enterprises.
companion to ARS No.

34ibid., pp.
35

1.

It is designed as a

Like its companion, ARS

No. 3is in part

2 and 4.

Robert T. Sprouse and Maurice Moonitz, "A Tentative Set of
Broad Accounting Principles for Business Enterprises," Accounting
Research Study No. 3 (New York; American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, 1962).
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normative.
be.

The authors describe accounting as they think it should

Their concept of accounting differed in certain respects from the

concept of accounting evidenced by then current practice.

Thus, the

assumptions and theorems they reductively derived differ from those of
current practice.

Basic Assumptions in Accounting
Accountants could call any set of statements describing and
explaining what accountants do, or should do, as the basic assumptions
of accounting.

For instance, the detailed rules and procedures applied

in accounting practice could be called accounting’s assumptions.
ever, accountants prefer to look further into their practices.

How
They

prefer to look past the rules and procedures, past the principles, and
back to more fundamental concepts that underlie accounting practices.
These they call the basic assumptions of accounting.
Underlying the broad principles of Accounting Research Study
Ho. 3 are the assumptions of Accounting Research Study No. 1 .

If the

ARS No. 1 assumptions are the assumptions of accounting, then this
must be the case.

But as the following examples show, Moonitz*s

assumptions in ARS No. 1 are insufficient to derive all the ARS No. 3
principles.

First Example— The ARS No. 3 "C" Principle
One of

the ARS No. 3 principles,, called "Principle C" in

that study, is that "all assets of the enterprise . . . should be
recorded in the accounts and reported in the financial statements."^

36lbid., p. 5 5 .
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This principle cannot be derived from the ARS No. 1 assumptions
without the aid

of at least one additional assumption.

assumption C-5 can

ARS No. 1

be restated as follows, preserving Moonitz’s

apparent intended meaning:
Assumption C-5 - If accounting reports are to be useful
in making rational economic decisions, then
accounting reports should disclose all that
is necessary to make them not misleading.
This assumption (C-5) is an internal assumption.
nothing observable.

It relates to

In order to derive the above Principle C, a

second assumption must be added.
Statement 1

- If accounting reports should disclose all that
is necessary to make them not misleading,
then accounting reports should report all
the assets of a business enterprise.

This assumption serves as a bridge assumption.
Statement 1 does not appear anywhere among the ARS No. 1
assumptions.

Nor do any other assumptions in ARS No. 1 appear to be

sufficient to derive Principle C.

When assumption C-5 and the above

second assumption, Statement 1, are combined logically, the result
is the following principle (theorem).
Principle 1

- If accounting reports are to be useful in
making rational economic decisions, then
accounting reports should report all the
assets of a business enterprise.^

This principle seems to be consistent with the intent of ARS No. 1 and

37p;roof:

Let A = "accounting reports .. .decisions,"
B = "accounting reports .. .misleading,"
C = "accounting reports .. .enterprise."
Then if A, then B (Assumpiton C-5) and if B, then C
(Statement 1), then if A, then C [Principle
(Theorem) 1].
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ARS No. 3.

Only with the addition of Statement 1 or some similar

type statement is the derivation of the ARS No. 3's Principle C
possible.

Second Example— The ARS No. 3 "A11 Principle
Another of

the

ARS No. 3 principles is that "profit is

attributable to the whole process of business a c t i v i t y . T h i s
principle is not derived from any of the stated ARS No. 1 assumptions.
However, one of those assumptions could be changed slightly.

A Modified ARS No. 1 Assumption
Moonitz's assumption A-4 is that:

"Economic activity is

carried on during specifiable periods of time."-^

He uses the term

"economic or business activity" as follows:
Economic activity— The production and exchange of goods and
services.
Assumption A-4, an internal assumption, could be changed as follows:
Statement 2 - If the production and exchange of goods and
services requires the transformation of goods
services, then the production and exchange of
goods and services is carried on over time.
Moonitz uses the term "transform" as follows:
The term "transform" is used in the broadest possible
sense to denote conversion or combination or rearrangement. It
includes physical transformation, as in manufacturing, but also
covers, for example, the activities of professional men in
applying their knowledge and skill to the solution of a client's
problems.

3®Sprouse and Moonitz, loc. cit.
"^Moonitz, op. cit., p. 52.

^Ibid., p. 13.
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Considering the definitions of the terms "revenue" and
"expense" in ARS No. 3,^1 it appears that Principle A is true by
definition.

The terms "revenue" and "expense" are defined in

ARS No. 3 as follows:
. . . Revenue is the increase in net assets of an enter
prise as a result of the production or delivery of goods and
the rendering of services. Expense is the decrease in net
assets as a result of the use of economic services in the
creation of revenues or of the imposition of taxes by govern
mental units.^2
Net profit is the difference between revenues and expenses (and gains
and losses).

Revenues and expenses result from the production and

exchange of goods and services.

Thus, if the production and exchange

of goods and services is carried on over time, then profit (or loss)
must also be earned over time.

If the ARS No. 1 assumption A-4 is

changed as suggested above, then one may question wheth„er this leaves
a gap in the ARS No. 1 assumptions.

In one respect a gap is created.

In another respect a gap is not created.

Some Other Needed Assumptions
Moonitz states the following "corollary" to assumption A-4:
"Any report on that [economic] activity must identify clearly the
period of time involved."^3

What Moonitz calls a corollary to

assumption A-4 is in fact a theorem combining another of his assump
tions and an unstated assumption.

^Gains and losses are defined in a similar manner in terms of
increases and decreases in net assets. See Sprouse and Moonitz, op.
cit., p. 54.
^Loc. cit.

^Moonitz, op. cit., p. 52.
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The C-5 assumption on disclosure could be reworded as follows
without losing any of Moonitz’s intended meaning:
C-5 - If accounting reports are to be useful in making rational
economic decisions, then accounting reports should dis
close all that is necessary to make them not misleading.
According to Statement 2, the production and exchange of goods
and services is carried on continually over time.

Accounting reports

may be defined generally as including reports on the production and
exchange of goods and services.

Thus, the corollary that follows from

Statement 2 is not that accounting reports must identify the time
period covered in accounting reports.

Rather, the corollary is that

accounting reports may be prepared as of or for any period of time
during which the production and exchange of goods and services (eco
nomic activity) occurs.
The statement that accounting reports must identify the time
period reported on is derived from Moonitz's Statement C-5 shown
above and the following bridge assumption:
Statement 3 - If accounting reports should disclose that
which is necessary to make them not misleading,
then accounting reports should disclose the
period of time reported on in accounting
reports.
When Statement C-5 is combined with Statement 3, the result is the
following:
Theorem 2

- If accounting reports are to be helpful in
making rational economic decisions, then
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accounting reports should disclose the period
of time reported on in accounting reports.^4
In both cases in the preceding discussion where assumptions
were added. Statements 1 and 3, the added assumptions, were bridge
assumptions.

Statement 2 was an internal assumption.

was simply a reformulation of Moonitz's assumption A-4.

However, it
It is

bridge assumptions that tie nonobservable assumptions to observable
events in the real world.

Hence, in the areas examined Moonitz’s

assumptions are not applicable in the real world.

However, with the

addition of Statements 1 and 2 above application of Moonitz's
assumptions in the real world can begin.

Incompleteness in the ARS No. 1 Assumptions
The preceding discussion demonstrates two ways in which
Moonitz's ARS No. 1 assumptions are incomplete.

First, they are not

sufficient to permit the derivation of some of the ARS No. 3 princi
ples.

But these principles were intended to be based on the ARS

No. 1 assumptions.
Secondly, and more important, the ARS No. 1 assumptions are
incomplete statements of the assumptions actually employed in ARS
No. 1.

In the areas examined above, Moonitz correctly uses deductive

logic in the related background discussion of the ARS No. 1 assump
tions.

However, his attempts at reductively determining the

4^Let A
= "accounting reports are . . .decisions,"
B = "accounting reports should . . .misleading,"
C = "accounting reports should . . .reports."
Then if A, then B (Statement C-5) and if B, then C
(Statement 3), then if A, then C (Theorem 2).
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assumptions underlying his deductive description of accounting
yielded a mixture of stated assumptions, unstated assumptions, and
theorems.

The result in ARS No. 1 is not a presentation of the

assumptions of accounting.

Rather, what results is simply a list

of important concepts in accounting.

This criticism is not intended

to take away anything from the importance of the ARS Nos. 1 and 3.
Such studies are an important first step in developing deductive
theories in accounting.

Had the correct nature of basic assumptions

in deductive theories been understood, ARS Nos. 1 and 3 could have
been more complete and consistent with each other.

And, thus more

useful to the accounting profession.

The Nature of Basic Assumptions
As has been pointed out in Chapter 1 ^

and preceding sections

of this chapter, Moonitz apparently did not investigate the nature of
basic assumptions.

He simply accepted the description of assumptions

given by the Special Committee on Research Program.
did not study the nature of assumptions either.

They, in turn,

Rather, they simply

described the term "assumption" as it had been employed in traditional
accounting literature.
But just because the term "assumption" had been employed in a
certain way over the years, this does not mean it should continue to
be employed in that way.

The examination in this study of theory

construction revealed much about the nature of basic assumptions that

^^See Chapter 1, pp. 11-12 for a more detailed discussion on
these points.
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Moonitz and others have not considered.

For instance, the discovery

of the need for bridge assumptions to tie the.nonobservable internal
assumptions to real world phenomena is mentioned above.

Also, the

use of idealizations in basic assumptions in needed because of the
complexity of the real world.
be totally described.

The real world is too complicated to

Only the aspects of the real world that

represent significant influencing factors in a theory are normally
considered.

Other Forms of Incompleteness
As shown above, Moonitz's ARS No. 1 assumptions are not
complete for purposes of deriving the ARS No. 3 principles.

This

type of incompleteness could not have been intentional, because the
ARS No. 3 study was to serve as the companion to the ARS No. 1
study.

Moonitz admits that his list of assumptions is not complete

in two other ways.

Each of these forms of incompleteness is

acceptable.
In his discussion of the accounting environment Moonitz
states:
That there may be more than five basic postulates
referring to the environment is readily conceded. For one
thing, each of the five is a complex assertion and could be
restated in the form of two or more simpler statements. In
other words, these propositions are not as basic as might
appear from their brevity and relative simplicity of statement.
For another thing, other aspects of the environment,
not covered in these five propositions, could be expressed
in suitable fashion. In this sense, the list is open-ended,
and admits of indefinite extension.

4<3Moonitz, op. cit., pp. 22-23.
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That one of his assumptions may in fact be a combination of two
or more other assumptions is certainly true.
basic assumption.

No assumption is unique.

This is true of any
Any basic assumption of

any theory could be derived as a theorem from another set of basic
assumptions.
Secondly, Moonitz points out that his environmental assump
tions are not complete.
tions could be added.

That is, additional environmental assump
One assumes this also can apply to the B and

C group assumptions.
As the analysis of Godel’s proof in Chapter 3 points out, no
set of assumptions underlying a deductive theory can be both complete
and consistent.

There will always be some true statement one can

make about a concept that is not derivable from any finite set of
basic assumptions.

Thus, as Moonitz says, his assumptions are

open-ended.

Postulates for All of Accounting
Finally, Moonitz attempted to set forth the assumptions for
all of accounting.

But this is too ambitious an undertaking.

Not

until there is agreement on the boundaries of accounting can one
purport to have determined all the assumptions of accounting.

And

today, it is unlikely to find even a few accountants who would com
pletely agree on any particular concept of accounting.
Furthermore, accounting is continually expanding because of
new challenges from users.

The expanding application of knowledge

in related disciplines is continually changing the scope of account
ing.

Thus, the possibility of finding a finite number of assumptions
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which everyone would agree are the basic assumptions of accounting
is highly unlikely.

Summary and Conclusions
The purpose of this chapter is to show that the techniques of
theory construction presented in earlier chapters have broad appli
cability to a great many problem areas in accounting.
spectrum of accounting is sampled.
broad spectrum are chosen.

The broad

Different examples from this

These examples are:

(1) evaluated in

light of the theory construction techniques presented in this study
and (2) used to demonstrate the range of applicability of the theory
construction techniques.

Pertinent conclusions are summarized in

Table 5 on the following page.

Materiality
First, materiality, a long-time problem area to accountants,
is examined.

Internal assumptions and bridge assumptions as might be

found in a particular theory of materiality concerning earnings per
share are stated.

Two alternative bridge assumptions are proposed.

One is determined by stipulation.
measurement in accounting.

Thus, it is an example of fiat

The second alternative bridge assumption

is based on the findings of an empirical study.
fiat measurement is not involved.
idealizations.

In this second case

Both of the bridge assumptions are

As with all idealizations they ignore other factors

that might account for investor reaction.

The earnings per share

change is considered the dominant causal factor.
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Table 5
Applications of the Techniques of Theory Construction

Study

(1)

Bridge
Internal
Assumptions Assumptions

(2)

(3)

Theorems

Ideal
izations

Fiat
Meas
urement

(4)

(5)

(6)
No, for
6.5%
change
Yes, for
10%
change

Materiality

Stated

Stated

Stated

Used
properly

Depreciation
Accounting

Stated

Stated

Stated

Used
properly

Yes

Implied
but not
stated
in the
area
examined

Stated

Used
properly

Yes

Stated

Not
stated

Used
properly

Yes

APB 15 (applies Stated
only to area
examined— when
convertible
securities are
considered
common stock
equivalents)
APB 18 (when
to use the
equity
method)

Implied
but not
stated

Leftwich’s
Criticism of
Chambers:
1. Rationality

Stated

Used
properly

2. Homeostasis

Stated

Not
used
properly
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Table 5 (continued)

Bridge
Internal
Assumptions Assumptions

Study

(2)

(1)
Moonitz:
1. Principle C

Assumption
C-5 stated

2. Principle A

Assumption
A-4 stated
but modi
fied
slightly to
Statement 2

3. Corollary
to Assump
tion A-4

Assumption
C-5 stated

(3)

Theorems

(4)

Ideal
izations

(5)

Fiat
Meas
urement

(6)

Statement 1 Principle
not stated C reworded
as Princi
ple 1—
stated
Principle
A not a
theorem
but a
corollary
(true by
definition)
Statement 3 Called a
not stated corollary
by Moonitz
but
actually
a theorem

Source:
Original.

Depreciation Accounting
Secondly, the techniques of theory construction are applied
to depreciation accounting.

Internal assumptions, bridge assumptions,

and theorems are stated as might be found in a particular theory of
depreciation.

In this particular example observable formulas can be
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introduced by appropriate definitions.

Two APB Opinions
After demonstrating theory construction techniques in these
areas, these same techniques are used in analyzing selected aspects
of several current accounting theories.
ciples Board Opinions are studied.

Two recent Accounting Prin

In Opinion 15 on earnings per

share the area examined concerns determining when convertible
securities are common stock equivalents.

In Opinion 18 on the equity

method of accounting for investments, the assumed criteria covering
when the equity method should be used is studied.
A comparison of the types of statements directly stated in
Opinions 15 and 18 is revealing.

The APB is inconsistent in the

manner in which it presents its theories.

In Opinion 15 the APB

states an internal assumption and a theorem.

The bridge assumption

that is needed to develop the theorem is only implied indirectly.

On

the other hand, in Opinion 18 the APB states only the bridge assump
tions used.

An internal assumption and the theorem, which is the

APB's apparent objective, are only indirectly implied.
In both cases the bridge assumptions arrived at by the APB are
examples of fiat measurement.

In both cases no discussion is presented

as to how these assumptions are arrived at.
coming of the theories presented.
appear to be arbitrary conclusions.
both.

This is a distinct short

Both of these bridge assumptions
More research is needed regarding
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Leftwich's Criticisms of Chambers
The two criticisms by Leftwich' concerning Chambers’
Accounting, Evaluation and Economic Behavior are examined next.
First, Chambers’ assumption of rationality is examined.

It is con

cluded that Chambers uses rationality as the concept is used in
economics.
sense.

That is, Chambers uses rationality in an idealistic

Two other possible ways rationality could be used are also

considered.

Rationality in a trivial sense, though rejected by

Leftwich, applies to all theories.

A thoroughly comprehensive des/

cription of the real world is impossible.

Rationality, as an

empirically false assumption, conflicts with extensive usage of the
concept in economics.

The predictive ability of economic theories

which assume rationality gives evidence that the rationality assump
tion is not empirically false.
In contrast, Chambers* assumption of homeostasis may be
improper.

Leftwich points out that as a concept homeostasis is not

accepted in psychology.

If Leftwich is correct and homeostasis is not

an idealization but an empirically false concept, then Chambers'
inclusion of it in his theory is incorrect.

Conceptual Comparison With Moonitz
Finally a conceptual comparison with selected aspects of
Moonitz's ARS No. 1 is offered.

Such a comparison necessitated

analyzing the companion ARS No. 3 principles study.

This is done in

order to determine if the ARS No. 3 principles are derived from the
ARS No. 1 assumptions.
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First,

' : approach Moonitz used in ARS No. 1 is analyzed.

The approach in ARS No. 1, though called a problem-oriented approach
by Moonitz, in reality is the deductive approach.

And the deductive

approach is synonomous with the axiomatic approach which he mis
takenly rejected.
Next, two principles are selected from the ARS No. 3 study.
An attempt is made to derive these principles from the ARS No. 1
assumptions.

In the case of Principle C, an additional assumption

has to be supplied.

In the case of Principle A, one of Moonitz's

assumptions must be modified.

In addition, one statement identified

as a corollary by Moonitz in reality is a theorem (principle).

Its

derivation also requires the addition of an unstated bridge assump
tion.

Furthermore, in the two areas examined, Moonitz's assumptions

are both internal assumptions.

Bridge assumptions had to be added

in order to apply his assumptions to the real world.
The ARS No. 1 assumptions are found incomplete in a number
of ways.

First, taken alone, they are not capable of yielding all

the ARS No. 3 principles.

Since the ARS No. 3 principles are

intended to be based on the ARS No. 1 assumptions,
shortcoming.

this is a serious

Second, Moonitz reductively derived the ARS No. 1

assumptions from a concept of accounting, also described by him in
ARS No. 1.

In reality the assumptions he identified are only a few

of the assumptions actually underlying his concept of accounting.

In

order words, Moonitz's reduction is inadequate.
Additionally, Moonitz chose too large a
to work with.

concept of accounting

The reduction of all the assumptions of an entire
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discipline in nearly impossible.

Had Moonitz more fully understood

the nature of basic assumptions and the techniques of theory con
struction, most of the above criticisms could have been avoided.
Moonitz's assumptions are incomplete in two other ways, both
of which are acceptable.

First, each of Moonitz's assumptions could

itself be derived as a theorem from two or more assumptions.
true of all assumptions.

This is

Secondly, as Godel's proof verifies, all

sets of assumptions are open-ended.

Some true statement concerning

accounting could always be made that itself was neither an assump
tion nor a theorem of a given set of basic assumptions.

Conclusions
The examples in this chapter serve to show that the techniques
of theory construction are applicable to a great many problem areas in
accounting.

Indeed, these examples are a type of empirical evidence.

While it can never be proven that these techniques are applicable to
every aspect of accounting, evidence is provided demonstrating their
applicability in some areas.

This author, and hopefully the reader,

can see their applicability in a great many other areas.

This author

is confident that great advances in accounting research can result if
these techniques of theory construction are applied to the problem
areas of accounting.

Chapter 7

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The objectives set for this study in Chapter 1 were as
follows:
(1)

To describe the nature and function of basic assump
tions in a theory or discipline by a detailed analysis
of the techniques of theory construction;

(2)

To demonstrate that the above is applicable to
accounting by constructing an outline of a theory of
financial accounting measurement; and

(3)

To demonstrate the wide applicability of theory con
struction techniques in accounting by applying these
techniques to a diverse sample of accounting topics.

These objectives were accomplished in the following ways.

Basic Assumptions in Deductive Theories
The objective of Chapters 2 and 3 (Objective 1 above) was an
examination of the nature and function of basic assumptions in deduc
tive theories.
selves.

Chapter 2 concentrated on the basic assumptions them

In Chapter 3 the relation between basic assumptions and the

other components of a deductive theory was explored.

The Nature of Basic Assumptions
Extensrive library research in the area of the philosophy of
216
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science was undertaken to determine how basic assumptions are employed
in theory construction.

This research was necessary because previous

accounting studies aimed at determining accounting’s basic assumptions
analyzed the nature of basic assumptions in deductive theories only
superficially, if at all.

This research led to a number of conclusions

regarding the nature of basic assumptions and theory construction
which largely had not been recognized in accounting.

Determination and Characteristics of
Basic Assumptions
A theory is essentially a deductive description of some
concept.

Every theory is based on some basic assumptions in order

to avoid either an infinite series of statements or circular rea
soning.

Reduction is used in determining the basic assumptions

underlying a particular concept.

With reduction, an attempt is made

to identify the basic assumptions underlying a concept which when
combined logically yield the concept.

Once this is done, an attempt

can be made to combine these same basic assumptions in "new" ways
with the hope of yielding "new" knowledge about the concept.
Basic assumptions are generally required to have certain
characteristics.

They should be consistent with the other assump

tions present and completely capable of logically yielding the
desired concept.

In addition, it is desirable that basic assumptions

be independent of the other assumptions present, reproductive or
capable of yielding many theorems, and have the aesthetic quality of
simplicity.
The basic assumptions of many theories appear trivial.

And
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because of the use of idealizations they frequently are not exact
descriptions of the real world.

But idealizations are acceptable if

under purified conditions they are true assumptions about a concept.
The basic assumptions of a theory describe only the most significant
influential factors underlying a concept.
thought to be immaterial are ignored.

Many distorting influences

The real world is too complex

to completely specify all the assumptions underlying a concept.

Five Types of Basic Assumptions
Five different types of basic assumptions were identified.
These were:
(1)

objectives,

(2)

internal axioms,

(3)

bridge axioms,

(4)

internal postulates, and

(5)

bridge postulates.

A conceptual distinction was made between objectives, axioms, and
postulates.

Objectives indicate the goals which axioms and postulates

attempt to describe and explain.

Axioms are assumptions borrowed from

theories in other disciplines and applied to accounting theories.
Postulates are assumptions originating in accounting which serve to
make accounting a distinct discipline.

Axioms and postulates were

further subdivided into internal and bridge axioms and postulates.
Internal assumptions contain dispositional and theoretical
concepts.

These concepts are nonohservable characteristics of

observable things Cdispositionals) and nonobservable characteristics
of nonobservable things (theofeticals).

Both concepts play a

currently indispensable role in scientific theories.
Since both concepts involve nonobservables neither they nor
the assumptions and theorems containing them can be directly empir
ically verified.

Instead of direct testing, bridge assumptions are

sought connecting the nonobservable internal assumptions with
observable phenomena.

Verification of the observable phenomena is

used as supporting evidence of the internal assumptions.

Because such

indirect confirmations are not valid logically they are not considered
proofs.

Rather, these indirect confirmations serve as evidence

increasing one’s confidence in accompanying internal assumptions.

Obtaining General Acceptance for
Basic Assumptions
Several other alternative methods of obtaining general
acceptance for basic assumptions were examined.
none were accepted.

For different reasons

These methods included (1) relying on self

evidence to support basic assumptions, (2) limiting basic assumptions
to analytic statements, or (3) demonstrating basic assumptions by an
appeal to another deductive system (theory).
Because basic assumptions contain idealizations, relying on
self-evidence to support those basic assumptions is risky.

Kant’s

distinction between analytic and synthetic statements seemed prom
ising.

Analytic statements are true because of their logical form.

If one understands all the terms of an analytic statement, then one
can judge its truth value.

Unfortunately, analytic statements do not

contain sufficient content to convey anything meaningful.
are of limited utility in theory construction.

Thus, they

On the other hand,
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synthetic statements can be rich in content*

But knowledge apart

from the statement itself is necessary in order to confirm synthetic
statements-

Thus, confirmation must rest on empirical testing.

Finally, appeal to another deductive system was considered.
Here a basic assumption of one theory could be derived from the basic
assumptions of a second theory.

If the second theory is generally

established, then one's confidence in the derived basic assumption
is strengthened.

However, nothing has been proven-

Ultimately, one

set of basic assumptions must be accepted as given.

The Nature of Deductive Theories
The objective of Chapters 2 and 3 was an examination of the
nature and function of basic assumptions in a theory ordiscipline.

The

nature of basic assumptions in deductive theories was analyzed in
Chapter 2.

In Chapter 3 this analysis was expanded to include the

entire structure of a deductive theory:
theorems.

basic assumptions and

This analysis was accomplished by library research in the

area of logic, in the use of the deductive approach in mathematics,
accounting, and other selected areas, and by a continuation of the
study of theory construction.

Components of a Deductive System
Following a brief examination of the origin and significance
of the deductive approach, the components of a deductive theory were
briefly discussed.
(1)

These components included:

a set of basic assumptions (five types were discussed
in Chapter 2),
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(2)

a set of derived statements (alternatively called
theorems or principles),

(3)

rules of logic,

(4)

a set of primitive terms,

(5)

a set of defined terms,

(6)

a set of universal terms,

(7)

rules of definition, and

(8)

rules of grammar.

The rules of logic are part of a deductive theory since they
must be assumed in order to derive theorems from basic assumptions.
Both basic assumptions and theorems are statements composed of terms.
Three types of terms were identified:
universal.

primitive, defined, and

Primitive terms are the undefined terms of a theory.

are unique only for a given theory.

They

Some terms must remain undefined

in order to avoid circular definitions or an infinite series of
definitions.

The similarity with basic assumptions is obvious.

Although not explicitly defined in a theory, the primitive terms are
implicitly defined by the way they are used in a theory.
In contrast, defined terms are explicitly defined in a theory.
They are defined utilizing other defined terms, primitive terms, and
certain universal terms.

Universal terms are similar to primitive

terms in that they too are not defined.

However, universal terms are

limited to non-^technical terms which should be universally understood.
In order to define a term certain rules of definition must be
followed.
theory.

These definitional rules are also part of a deductive
Explicit definitional rules are used in deductive theories.
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Finally, terms must be combined to form statements which serve as
basic assumptions.

Rules of grammar specify permissible combinations

of terms.
All of the above components of deductive theories are present
whether the theory is formalized with symbolic logic or stated, as is
normally the case outside of mathematics, in ordinary language.

Care

ful attention must be paid in theory construction to each of these
components.

Else, a theory’s basic assumptions may not convey the

theorist's intended meaning.

Characteristics of Deductive Systems
Deductive theories have characteristics beyond the charac
teristics of basic assumptions discussed in Chapter 2.
desirable that all theories be fully formalized.

First, it is

This requires that

every statement in the theory is either a basic assumption or a
theorem, every technical term must be either a primitive or a defined
term, and every possible meaningful theorem that could be derived from
the basic assumptions is derived.

Though desirable, this charac

teristic is rarely attained, especially in relatively new theories.
The benefits of full formalization may not be worth the costs of
delaying the application of the theory.
It also seems desirable that deductive theories be both
consistent and complete.

Consistency means no contradictions are

contained in either the assumptions or the theorems.

Since theorems

do not contain anything that is not in the underlying assumptions,
consistency of the entire theory is simply consistency in the basic
assumptions.

Inconsistency destroys a theory.
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Completeness includes full formalization and adds the require
ment that all true statements about a concept expressible in the
primitive terms of the theory be derivable from the basic assumptions.
Godel’s proof has shown that deductive systems cannot be both con
sistent and complete.

Completeness must then be abandoned in favor

of consistency.
Finally, several advantages of deductive theories were dis
cussed.

First, theorists are forced to recognize all their assump

tions and to rigorously define their terms.

Second, pursuing basic

assumptions to their logical ends helps eliminate inconsistencies in
a discipline.

Third, deductive theories represent a convenient

breakdown of a subject.

This breakdown serves as a useful teaching

device.
This completed the analysis of the nature and function of
basic assumptions in theories.

Conclusions concerning this analysis

are presented later in this chapter.

The following two sections

summarize the effort to show the techniques of theory construction

were applicable to accounting theory construction.

Some Basic Assumptions in a Theory of
Financial Accounting Measurement
The objective of Chapters 4 and 5 was to demonstrate that the
techniques of theory construction are applicable to accounting by con
structing an outline of a theory of financial accounting measurement.
If theory construction techniques are to be of benefit in accounting
theory construction, they must be capable of application in accounting.
To demonstrate this capability the theory construction techniques were
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applied to one currently important topic in accounting:

financial

accounting measurement.

A Summary of Measurement Theory
One entire chapter was devoted to the study of measurement
theory for three reasons.

First, in order to develop a theory of

financial accounting measurement, one has to be knowledgeable of
measurement theory.

Secondly, the theory of financial accounting

measurement developed in Chapter 5 involved the use of index numbers
to adjust for general and specific price-level changes.

And, it was

necessary to show that financial accounting measurement is on a ratio
scale in order to use index number adjustments.

Thirdly, several of

the accounting examples analyzed in Chapter 6 involved fiat meas
urement.

Thus, it was necessary to describe and classify fiat meas

urement according to measurement theory literature.
In Chapter 4 extensive library research was undertaken on
measurement theory.

Three major topics were discussed:

(1)

the nature of measurement,

(2)

alternative systems for the classification of meas
urement , and

(3)

the measurement unit.

What Is Measurement?
Measurement was defined in this study as follows:
Measurement - The assignment by rules of numerals to
ohjects or events in order to represent
particular properties of the objects or
events.
This definition included classification as measurement.

Several of
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the authors examined (Ellis, Torgerson, Sterling, and Campbell), con
sidered classification a premeasurement concept.

Despite a rigorous

reformulation of the kind of rules that can qualify as measurement
rules, Ellis admitted that classification could be excluded from meas
urement only by arbitrary convention.
On the other hand, Mattessich pointed out that the exclusion
of classification dichotomizes a logical entity since classification
is inherent in all higher forms of measurement.

Because the exclusion

of classification is arbitrary and because its inclusion preserves a
logical entity, no restrictions to exclude classificaiton were placed
on the measurement definition adopted in this study.

Alternative Systems for the Classification
of Measurement
Two major measurement classification systems, Stevens’ system
and Campbell's system, were examined next along with criticisms and
modifications of each system.

Of particular importance to the theory

of financial accounting measurement presented in Chapter 5 was ratio
scale measurement and fiat measurement.

Stevens’ Classification Systems and
Its Variations
Stevens' classification system identified four major meas
urement scales:

nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio,

A fifth

possible scale, the logarithmic interval scale, has no important
applications at the present time.

The basis of Stevens’ classification

is invariance of the scale form under mathematical transformation.
Coombs presented an expansion of Stevens' classification.
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Coombs added to Stevens' four major scales a partially ordered scale
and an ordered metric scale, which was simply an unfinished interval
scale.

Since Coombs distinguished between two aspects of each scale,

the object and the distance between objects, his classification
yielded many subclasses.

The basis of Coombs' classification was the

kinds of application of arithmetic that the scale represents.
Ellis criticized the basis of Stevens' classification as
ambiguous and questioned its reliability for classifying scales.

Ellis

pointed out that Stevens may have been thinking about the kinds of
application of arithmetic and not mathematical invariance alone as the
basis of his scale.

However, Ellis admitted that Stevens may have had

better reasons for his classification of which Ellis was not aware.
Through his reformulation of Stevens' invariance criterion
Ellis showed that Stevens' classification system could be derived
from Coombs' system.

Ellis showed that a nominal, ordinal, interval,

or ratio scale under Coombs' classification was classified the same
under Stevens'.

Thus, a given scale type can only be transformed as

Stevens suggested.

Based on this, it was possible to show in Chapter

5 that irregardless of whether Ellis' criticism of Stevens' system was
correct or incorrect, the concept of financial accounting measurement
presented in Chapter 5 was measurement on a ratio scale.

Thus, scale

transformations involving multiplication by a constant are permitted.
Torgerson offered a modification of Stevens' scale classification
system.

Torgerson did not recognize Steven's nominal scale as

measurement.

Additionally, Torgerson recognized two kinds of ordinal

scales, one with a natural origin and one without a natural
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origin.

Like Stevens, the basis of Torgerson's classification was

invariance under mathematical transformation.

Campbell's Classification System and
Its Variations
The second major measurement classification system examined
was Campbell's.
measurement.

He distinguished between fundamental and derived

Fundamental

measurement, which depends on no

urement, requires that the property measured be additive.

prior meas

Derived

measurement depends on prior fundamental measurement of two or more
quantities.

With present

knowledge very few properties in

or other social sciences,are fundamentally measurable,
being linked to fundamental measurements.

accounting,

or capable of

Thus, Campbell's class

ification system had little application to accounting measurement.
Ellis offered a modification of Campbell's measurement system
which recognized elemental and associative measurement in addition to
Campbell's fundamental and derived measurement.
is measurement of rank-order.

Elemental measurement

Associative measurement is measurement

that depends on the prior measurement of only one quantity.

Ellis'

modification does not recognize much of the measurement done in
accounting and other social sciences.
Finally, Torgerson's modification of Campbell's measurement
classification system was presented.

In addition to fundamental and

derived measurement Torgerson identified fiat measurement:
by stipulation, convention, or definition.

measurement

Fiat measurement is used

frequently in the social sciences and in accounting.

Selected examples

of fiat measurement in accounting were analyzed in Chapter 6 where the
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techniques of theory construction were applied to a number of
accounting topics.

The type of financial accounting measurement

described in Chapter 5 was classified according to these different
systems of measurement in Chapter 5.

The Measurement Unit
Finally, the nature of the measurement unit was discussed.
Measurement units that are relatively invariant are normally chosen
by scientists because they lead to simpler theories.

Once a given

measurement unit has been chosen, a decision must be made as to whether
it needs to be adjusted for distorting influences.

The typical meas

urement unit used for business activity is the dollar.

The dollar can

be adjusted with index numbers for the effects of general price-level
changes.

These adjustments are for distortions in the dollar caused

by inflation or deflation.

Though the adjustments for distorting

influences complicate measurement rules, they lead to simpler theories.

An Outline of a Theory of Financial
Accounting Measurement
In Chapter 5 the techniques of theory construction were com
bined with the background material on measurement theory to demonstrate
that theory construction techniques can be applied to accounting
theory construction.

An effort was made, to demonstrate the use of the

five different types of basic assumptions (objectives, internal
axioms, bridge axioms, internal postulates, and bridge postulates),
the use of theorems, and the use of idealizations in accounting theory
construction.
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One Financial Accounting Objective
The financial accounting measurement theory presented was
built around the following assumed objective of financial accounting:
an objective of financial accounting is to measure the economic value
and changes in the economic value that have occurred in a profitoriented business firm in order to enable investors to predict the
future economic value of the firm.

This objective is only one of

many financial accounting objectives.

It reflects a concept of

accounting similar to the one described in APB Statement No. 4.
The end result of the theory was the following financial
accounting measurement rule that could be used to measure the economic
value of a business firm;
The Financial Accounting Measurement Rule - Assign to every
asset that a given firm controls at a given time the
numeral that represents the current market price of
that asset at that particular time.
The development of this rule is briefly summarized below.

Some Initial Assumptions
The development of the theory commenced with a number of
internal assumptions concerning the existence of business firms
(I.Ax.l), consumers (I.Ax.2), scarce resources (I.Ax.3), purely com
petitive markets (I.Ax.4), and an activity called financial accounting
measurement (I.P.l).

The assumption of purely competitive markets was

an example of an assumption specifying the conditions under which a
theory holds.

All the above assumptions were internal assumptions

because none of the concepts involved were observables.

All were

axioms except the assumption of the activity of financial accounting
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measurement.

It was a postulate because it is an assumption orig

inating within accounting.
Since the assumed objective of financial accounting was aimed
at supplying information that investors could use in predicting the
future value of a business firm (Obj.l), a number of assumptions
regarding prediction were made.
axioms.

All were classified as internal

It was first assumed that man's only source of knowledge

about the future is knowledge about the past (l.Ax.5).

Then, it was

assumed that the more complete man's knowledge of the past, the better
predictor that knowledge is of the future (I.Ax.6),

These assumptions

justify the financial accounting objective of presenting information
on all economic value changes that have occurred.

Current value

accounting presents information on economic value changes as they
occur.

Historical cost-based accounting frequently reports only com

ponent net value increases or component net value decreases.
The objectivity of current value accounting was implied by
three additional internal assumptions.
uncontrollable (I.Ax.7).
are uncontrollable.
assumed (I.Ax.8).
not occur.

One stated that the past is

This means that past economic value changes

Secondly, the uncertainty of the future was
This means that future economic value changes may

Thirdly, the assumption that time is not efficacious

(I.Ax.9) means that economic value changes occur not merely because
of the passage of time hut because of something inherent in the nature
of economic value.
Another internal axiom was then added.

This assumption stated

that there is a reason for everything that exists (I,Ax.10).

Thus,
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there must be a reason why products exist.

This reason was found to

be because ultimately all products produced by man contribute either
directly or indirectly to the attainment of satisfaction by consumers.
Consumer satisfaction is the ultimate product of all economic activity.
The reason business firms exist is that they produce products that
provide satisfaction to consumers.

Economic value must be a property

people give to products.

Assumptions About Consumers and
Business Firms
A number of assumptions about consumers and business firms were
given.

Consumers have unlimited wants and needs (I.Ax.11) but only

finite money incomes available to satisfy their wants and needs
(I.Ax.12).

The intensity of consumer's wants and needs varies

(I.Ax.13).

Thus, the satisfaction a consumer receives from consuming

different products or combinations of products varies.

And since con

sumers maximize the satisfaction they receive from consuming products
(Obj.2), consumers must buy what they value most.
The objective of all business firms is to maximize profits
(Obj.3).
sumers.

Business firms exist ultimately to provide products to con
Thus, the economic value of a business firm is derived from

the business firm's ahility to satisfy the wants and needs of consumers
for products (I.Ax.14).

And the ability of a business firm to produce

a product is derived from the scarce resources under the business
firm's control (I<Ax.15).
Depicting consumers, and business firms as maximizers showed
the use of idealizations.

As such, these objectives describe their
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behavior under purified conditions free from distortions caused by
their other complementing and conflicting objectives.

Maximization

was assumed the dominant objective.

Measuring Economic Value
Economic value is a nonobservable property that people give
to products.

When talking about business firms and consumers, one

is really talking about people.

And the economic valuations of

people are observable in the activity of people buying and selling
products in the market place (B.Ax.1).
After determining how a person’s valuation of a good could be
observed, it was necessary to determine what number should be assigned
to represents economic value.

This number was found to be the market

equilibrium price for a product which is determined by the intersection
of the market supply and the market demand curves for a product.
According to economic theory a supply curve shows the minimum
prices that business firms are willing and able to accept for placing
different quantities of a product on the market.

A firm's supply

curve reflects the firm's business costs which reflect the relative
demand for productive resources which in turn reflects the relative
demand for final products.

The aggregate of all the individual firm

supply curves is the market supply curve.

The market supply curve

reflects a consensus of opinion as to the economic value of a product
by all suppliers of the product,
The market demand curve shows the different quantities of a
product users are willing and able to take off the market at every
different possible price.

These prices represent the maximum unit
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prices users will pay for a given quantity of a product.

Thus, aggre

gate market demand represents a maximum consensus valuation of a pro
duct by all users of that product.
At the intersection of the market demand curve and the market
supply curve, the equilibrium price, there is a balancing of forces.
The equilibrium price represents a consensus valuation of the economic
value of a product by all buyers and sellers of the product.

Since

the equilibrium price is a nonobservable, the following bridge axiom
was needed:
B.Ax.2 - The current market price of a product is an approx
imation of the market equilibrium price of a product.

Financial Accounting Measurement of the
Economic Value of a Business Firm
A method of measuring the economic value of a product was
determined.

This measurement was found to be on a ratio scale.

Then

the use of index numbers is allowed for foreign currency conversions,
for specific price-level adjustments (conversions to current market
prices), and for general price-level adjustments* (corrections for dis
tortions in the measuring unit).

Financial accounting measurement

was also described as fiat measurement which, as Chapter 6 showed, is
a very important in accounting.
Finally, the assumption was added that the total economic value
of a firm is the sum of the individual asset values (B.P.l).

This

assumption was classified as a hridge postulate reflecting its impor
tance in present day accounting theory.

It was also an idealization.

In summary it was shown in Chapters 4 and 5 that the techniques
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of theory construction are applicable to accounting theory con
struction.

Each of the five types of basic assumptions, along with

theorems, idealizations, and explicit definitions, were illustrated
in the theory of financial accounting measurement.

A concept of

financial accounting measurement and business activity was described,
and reduction was used to identify some of the basic assumptions
underlying that concept.

The wide applicability of theory con

struction techniques to accounting theory was shown in Chapter 6.

The Applicability of Theory Construction
Techniques in Financial Accounting
The objective of Chapter 6 was to demonstrate the wide appli
cability of theory construction techniques in accounting by applying
these techniques to a diverse sample of accounting topics.

Topics

were selected from the broad spectrum of financial accounting and
evaluated in light of the techniques of theory construction presented
in Chapters 2 and 3.

This evaluation showed that theory construction

techniques are widely applicable to accounting theory construction.
Aspects of the general topics of materiality and depreciation
accounting were examined first.

Then selected aspects of a number of

specific published works were examined.

These were APB Opinions 15

and 18, Leftwich's criticism of Chambers' rationality and homeostasis
assumptions, and some of the ARS Nos. 1 and 3 assumptions and prin
ciples.

An attempt was, made to supply any unstated.assumptions

omitted in the areas examined.

Materiality and Depreciation Accounting
First, the techniques of theory construction were applied to
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materiality and depreciation accounting.

Internal and bridge assump

tions that might be found in a specific aspect of each theory were
stated.

Theorems were derived.

In the case of materiality two

alternative bridge assumptions were stated and contrasted.

One

involved fiat measurement and the other was based on an empirically
determined measurement.

In the depreciation accounting example only

fiat measurement was involved.
since they accounted
factors.

Both examples employed idealizations

for only what was thought to be major causal

Distorting influences thought to be insignificant were

ignored.

APB Opinions 15 and 18
Aspects of two APB Opinions were examined;

Opinion 15 on

earnings per share and Opinion 18 on the equity method of accounting
for common stock investments.
their key assumptions.

In both cases the APB omitted some of

In Opinion 15 the APB stated an internal

assumption and a theorem but did not state the bridge assumption
they used.

This apparent bridge assumption that the APB used was

supplied by this author.
assumption.

In Opinion 18 the APB stated only a bridge

The connecting internal assumption and the resulting

theorem were both supplied by this writer.
measurement.

Both cases involved fiat

Idealizations appeared to have been used properly.

It

was concluded that the APB and its successor, fhe Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASR), should attempt to state all their major
assumptions and provide a narrative description of their reasoning
process giving rise to their assumptions.
orated on later in this chapter.

This conclusion is elab--
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Two Criticisms of Chambers' Accounting,
Evaluation and Economic Behavior
Leftwich's criticisms of Chambers' assumptions of rationality
and homeostasis in his book Accounting, Evaluation and Economic
Behavior were examined next.

Both assumptions were internal axioms.

The assumption of rationality was borrowed from economic theory.

Since

rationality appears to be fairly well established in economic theories,
Leftwich's criticism seems to be incorrect, and rationality is a proper
use of an idealization.

Of course, if rationality is subsequently

proven false, then Leftwich's criticism would be valid.
The assumption of homeostasis was borrowed from psychology.
Leftwich pointed out that homeostasis was not generally accepted in
psychology because it was thought to be empirically false.

Thus,

Leftwich's criticism of Chambers' homeostasis assumptions appears to
be correct and homeostasis was an improper use of an idealization.

Moonitz's Basic Assumptions of Accounting
Finally two principles from Sprouse and Moonitz's Accounting
Research Study No. 3 "A Tentative Set of Broad Accounting Principles
for Business Enterprises" were examined.

The ARS No. 3 principles

were supposed to be based on the assumptions developed by Moonitz in
Accounting Research Study No. 1 , "The Basic Postulates of Accounting."
In both, cases examined the ARS No. 1 assumptions were insufficent to
derive the ARS No. 3 principles.

Also, one statement called a cor

ollary by Moonitz was actually a theorem.
he called the "problem oriented" approach.

Moonitz had followed what
In reality, this was the

deductive or axiomatic approach which Moonitz mistakenly had rejected.

237
Moonitz had rejected the axiomatic approach because he thought
it was not capable of application in the real world.

In every case

examined the assumptions that Moonitz stated were internal assumptions.
Bridge assumptions had to be supplied in order to derive the ARS No. 3
principles.

Since it is bridge assumptions that allow a theory to be

applied in the real world, Moonitz's assumptions, in the areas examined,
could not be applied in the real world.
Thus, the techniques of theory construction are applicable to
accounting theory construction.

However, these techniques have not

been adequately applied in previous accounting research.

This and

other conclusions are elaborated on in the final section of this study.

Conclusions and Implications for Accounting Research
This study has demonstrated that the techniques of theory con
struction are applicable in accounting theory construction.
been demonstrated in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.

This has

This important conclusion

has significant implications for future accounting research.

Basic Assumption Studies
Attempts at specifying the basic assumptions underlying the
accounting discipline span a period of over fifty years.

Moonitz's

Accounting Research Study No. 1 , "The Basic Postulates of Accounting,"
identified concepts similar to those traditionally considered the basic
assumptions of accounting.

But is was clearly seen from the exam

ination of several principles from Accounting Research Study No, 3
that the assumptions Moonitz identified were not all the basic assump
tions of accounting:

In both cases where ARS No. 3 principles were

238
examined, the ARS No. 1 assumptions were not sufficient to derive
the ARS No. 3 principles.

However, in both cases assumptions were

added demonstrating these principles could be derived.
Both assumptions added by this researcher were bridge postu
lates.

Moonitz's omission of bridge assumptions is especially

revealing.

Bridge assumptions tie the nonobservable concepts of a

theory to observable reality.

Thus, it is the bridge assumptions

that permit a theory to be tested and applied in the real world.

The

assumptions examined in ARS No. 1 were insufficient to allow
Moonitz's theory to be applied in the real world.
Moonitz did not study the nature of basic assumptions.

He

simply accepted the description of basic assumptions implied in pre
vious studies on the basic assumptions of accounting.

Had Moonitz

and these other accounting researchers studied the nature of basic
assumptions, they would have discovered the need for bridge assump
tions in theory construction.

Accounting Research Studies Nos. 1

and 3 and much of the previous research on the basic assumptions of
accounting might have been more useful to the accounting profession.

Overambitious Attempts at Theory Construction
Moonitz and similar studies (see pages 2 and 3) that attempted
to determine the basic assumptions of all of accounting were overambitious.

Accounting is a very broad discipline.

It consists of all

the axioms, postulates, and objectives of all the theories that are
generally accepted in accounting.

It is highly unlikely that all the

basic assumptions of accounting could be named in any one study.
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Axioms
In this study the assumptions borrowed from other disciplines
and applied in accounting theory construction are called "axioms."
The ARS No. 1 assumptions given by Moonitz hardly touched on the axioms
of accoutning.
assumptions.

For example, no reference is made to logic in Moonitz's
Does this mean that accountants do not use logic?

course not, Moonitz's list is merely incomplete.

Of

Other obvious areas

omitted from Moonitz's list include, for example, axioms of arithmetic,
measurement theory, communications theory, ethics, and human behavior.
The interdisciplinary aspect

of accounting is apparent.

The account

ing discipline cannot be fully developed without assumptions in these
and other areas.

Objectives
Objectives along with the axioms and postulates serve to give
direction to a discipline.

Objectives help to delimit and implicitly

define what is the domain of accounting.
be posed:

The following question might

Should accountants attempt to determine all the objectives

of the accounting discipline?

In light of the preceding discussion

this author must answer no.
The objectives of accounting should be determined on a theory
by theory basis.

As seen in the preceding discussion, accounting is

a large discipline.
within accounting.

It is. composed of all theories generally accepted
For this same reason it is unlikely that all the

accounting axioms and postulates could be determined.

It is also

unlikely that all the accounting objectives could be determined.
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Accounting is simply too large a discipline.

Objectives Change
The accounting discipline is constantly exposed to new dis
coveries both in accounting itself and in other disciplines.

The

expectations of society regarding accounting, as evidenced by the
demands society places on accounting, are also changing.

The

objectives of accounting change in response to these influences.
Even if it would be possible to determine all the objectives
of accounting, this may not be desirable.

Instead of acting as a

stimulus, such a list of objectives could act as a constraint on future
accounting research by excluding certain areas from accounting.
Reflecting on the preceding discussion, it is evident that in
an absolute sense the accounting basic assumptions are not few in
number.

In reality, there are many basic assumptions of accounting

without which the accounting discipline cannote be adequately
developed.

Unrealistic Theories
Theories are sometimes criticized for being unrealistic or
for being incomplete descriptions of a concept.

The discussion in

this study regarding idealizations has important insight concerning
these criticisms.
Idealizations are frequently employed in theory construction
in the sciences and social sciences.

The real world is too complex

to be fully described in any theory.

What a theorist attempts to

do is to identify only the most significant causal factors that
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account for the concept examined.

This involves ignoring many dis

torting influences which the theorist believes are insignificant
individually and as a group when compared to the significant factors
accounted for in a theory.

The factors accounted for in a theory are

empirically true under highly purified conditions free from all rela
tively insignificant distorting influences.
Criticisms of theories for being unrealistic because they
employ idealizations in the above way are invalid.
an adequate

job

Such theories do

of describing, explaining, and predicting.

On the

other hand, if the factors described in a theory fail to describe the
concept because the idealized descriptions are empirically false, then
these idealizations are not acceptable for use in theory construction.

A Deductive Framework for Accounting Theory
This study has provided accounting with a deductive theory
structure.

Accounting literature has long reflected the deductive

approach in narrative discussions.

This study takes this approach one

further step and requires that such discussions ultimately be refor
mulated as deductive systems in which all basic assumptions are
explicitly stated.

The systemization of a discipline offered by the

deductive approach along with its other concomitant advantages should
result in the more rapid and efficient development of accounting
theory.
Implicit in the deductive approach is the deductive framework.
Thus, the theory structure of accounting could be diagramed as shown
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in Figure 1.

Theorems

Basic Assumptions

Figure 1
The Structure of Accounting Theory

Source:
Original.

Figure 1 could represent the structure of a single accounting theory
or the entire accounting discipline.

In the latter case the structure

is more properly viewed as many theories with overlapping basic
assumptions and theorems.

As previously discussed, the basic assump

tions are not few in number.

But relative to the larger number of

derived theorems, the basic assumptions might be considered "few in
number."

Future Research in Accounting
The era of research started in 1957 at the suggestion of Alvin
Jennings is drawing to a close.

The Accounting Principles Board, which

has contributed significantly to accounting theory development, is
currently being replaced this year (1973) with a full time body, the
Financial Accounting Standards Board.

The FASB will continue and

expand the efforts of the APB in attacking current problem areas in
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accounting.

Should the FASB fail in its efforts, the result could be

governmental control of accounting.

Ongoing Theoretical Research
The Opinions issued by the APB and its successor, the FASB,
represent ongoing theoretical research within the accounting profes
sion.

This research is especially important because of its influence

on current accounting practice.
are being constructed.

In this research accounting theories

The Board is not espousing alternative

accounting theories; they are determining what is generally accepted
accounting theory.

The assumptions on which the Board's Opinions are

based are part of the basic assumptions of accounting.
Selected parts of two APB Opinions, Opinions 15 and 18, were
examined in Chapter 6.

Not all the Board's assumptions were stated.

But bridge assumptions were either

stated explicitly or implicitly

implied enabling these Opinions to be applied to accounting practice.
Both bridge assumptions involved fiat measurement.
The materiality example in Chapter 6 showed that bridge
assumptions could be based on empirical measurements or on fiat meas
urements.

Bridge assumptions based on empirical measurements are

empirically confirmable.

Empirical tests are conducted to increase

one's confidence in empirically based bridge assumptions by providing
additional positive confirmations.

Though such, tests can never prove

assumptions true, they do serve as additional evidence.
Since fiat measurement is measurement by arbitrary stipulation
or convention, bridge assumptions based on fiat measurements are also
arbitrary.

It would be only coincidental if empirical tests exactly
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confirmed bridge assumptions based on fiat measurements. Empirical
testing of fiat measurements is undertaken not to confirm such meas
urements.

Rather, empirical testing is employed to determine empir

ical measurements.

Thus * fiat measurements are refined into empir

ically determined measurements that one is confident enough to give
the status of "laws.”

Implications for Research by the FASB
In its future research efforts the FASB should strive to
develop bridge assumptions based on empirical measurements.

This

should represent a major research effort by the FASB and its research
staff.

But gathering sufficient empirical evidence for bridge

assumptions takes time.

And the FASB cannot always afford to delay

the issuance of opinions until such empirical evidence is collected.
One major criticism of the APB was that it took too long to issue
some opinions.

If this criticism applies to the FASB, they run the

risk of Congress, the courts, and the SEC stepping in and legislating
accounting theory.
Until sufficient empirical evidence can be gathered, the FASB
should continue, as the APB has done in Opinions 15 and 18, to
develop accounting principles on a theory by theory basis through the
use of fiat measurements.

These fiat measurements should be based on

the hest informed judgment available at the time, supplemented by
whatever empirical evidence is available.

As an efficient method for

obtaining this informed judgment, the FASB should continue the pro
cedures started by the APB of holding public hearings and circulating
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exposure drafts of proposed opinions to all interested parties.

Fiat

measurements based on such group judgment draws on the knowledge and
experience of practicing accountants, business representatives, govern
ment representatives, accounting educators, and others.
Though dissents from FASB opinions probably can never be
eliminated, giving consideration to the opinions of all interested
parties can help to reduce criticism of the FASB,

Drawing on the

knowledge and experience of these groups, hopefully, would increase
the likelihood that the fiat measurements would approximate future
empirical measurements.

The Refining Process
After each FASB opinion involving fiat measurement is issued,
the FASB's research staff and other accounting researchers should
attempt to empirically refine these fiat measurements.

Then this

empirical evidence can be used to justify making any needed changes
in the FASB opinions.

This empirical refining process should not

be delayed because there is the danger that accounting assumptions
determined by fiat could become permanent.
Undoubtedly, the refining process may take considerable time.
Many tests of a set of assumptions will be necessary before the
accounting profession is satisfied to call them "laws” of accounting.
But this is a goal of sciences— to discover the regularities of nature.
And until sufficient evidence is collected to enable accountants to
give their assumptions the status of "laws," criticisms of those
assumptions will continue.
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An Integration With Knowledge in
Other Disciplines
Much of the refinement process will involve integrating
accounting assumptions (postulates) with assumptions (axioms) from
other disciplines.

For example, consider the empirically based

bridge assumption in the materiality example from Chapter 6.

That

empirical test drew on knowledge from psychology, specifically the
area of

psychophysics.

Fechner law.

Heavy reliance was placed on the Weber-

Should accounting ultimately adopt an empirical measure

of materiality based on this law, then the Weber-Fechner law would
represent an accounting axiom.
In some cases the process of refining fiat measurements may
have to await theoretical advances in other disciplines.

Other

refinements, such as the materiality example, can be made with present
knowledge.

In the future, accounting researchers will almost have to

specialize in particular non-accounting areas such as psychology,
mathematics, communications theory, logic, measurement theory, and
theory construction.

Otherwise, existing knowledge in these areas

could go unnoticed.
Accountants cannot expect researchers in other areas to search
out and apply their expert knowledge to accounting problem areas.
Accountants do not necessarily have to be experts in these other
areas.

But they must be able to recognize when existing knowledge and

new discoveries, made in other disciplines, can be applied in accounting
theory construction.

In-depth, knowledge can be provided by researchers

from these other disciplines working under the direction of accounting
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researchers.

FASB Formalization Efforts
What degree of formalization should the FASB strive for in
their opinions (theories)?

Rudner stated in Chapter 3 (page 72) that

requiring full formalization of new theories is too rigid a require
ment.

Overemphasis on full formalization may be detrimental to

other goals of theory construction such as implementing and testing
a theory.

Implementing FASB theories could mean using the theory to

make predictions or using the theory to eliminate unsound accounting
practices.
The major effort of the FASB should be directed at attempting
to solve current accounting problems.

Extensive efforts by the FASB

at refining their theories would only delay their work on other
important problem areas.

The FASB should attempt to state all the

major assumptions underlying their opinions.
indicating their reasoning

A narrative explanation

should also be provided. Based on this

other researchers can concentrate

on rigorously reformulating the

FASB opinions as deductive theories.
Attempts at reformulating the existing APB Opinions as
deductive theories should begin immediately.

As each new problem

area is examined, the FASB

should first examine theassumptions under

lying previous Opinions, to

see if these assumptions can contribute to

the solution of other accounting problems.

Gradually, as more assump

tions are explicitly recognized, other accounting problem areas may be
partially and, hopefully, fully solved by the application of pre
viously determined accounting assumptions.

This approach would
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eliminate any needless duplication of effort in accounting research.
Alsoj accounting would be less likely to yield inconsistent theories.
A list of the basic assumptions of accounting would be gradually
compiled.

And these assumptions would gradually be developed to

their logical ends.

Such a list of assumptions would be open-ended.

In summary, future research by the FASB should proceed on a
theory by theory basis.

As new problem areas and challenges are

encountered, such as accounting for a business firm's contribution to
society, accounting research should be undertaken to determine what,
if any, are the objectives of accounting in that new area.

Once

determined, these objectives would serve to direct the accounting
theory construction efforts at determining the axioms and postulates
of accounting in these areas.
Where empirical measurements are lacking, fiat measurements
should be used to determine the bridge assumptions which will link
nonobservable aspects of theories to observable ones.

This should be

followed by empirical studies aimed at determining empirical meas
urements that can be used to refine the fiat measurements.
Precious research funds should not be expended on attempts to
list the basic assumptions of all of accounting.

After many theories

of accounting have been well-constructed, accountants can look to the
assumptions in these theories and then identify some of the basic
assumptions of accounting.

This researcher is confident that great

advances in accounting theory construction can be made through the use
of the theory construction techniques described in this study.
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